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GOVERNME~T

CHAJ?TER I
The scope and aim of our investigation is the presentation
of an organized or systematic view of Brownson's political
philosophy.

This includes particularly the argumentation

whereby Brownson supports his conclusions.

This task requires

one to sift the pertinent material from the multitude of
articles on _;_)oli tical to·pic s penned ·oy this :;Jrolific writer
1

from 1838 to 1875.
Orestes Brownson was a professional reviewer.
touched upon every im?ortant issue of his day.

As such he

In his

commentaries he strove to analyze his subjects carefully, to
delve into the basic princiyles involved.

So it is that in

his observations on contemporary political problems, he frequently transcended immediate issues to enter the realm of
:yhilosophy.
Since Brownson's discussions were 9rom:pted by current
issues, it is difficult to comprehend and. to evalurte his
political philosophy without noting specifically the :Jroblems
1 His ·,vritings fill twenty large volumes which have been
collected and arranged by his son. Henry :h1 • Bro-vvnson, The
;forks of Orestes A. Bxovmson, Detroit, 1882-1887. Citations

hereafter are to the volun1e and page of these works.

i

p:u
that prompted it.

However, detailed biographical information is

not pertinent to the topic treated, and is furthermore unnecessary because of comparatively recent biographies which are
2

readily accessible.

Therefore it seems advisable to indicate

briefly the salient features of his life and times, selecting
only information that is helpful, and even necessary, for an
understanding of Brovnson's position.

2

Doran i1halen(Sister Rose Gertrude /Jhalen, C.S.C.}, Granite for
God's House, Hew York, 1941; .Arthur I~I. Schlesinger, Jr.,
Orestes A. Bro·wnson: A .Pilgrim_'s Progress, Boston, 1939;
Theodore llaynard, Orestes Brownson- Yankee, Radical, Catholic
Hew York, 1943. It is helpful to know that these-biographies
are based largely urJon a three volume life of Brownson by his
son, Henry F. Brownson, who reprints most of the imgortant
letters sent and re'Jeived by his father. Orestes A. Brownson' I
Early Life, Middle Life, Later Life, Detroit, 1898-1900.
·
It omits letters which are _purely oersonal, such as Brownson's
quarrels with his family and his indulgence in intoxicating
beverages in his old age. Schlesinger's work is gerhaps the
most helpful, although his treatment of the period immediately
prior to Brownson's death appears slightly misleading. The
work of '1lhalen is confessedly pro-Brownson, to such a degree
that it is inaccurate, as is indic:.:;ted clearly by ~Vilfred
Parsons, S.J., "Brownson, Hecker, and Hewit," Catholic World,
(1941), CLIII, 396-408. Maynard adds information concerning
Brownson es a Catholic omitted by Schlesinger, and with
considerable flourish indicates defects in #halen's study.

•
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Orestes A. Brownson was born in Stockbridge, Vermont, on
3

september 16, 1803. His parents were Sylvester and Relief Metcalf Brownson.

Sylvester died shortly after the birth of Oreste

and his twin, Daphne Augusta.

The boy was one of six children.

wnen he was six years old his mother, unable to continue the
support of bmr family, placed Orestes with an aged couple in the
town of Royalton where he was reared.
The people with whom he lived were New England Congrega4

tionalists. Brownson says that they treated him with great
kindness and affection.

However, he led a rather isolated

existence:
Properly speaking I had no childhood • • • •
Brought up with old people, and debarred
from ~11 the sports, plays, and amusements
of children, I had the manners, the tone,
and tastes of an old man before I was a
boy. A sad misfortune.
5
Because of his environment Brownson was free to devote a
great part of his time to reading, an accomplishment he
achieved at an ec"rly age.

He read whatever was available,

3 The brief account of Brownson's life given in this chapter is
based, for the most part, on Brownson's autobiography, The
Convert, V, 1-200.
--4 They did not attend the services of this congregation because
its meeting :place was too far from their residence. V, 7.
5 V, 4.

•
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although this was comparatively little. He was interested particularly in the Scriptures and eSpecially in tbe Passion.

Thus he

says that his reading Yvas confined " ••• principally to the
Scriptures, all of v~ich I had read before I was eight, and a
great part of which I knew by heert before I was fourteen years
7

old.n
He recounts an incident at the age of nine which gives us
an insight into the temperament which cha.racterized both his
youth and maturity.

He tells us that he was permitted to

accompany a much older boy to the square at Toyalton ••• to witness a muster, or general training
of a brigade or militia. On returning home, I
was asked what I had seen to interest me. I
answered that I had seen two old men talking
on religion. In fact, I was so much interested
in their discussion that I quite forgot the
soldiers, Shough I came of a military family,
and almost forgot to eat my card of gingerbread.
The discussion, I remember, w~~s on free-will
·
and election, and I actually took part in it,
stoutly maintaining free-will against Edwards,
who confounds volition with judgement....

8

This incident indicates that Brownson possessed a rather

6 "Our family librt::~ry consisted of a .:.:'rotesta.nt version of the
Scriptures, a London edition; /latt's Psr,lms and Divine Songs,
and The Franklin .Primer, to v.h ich viere subsequently [~.dded
Edward 1 s History of Redemption; Davies's Sermons; a History of
the Indian ~aars by Dr. S"anders ••• , a muliila ted copy oi·
Pnilip Q,uarle, ••• and during the wer of 1812 with Great
Britain, a weekly newspaper, published in ;'lindsor by Alden
Spooner." V, 4-5.
7
8

v' 5.
v' 5.

ptt

v
unusual aptitude for becoming involved in t:;,rguments.

He

mentions also that he possessed this inclination in common with
a fiery temper: "I had an irritable temper, and was subject to
violent outbreaks of passion, but I tried hard to control myself

... and,

till I was man grown, I do not believe I ever suffered
9

the sun to go down upon my ·wrath."

The incident indicates

further the primacy which matters pertaining to religion and
controversy

occu~ied

in the life of Brownson.

In fact anything

as mundane as a card of gingerbread remained of secondary
10
importance tr~oughout his life.
As has been noted, Brownson refers to his lack of childhood
companionship as a sad misfortune.

tlliile it undoubtedly was

such in the sense that it deprived him of something, it also
encouraged his tendency to medit9te upon scriptural passages,
' of the Passion •
and especially upon the accounts

And while his

solitude w&s due in part to circumstances over which he had no
control, it

9

w~:ts

also partially voluntEry.

Thus he says:

V, 6. It seems that Brownson g2,ve way to his temper rather

frequently, but es)ecially in the heat of an argument. Of.,
for e7oB.mple, the following in which Schlesinger, 153,
describes Brownson's visits to Brook Farm: "The star·ry
optimism of the dwellers frequently stirred him to debate
where, argument failing, he sought to overawe by sheer
physical massiveness, raising his voice, pounding on the
table, and givmng ·Nay to anger when his op:9onents failed to
grasp his point."
10 Maynard, 282-283, notes th:s,t Brownson was distressed financially at rather frequent interV[\lS. He attributes this not
to Bro1mson's lack of sh~ewdness in managing finances, but to
· the fact that they were not su c'fici ently imp or tan t to
receive a great deal of his time and attention.

p;;

Vi

Sometimes I seemed to hold lon~ familiL.r
conversations with him rchrist] and was deeply
pained when anything occurred to interrupt
them. Sometimes, also, I seemed to hold a
spiritual intercourse with the Blessed Mary,
and with the holy angel Gabriel, who had ,
announced to her that she was to be the mother
of the Redeemer. I was rarely less alone than
when alone • • • • I :!)referred to be alone, for
then I could taste the sweets of silent meditation, and feel that I was in the presence of
Jesus and Mary, and the holy angels; yet I had
not been baptized, and had very little instruction
except such as I had obtained from reading the
Holy Scriptures.
11
·~vhile

Brownson had no particular instruction in religion he

frequently attended the meetings of the various sects which were
held in the vicinity.

These inal ud.ed the Methodists, Baptists,

Universalists and Christians.

He could discover no difference

in their respe 'Jti ve doctrines, but he prefer red the Methodist
preachers

bec~use

they

••• apiJe~c·red to have the stronger lungs; they
preached in a louder tone, and when they
pre:c ched the pe01)le shouted more. I thought
them the best, bec~use they made tile most
noise, and gave the most vivid pictu:res of
hell-fil'e, and the tortu.res of the damned.
All I lea1·ned, ho i7ever, ±·rom v.i ther was, that
I must be born again or go to hell, get religion
or be damned. The more I listened to them, the
more I feared hell, and. the less I loved God.
At the age of fourteen he left his gue.rd.ians.

12

His mother

took him, along 'iiith the re:::r'c of the family, to B&.llston Spa,
in Hev.r York.

He earned his livelihood by \,'or king iE. a ·::?rinter'
---····--------··---·----------

11
12

v,

v'

6.
7.

a

V:Ll

office.

:C:e also attenued c:.n acad.emy in the vi::dnity, but only
13
for a very brief period.
His stay at the academy marked the
beginning and end of his formal e<iucation.

During this :period

he retained his inte1:est in religion, but he was ex)osed to many
conflicting theol"ies.
deists.

He encounte:ced atheists, Univers&.lists,

lie mind became confused.

The nore he trusted his

reason, the further it led him :from religion.

Yet _he felt the

need of religion.

He vms in a ;>osition which necessitated a
14
At the age of nineteen he
choice betvleen 1·eason and religion.

decided in favor of religion.

He says that he vtas p&ssing a

Presbyterian meeting house on a llleasant September day, entered
it, and ·1tas deeply
Sunday he
15
gat ion.

~·1as

o~ffe-cted

by the services.

The following

baytized and received as a member of the congre-

His life as a Presbyterian was not very agreeable.

After

attending his first meeting on the dry after his ba:::>tism, he
realized he had made a mistc.ke.

The account of his "Presbyter-

13 The ex::o.ct extent of Browns on's forrnal education is urJ.kno\m.
Schlesinger, 7, mentions that "••· he briefly attended a
a neighboring academy, probably until his earnings ran out ••.
Brownson says he was attending school at the age of nineteen,
but does not indicate his age at enrollment. V, 10. l!aynard,
12, n. 13, gives a reo.,r3onabie explanation: "••• After Orestes
had exhausted his savings, he worked as a 1n·inter, and then,
having ear ned enough, resumed his studies." The only thing
certain in regard to Brownson's formal education is that it
was brief.
14 v' 9.

15

v,

10.

1

a

viii
ian Ex:1erienae" in The Convert desc:cibes the )articular congre16-·
gation he joined. It also describes his
17
Presbyterianism in its doctrines.
His position was a painful
one.

He endured his torments for two years.

he anBlyzed his position.
autho1·itative teacher.

During this time

He had abandoned reason for an

In Presbyterianism he found no authority

It directed him to the Bible, asking him to read it with a
prayerful mind.

Thus it disclaimed all responsibility as an

authoritative teacher.

Brownson

immedi~;tely

detected an ,unfair-

ness in this attitude:
But while the Church refused to t~e the
res,)onsibili ty of telling me -what dootrine I
must believe, while she s ;nt me to the bible
and grivate judgment, she yet claimed authority

16 Schlesinger, 10-11, notes that his descri?tion on this point
is exaggerated. He object~=, for example, wben Brovvnson says
that the member-' of the Oongregetion v:ere bound to watch over
one another ·Ni th fraternal affection. Brownson says that "I
was not long in discovering that this meant that we were eac
to be a spy upon the others, and to rebuke, admonish, or report them to the .Session. My whole life became constrained.
I dared not trust myself in the presence of a chDxch member,
to a single s2ont&-neous .emotion. I dared not S?3 ak in my
natural tone of voice, and if I smiled, I expected to be
reported." V, 12.
17 The descri•)tion of his own state of mind may be, and undoubt
edly is, accurEcte, even though it is exaggerated in regard t
the ~oarticulEr congregation he joined. It has been noted
that Brownson joined the congregation on the s:9ur of the mom
ent. Consequently he ..,-n:;s unsY:are of his incompatibility with
Presbyter ian ism. Further more, he was in t:~n extremely disturb d
!lt~;te of mind drawn between rationality or reason and
religion.
T!'king all these factors into consideration one
may easily believe that Brovmson v:as rrther nervous about
the entire situ2.tion E.nd conseq_:eetly s~1eaks the truth when
he s<>.ys that his v:hole life ·:·as constr::dned.

•

ix
to condemn and excommunicate me as a heretic
if I departed from the standard of doctrine
contained in her confession.

18

Having become more keenly aware of his position, Brovmson
realized very vividly that he had made a mistake in abandoning
his rec::son.

.l!'or if he denied it, or looked upon it as unworthy

of his confidence, he would be as though he v1ere vvi thout it.
conseq~ently

he would be no better than an ox or an ass.

There-

fore he v1ould be qualified no beti7er than an ox or an ass to
determine whether God exists or has made a revelation. Furthermore, an ass could not receive a revelation even on the supposition that God exists and has made one.

So he decided that to

revoke reason as he had done was a ncowardly act, the act of an
19

intellectual des1)eredo."

Hereafter he vvould trust his reason.

He would never s.gain abendon it.
wluch contradicted it.

He would not believe anything

Brownson made this decision at the age

18 V, 13. Brown son cent inue s the same trend of thought. "This I

rded as unfEir treatment. It subjected me to all the dis
advantages of authority ~vithout'any of its advantages. The
church demanded that I should tre~::t her as a true mother,
vvhile she v.cas free to treat me only as a ste gs on, or even as
a stranger. Be one thing or another, said I; either assume
the authority and responsibility of teaching and directing
me, or leave me with the responsibility and my freedom. If
you have authority from ~od, avow it, and exercise it. I am
all subwission. I will hold what you say, and do what you
bid. If you have not, then say so, and fSorbear to c.<.:Lll me to
an account for differing ~rom you, or disregarding your teach
ings. Bither bind me or loose me. Do not mock me with a
freedom which is no freedom, or vii th an authority which is
ill·usory. n V, 13-14.
reg~

19

v,

18.

p
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of twenty one.

He says of it that ,it marks the beginning of his
20
intellectual life.
After severing connections with Presbyterianism Brownson

also left New York in order to teach at Detroit.

Some;,time

after arriving there he became a victim of malaria.
seriously ill that,he was not exyected to recover.

He

w~s

so

He was con-

fined to his room during the latter part of 1824 and the early
21

part of the following year.

During his illness he turned his
22

attention toward Universalism.
Vermont.

After his recovery he returned t

He applied for and received a letter of fellowship as

a oreacher, and was formally ordained an Evangelist during the
-

23

summer of 1826.
]

1

ollowing his ordination Brownson returned to Uew York. He

lived and preached su(Jcessi vely in Fort Anne, Whitehall, Licht24
field, Ithaca, Geneva and Auburn. This period of his career is

20 v, 19.
21 Brownson does not mention these facts in The Convert;_ he refers to them briefly in XV, 284-285.
2:2

Bro~vnson bec.~:,me

interested in Universalisrn thra»ugh his

mother's sister who gave him some literature on the subject
v;hen he was ,',bout fifteen. He had read some of it before he
was a Presbyteriz~n. iJhile it <''roused his interest it did nat
convince him. But, after rejecting Presbyterianism, Brownson
says " ••• I -vvEs necess~uily forced O[HJk on tbe point whence
it had taken me up, vt. . .en I believeQ., so far as I believed anything, the doctrine of Universalism. 11 V, 26. Thus it was
quite nt: tural for him to study Universalism more intensely
afte1· rejecting Presbyterianism. V, 20-28.

23

24

v,
v,

30.

31.

•

xi
importcnt for tvro reasons: In 1827 he mar1·i ed Sally Healy.
also marks the beginning of his career as

~writer.

It

He wrote

articles for The Gos)el Advocate and Iml)artia.!_Inyestigator, and
became its editor in 1828. Brownson describes his connection
with the magazine:
I had written a good deal for the :periodical
vwrhile at Ithaca, had chu..rge of it during the
absence of its editor, and had acquired through
its pae:e s considerable reputb. tion as a \lri t er
••• I conducted it for a year, but with more
credit to my free, bold and crude thinking,
than to my piety or orthodoxy even as a Universalist.
·
Brownson saon became dissatisfied with Universalism.
was unrea:3onable.

25

It

Somewhat untactfully for a minister he ex-

nressed his doubts openly, not only in regard to Universalism
but in regE,rd to Ohristie..:.1ity.
patible.
of the

He c..:nd Universalism were incom-

His own brief deS31'i.!tion is ag£1-in cited as indict:ctive

temp~.eament

character·istic of Brovmson.

But with these doubts hf,nging over me, it -,·;e.s
clear th2·t I could not, as an honest man, present
myself before the 1:.ublic t:.s a Ohri stian minister.
It is true I did not ~-.-ri"ce or L)reach differently
from wh: t I tho"L~ght and felt ••••
But, al thou:)i I 1vas beginning to acquire a
)rominent •!osition in the denomination, I felt that
I out to 1:;a ve it. I could not consent to )l'O fess
vvhat I did not honestly believe ••••
I v,'::cnted the t1·u th, Hould. 1 ;b or for it, har d.e::·
than most men perhb.llS, but never to sto~1 ';:ith its
mere a:;)rehension or bar1·en contem)lE~tion. r.:y
dis)or;ition 7:as practict..l rE.the::.· than S::_-Jecul<:tive. 26

25
{26

v'
v.

~32.

38-39.

•
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Clhis somevrh.at; det; iled ox o;:li "vi on of his ea1·ly life indicates Bro',mson as a man ·aho

YlEcf:>

im::;;uL3i ve, as evidenced by his
Once in a position he

su6.d.en entre.nce into l'resbyteri;:mism.
e:::mminecl it Very care fully •

l'hus he cLevelO)ed a power of

1

ancclysis- of stripping en issue of &nything extrei:nsic.
.2res·uyter i enism he
f' ind it.

1:~n teO.

an c:.ut hor

it~ti ve

In

teacher; he did not

Anything else . as merely embellishment.

Br ov1nson was

interested in one issue at one time: i.e., in concentr::."ting
v)on one sicte of it to the e:z:clusion o :f evel·ything not explicitly f,d

~·

..-..s a v:ri ter and a lecturer he v-1as, as incii ca ted, bold and .
free; he •:as also cr ud.e in the sense that he lacked s1:;.btlety or
·9olieh.

He had a fiery temper.

He

\'iCS

im~1rudent

in his

utter:nces, h<ving little regd'cl ::or the consoqur.;nces ensuing
fror::1 v:hrt he ::;aid.

He loved trv.th.

He vmnted to convey it to

others, to defen6. it against any and all comers.

As a man

writing bolclly and '.'tr i ting to defend his stands he w·as pre sen ted
vri th innumer 9-lbe occasions for develo ling his talents as a
controversialist.
This brusque, inde:::mndent inciiviclual continued his searah
for truth after abc:.. ndonine,: Uni ver ':ali sm.

He

becc~me

~

tt.:1.ched to

many movements for reform, such as thr:t of Robert Dale

O'~nen.

He

J?l'e8ched and vv'rote as an inde:::1endent mini::;ter, became a Unitari~n

minister, and was associeted with the transcendentalists.

His account of these experiences is given in his Convert, and is
also st::ted in some detail in the biograghies already cited.

Xll1

In his search for truth he read vvba t ms.y be referred to
conveniently <:?.s the ordinary works on religious and philosophi-:cal questions in which he vias interested.
.Protestants, and not having encountered the

Being reared among
,.~orks

of the

scholastics, he read, among others, the 1vorks of Locke, Reid,
~erkely,

Hume and Godwin. ~uite naturally he was influenced by
27
the men he 1·ee.d.
Some of the :rhilosophe rs famous in the day

were Jl'rench.

With the help of a dictionary Brovmso.11 vn s able

to read_ the v1orks of Pierre Leroux and Victor Cousin, both of
28
whom confessedly influenced him a great deal. ~Vhile Brownson
wE

s by no means an ac.:}om-Jlished linguist, he vn s able to acquire

a knowledge of sever&l other langu ges, including German, Spanish and

Itt~lian.

The most prominent of the Germans, Kant, and
29

later the Itr..lian, Gioberti, s.lso influenaed Bro>rmson.
now it hes been noted that these .:..len infJimenaed Brownson.
The way in v;hich they influenaed. him india cJ te s, as exaatly as
that is :possible, the nat-l1:ce of the man whose poli tiat::.,l philoso

27 V, 124. The ;:iork of John Riedl traces the influenae of these
men on Bro 'i\nson in a am·sory manner. "The Life and :::'hilosophy of Orestes Brownson,n doctoral dissertEtion, l,Iarquette
University, 1930.
28 V, 125-130; I, 215.
29 Even )rior to his conversion Brownson ap:precis_ ted the fact
that Kant and Catholicism are incomg::tible. Wnile he
labored to refute him, Kant exerted considerable influence
over Brownson. I, 130-313. Cf., Lavv-rence hoemer, "Bro;vnson
2s a Critic of Kant,n I·.:Issters Thesis, Loyola University,
1941.

p

x:iv
phy is to be investigDted, as v1ell as the terms in vlhiah his
thought is expressed.
It seems that Brownson aaae:yted, for examl;le, the view of
30

Leroux and Gioberti, in much the same way that he accepted
.Presbyterianism.

He vvc1s always desperate for truth.

He accepte

very eagerly whatever these men said that seemed to him to be
ree.sonable.

Having accepted it, he v;ould anaJ..yze his position

carefully.

Usually he found that something they said was true,

at least in some 2ense, and something was false.

The truth must

be tetained and the error rejected.
Having

investig,~.ted

these men, absorbed what they said,

Brov;nson adopted their terminology.
the formula of Gioberti,

~ns

Cr_ea.t

He says, for exam:Qle, that
~xistentias,

is true aon31

fessedly not as Gioberti holds it, but as Brownson holds it.
He said the same thing in regr:.rd to Leroux's doctrine of aommunion - that man lives by communing vli th his fellow man.
both of these men

se~id

l/hat

is false, according to Brovvnson, but it

is not false if properly under stood.

lJothing is more true than

the fact that God created all things, and nothing is more true
than the :fact that God created. man so thr::.t he needs the society
of his fellow man in ordor to develop his capacities.

acce~)ted these r:.en is still a dis·puted
Sidney :L:aemers, Americe.'s jj'oremost Philosopher,
ITashington, 1931, 17-30.
31 Brovmson bec~lme fa::ailiar \vith Gioberti s-~lbseqGontly to his
concersion to Catholicism. Brov:nson sc.:,ys that he hesitates
to refer his readers to Gioberti who is erroneous in many
res·pects. Yet he admits Gioberti assisted him in clarifying
40.

30 The extent to v;hich he
que~3tion.

pat
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Having acce9ted such views ec.se:rly, &nd having been
accustomed to analyzing them rathe:r zealously he acce:pted their
terminology and retained. it.

Thus the Brownson who is writing.

lecturing and attempting social reforms o-f one kind and another,
is a man who has accepted truth from a great many sources,
ex:Qressing it in somewhat unusual te1·ms.
In the course of his career ]3rovmson founded. a magazine of
his ovm in order to be unhampered in his expression by editorial
restrictions.

This magazine he called the Boston

Review. He used it as an organ for ex[;r essing

~uarterly

-~-ihatever

he. though

ought to be said and also for suyporting the Democratic party,
which he thought would secure necessfry reforms.
his thoughts boldly, vigorously, clearly.
consider<-ble ,-ttention.
giving him

1J..

His views attracted

The Democrats rewarded his efforts by

poli ticel position.

leader in the Democratic

He expressed

He ceme to be regarded as a

2~rty.

In 1938 Bro-,·;nson was a Democrat in the sense thet he was a
32
member of t.ha t party, which he supper ted in his '..,uarterly He view
He was also a democrat in the sense that he o.cce_pted as true the
popular conception of democracy, which in his estime;tion meant
to" ••• assert eg_uslity as a natural right, and to asst1me •••
that the introduction and maintenance of equality between man
and man is

32

v,

111.

~esirable,

and essential to the moral, intellectual,

.
33
and physical well-being of mankind on earth. 1'
Hr;.ving accepted the democratic principle of equality as a
good theory, Brownson also had the
-oractical realization.

cour~ge

to try to secure its

Thus he says that "I had had the incred-

.

ible folly. of tre.':ting the equality <;;,Sserted as if it meant
something, as if it could be made a reality, instead of a
34
miserc' ble sham." For that ret: son he ·published in his review an
35
essay on the laboring classes. It ap 1Jeared in 1840, during the
presictential campaign of that

ye~:.·r.

In it he argued that it is

nothing short o:f an absurdity to prate

::~iously

of equal rights
36
unless the mights e:ts vvell as the rights of men are equal. So .

he advocated, among otheT things, the destruction of great
business cor_porations, the modern credit system, and urged also
the modificution of the factory system and suggested that the
denial of the right to inherit ]roperty would tend to eqg&lize
37

men's rights.
33 v, 114.
34 v, 117.
35 Boston Quarterly Heview, July, 1940. This esscy is not reprinted in his collected ~orks.
36 11 If, then, you will have democr::-icy, if you insist on the democratic form, have the cou.rcge to go fu.rther, and the good
sense to adopt the measures ne ces Sc~ry to prevent your uni vel'·~
sal suffrage and eligib; li ty from being a mere sham ••• you :..
must est:":blish and. maint?S,in the substantial equality of conditions, so that not merely the rights but the mights of men
shall be equal. 11 V, 103.
37 On the basis of thet essay, Schlesinger, 100, compf.~res him
vii th LI:::~rx and sa:;s th:: t "B:co"'::nson -~·;as his ne2.r" st forerunner
in ..:':..mer icn:. n

...
Brownson gained much notoriety by his publication and subsequent defense of his "Ess:::.y on the Laboring Olasses.tr ifhen he
published it he was connected with the Democrttic y:rty, and it
38
was as a le&.der of that _:)~rty that his views were received. The
opposing PE'rty tJ:1er e fore 1·e o1·int ed the essay und circulated it
as c;iidely as llOSSi-ole to indicate that these were the VieWS of
39
his pc·r ty.
The appefn·ance of Brownson's ''Sssay on the Laboring

Classe~

c:,nd. the election of 1840, mark the end of his career as a politici n, and the beginning of his cEl'eer as a golitical philoso-

faith in him ; because the

n •••

:people sold tl1e i:c birthright for

a osrrel of cider, '1 Bro·.·rnson lost faith in ;opular democracy:
The famous election of that :ro~r .crought a
much gre<:tor revolution in us than in the
gove1·nment •••• vie for- one confess - anc1
we ca:;:e not who kaows it - that ,:hat ·:'e savv
during the presidential election of 1840 shook,
nay, gave to the winds all our. reme.ining confidence in the JOJUlar democratic doctrines.

40

Since B:ro·.:nson received a }ractic 1 de:11onstration of the
feet that he must revise his vie·;,s, he began to re-examine his

·v,

His essay ••• ',7e,s Te '3ei vDd. us a ;renouncement from a
leading ~emocr2t. Tne t::,dmini3tration forces, dismayed. to fine
Brownson disrobing in iJUblic, had to re~mdiate him, and to
r::ake cleer that he ',;: s in no v1ay s:) eaking for the )arty."
Schlesinger, 101.
39 ".. • the lfhir-s Te ~,r int ed his article and di f~tri buted it by
the hundreds,:o of t~ousonis to show ~,::hat it ·:as the J?resident
and his JB.l·ty really helcL. T! r.:aynard., 92. He remarks in the
same _CJla-;e thc:.t 3chlo singer has \'IJ:'i tton the best critic ism of
this as .;e ct of B1· ovmson. Schlesinf':o r, 99-111.
40 XV, 259.
38

103.
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hiS -position.

He contended both ;:~t this time and later that his

reasoning r:as sound.

However radical his conclusions seemed,

they -,;ere not only consiDtent . ith, but the only ones derivable
41
from, the Jremises given to him by his countrymen.
Having found no fault vii th his ret_:;.soning, 3rovmson began to
re-examine his prmi se s.

He became keenly n:1,vare of the fact that

.he must have a )hilosol.)hicrl foundation in order to tcke an
intelligible stf::.nd in his comments on c 1.1rrent events.

Oonse-

quently he investig. ted. more :Jarefully questions concerning the
origin ani ground of government.

lt is at this time that the

influence of Plato is discernible.
Rather remarkable is the fact that Brownson discovered that
he lacked an element without which he co1lid not s:£ak intelligibly of authority and liberty - this was an infallible authori ty to determine v1hether or not freedom is real freedom and
not license, and authority is not de spot ism.

Thus Brownson

defended, prior to his conve1·sion and vJithout a knowledge of the
writings of Catholic :philoso:;;)hers and. theologians, the view that
42
government c~:nnot be sustained without infallible authority.

41 Of., for exe.mple, the following: npeo:ple, though adopting the
democratic _:)rinc igle, told me I went too far, but I knew I
'Has logic~tl." XVIII, 224. "But I can hardly re2d the essay
over without being myself shocked, and wondering at my
temerity in :_:mblishting it • • • • plr. ce me v;he re I stood then
••• :~md I would today repeat and endol'Se eve1·y pe.rae;ra:ph and
ev,.:;ry ·;10rd I then ·vvrote ;n V, 104.
42 This point is treEted explicitly in Ohagter II, 15-19.
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Since his :poli ticL"l views were b!.'l sed upon what may be
/

referred to as a unique synthesis of ideas gathered from the
various ources mentioned, Brownson's political 90sition is
merely a concrete

of the inconsistency of his gen-

illustr~tion

eral position - that he &cce;ted and defended infallible authority without investig(_;,_ting the claims of the only institution
which claimed to be infallible.
reco,s-nize this inconsistency.

Brownson vras the first to
Yet, he tells us in his autobi-

ogrc.phy that if he investigLted this institution end if it required him to reject the doctrines which brought him thus far,
c_;nd v-.rhich he knew to be true, he
ing sdmission to the ehurch.
he sought
his

~~n

~eeision

·uou~d

have no reason for seek-

ili th some hesitation, therefore,

interview with the Bisho:p of Boston.

Describing

to seek such an interview, he says:

It was, no doubt, un_:;;leq.sant to take such a
step, but to be etern.slly d~mned would, after
all, be a grest deal un)leasanter. Accordingly,
vvith ±'ear and trembling, and yet with firmness of
purpose, in the last v:eek of I.Iay, 1844, I sought
an interview iNi th the late .1.Ught heveren!l Benedict
Joseph Fenwick • • • and in the follovling week,
visited him again, avo·.ved my ··.vish to be'3ome a
Catholic, and begged him to be so kind as to introduce me to some one who would take the trouble to
instruct me, and prepare me for reception, if
found worthy, into the coo~union of the church.
He immedi;tely introduced me to his coadjutor,
vvho hc..s su:]ceeded him, the J.\ight h.everend John
Bernard Fitzpatrick.
43
Brownson's deseription of his inte:cvie·.-iS

43

v,

164.

-~dth

Bishop

Fitzpatrick rep.:t·e sent his most tac!tful :.vri ting.
meeting of r:ainds.

There v.ras no

The doctrines Brownson held must be waived;

" ••• but, if I rejected or ','mived it, what reason hc-,d I for regar cling the chv..1· ch :. s auth ori ts ti ve • • • or for recognizing any
44
authority in the Bishop himself to teach me?"
Thus BrO'I'mson writes that it

w~s

two or three months before

there was any indication that they r:ould ever come to an understanding.

He could not indicate his difficulty,
••• lest the Catholic Bishop himself should
degrive me of all ret:son for becomlng a Catholic,
and ser:d me b~' ck into the wo1·ld utterly na1red
and destitute. I had made up my mind that the
church was my l,;.st )lank of safety, that it was
communion with the church or death. I must be
a Catholi~, and yet could not and would not ie
one blindly. I had gone it blind once, and had
lost all, and would not do so again. My trouble
was great and the Bishop could not relieve me,
for I d~red not disclose to him its source.
45

However,

Bro~nson

notes that he and the Bishop soon came to a

good understanding, without discussing at all the merits of his
ovm vie'.-.·s.

He .,-,as baptized and confirmed on Sunday, October 20,

1844 •

.As a Catholic Bl'0'.7nson continued his career as a reviewer.
He founded Br?wnson' s

~ue.rterly

HevieYl. ifi th the appr obL--vion of

nis bishop, he continued to v:ri te on 1·eligious and philosophical
matters, usually on the occasion of reviewing a book that dealt
with such matters.

- - - - - - - - ---------------· - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 44 v' 165. '
45 v' 166.
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Politically, his views did not change a great deal. Browason did not try to prove that a good Catholic could also be a
good

Americ~

citizen.

He stated boldly '""nd simply ths..t no one

oan be a good American oitizen unless he is a. Gatholic.

He

maint2ined from the start that Catholicity is necessary for the
republic, and that it cannot exist

~~:i thout

it.

Thus an article

in his review for October, 1845, is entitled, "Catholicity
46
iJecessary to Sustain .Po9ular Liberty. 11
This brief survey of what B1·ownson did immedi.c;tely after
his conversion is given to indicate that there was no complete
and rar.Ucr::l bre2k in the trend of his thought subsequent to his
conversion.

Yet, c: s hr.cs been

indic~ted,

Brownson was compelled

to adopt e.n entirely new a:ppro:.:,ch to these subjects.

Thus one

might say that it ;res by request th>,t Brovmson )rocwed another
dictionary and began, e.t the age of about forty one, to study
the

~orks

of St. Thomas and St. Augustine.

Consequently he

shifted also the ground and the terms in V.'hich his new ar·guments
were formulated.

Therefore those subscribers who had been

following the trend of his thought could see no connection what-

.

soever bet·,veen the :SroYmson who ·,-rrote before

~md

the Brownson

7lho v.rrote immedir·tely after his conve:r:sion.

It vms not until

some yec::,rs lD-ter thc::.t he retm·ned to his own doctrine of

46 X, 1-16.
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communion. 17
.At the time Br ovm.son Yvas converted, he vvas ::: t the ) eak of
his :popul<:ir i ty.

.His essay on the le,bor·ing

culated by the hundreds of thousands.
audience that the CEtholic

jov~·nals

The continuation of his Heview

cl~-'-S se s

had been cir-

He apgealed to the kind o

s.t tha.t time did not reach.

vn,s tnerefore desirable. "The

bishop told. him th&t ho should not hide his light under a bushel,
U}JOn r.:hich Van ;{yck Brook's comment is, 'e.s well urge a bull not
48
to pretend to be a lamb 1 • "

attitude immecli Lt ely &:fter' his conver·s ion:

Ne have no occasion to stop to defend ourselves
or our church • • • • The false chc:,.rges agB.inst
Catholics can do us no hsrm, unless v;e suffer them
to frighten us e,nd induce us to stop and re:-9el
them • . • •
We must fJ.ttc 3k the enemy 1 s camp, and arrfdgn
:r·rotestantism herself. She, not the church, is
the question; she, not the chm·ch must be ~=-ut on
the defensive • • • • ,Je muzt drag her from her covert,
force her into ti.1e li.ght, and comcel her to stand
and make her defence.·
Our duty calls us to <:.:.ct on the offensive, to
ex:,?ose tne so:ccoress, to shov•J v•.ha.t it is th:-~t ht:.s
bewitched our brethern and holds them s~ellbound •
.Protestantism is strong only ·d:en she is suffered
to att[ck Lnd keep Cetholics on their defence •
. _:,. tta·Jked herself, nhe is as tov; .e.t the touch of
flre.
49
Being some·whet belligerent t;;.bout his posit ion, Brownson
suffered no one to insult the l!'aith.

Anyone att:-·:;king the

47 U.:ynard, l?0-162, di S<Jl;_s::;e s the influence Brov1nson might have
had if he had beec allowed to continue to }resent his arguments in his oYm tenns.
48 EaynErd, 152.
49 XIX, 141-142.
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Chuxch in e, vulgar or d.er og<:~ tory ma.nner did so, in the
oi.' B1·ovmson, at the 1·isk of incm:ring bodily h~rm.

cites an instance,

<:~lso

1·eferrod. to by

l~aym-J..rd,

1;r

esence

His son

in v1hich

~.

man

l)t;dled. :S.oovel' insul tea the Ch-ccr ch: "Brownson s im::;ly took hold
of him by the coat collar and the
50
tossed him over the stove. 11

so~t

of his trousers and

Bro..-vnson, as is evident, took lliS relieion se2.'iously. He
and his review made an im)ression.
~:

t:bracted considerf. ble attention.

The review itself
lJ ot only ciid it enjoy rather

17icie cil·culetion in tho united 3tr tes but it was also reprinted
51
in .i:~ngland.
.As a Catholio reviwer Bro\Jnson 'Na;J sslc,_om cri ti-

·.:.rhile criticizing tho

::c'•J<ll:.ct of his pen.

Somewhat naively,

Bro7mson VIaS unaole to under stand Ylhy S"L.Ch an attitude s-hould
52
make him the target of antipathy.
Devoting his effort:::: to deteeting errors in the works of
othe2:s, and subseqt:ently defending his judgments, 3rovmson continued to develop his talents as a controversialist.
horred inconsistency.

He ab-

Finding it in the work of another he

50 I;i8;ynard, 155.
51 11 In 1853, indeed, inte1·est in .Brownson ,,..'aS grest enough to
compel an Bnglish edition." Sehlesin~,er, 198.
52 Jfor eJ-":am}Jle, Brovmson felt obliged to point out the errors
in a work of a very dear friend, ~eorge Bcncroft. The
hi sto:cien Yvas unco,ble to understand the"t a harsh review of
his 7<'0rk did not mN n thc::t Browns on ·wan ted to sever _:)er sonal
relationship. Brownson, in atonement, Ci.edic~ted his
Amerie<:~n .;.·.eoublic to his 11 old friend, George Bancroft."
:~VIII,

1.

-=---
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re~mgnance

e:xpressed his

graphically - almost ,Jruelly.

This means, of course, that vl.hile 13:r:ovmson inv:--rir::.bly
silenced an

o~)ponent,

ovm viewpoint.

he did not thereby gain acceptance for his

It means thct few )eOlJle would be willing to

argue a qoint '.7i th him.

li.'_

the.r than cite testimonials to that

effect, of v1hich t11ere 8.re many, it is :r)erhap s more effective to
ai te r=,n instanee of Bro·wnson 1 s glee in encoun to ring one whose
c.vo•.coed _pur:_s1ose ·;;as to carry on

8.

series of arguments with him.

After comr:lGnting that Protestsntisrn is an unintelle·Jtual religion, and that Erotestants have made a sorry figure of reasoning
on religious questions, Brownson writes:
It is, therefore, refreshing to meet even one
Protestant who shows some signs of intellectual
life, who has the courf:,ge to make some show of
argument, and who, :Jerha:ys, has understanding
enough of the matters on v7hich he writes to be
capable of being refuted. Ne had well-nigh
desgai:tod of ever meeting such a one, and now
that he rresent;s himself 11e greet him cordially
and choi" ish him as a friend. de ho_pe his COUl'Ecge
will not fail him ~~t the first onset, and that
he will not as soon f:J.S he reeeives the first blow,
like our orlinary adversaries, disap)ear, to be
seen or he~';rd of no more for ever. Seriously,
it gives us pl,~a::~ure to meet a Protestant v1ho
has a beard on his face, and w·ho h~:'S the str·ength
to give 2>nd take stur·dy blovrs. .·Te are tired of
comb~~ting me1·e boys or mere simulacra, or
shadows as unsubst=~'ntial as the gliosts of su:perstition.
53
-.1hile Brownson's -_•u:·i tings may be <Jhs,racte1·ized as direct,
hard hitting, blunt, forceful, it is not true that he is entirell
impersonal.

It is not at all unusval to i i nd him disrobing in

------53 X, 329.

publia.

In the midst of an argument it is rather ordinary for

:Oim to introd.uce purely .:_1ersonal matters.

.b'or example, in dis-

cussing the enfranc.i:lisement of ;:omen, 3rownson says that tt.illven
her tongue is a weapon that is more effectual than a man's fist,
as Lucretia I.:iott, the

~uakeress

_:_)rec"cher, :}roved to us personal-

54
ly some years <:,go at the tea-table of one of her nieces."
The Brownson descri.bed thus far has been a man who is
bold, rough, incle9endeut and somewhat ruthless as a contraversialist.

His term:perament and ?rofession were not the kind

conclusive to congenial personal relationships.

As a layman

Ylriting a Catholic review, Brownson's position necessitated personal contact :;.;ith members of the hiel'[:.rchy.

"'uite obviously,

difficulties developed; they may be desc1·ibed briefly e.s personal ra thcr thc"n doctrinal.

1!1 or exam·r)le, B:cownson Virote an essay

55
on "Archbishop Hughes on Slavery. 11
Brown-Son 1 s atti tuU.e on the question.
Brownson adopted a

The archbishop had opposed
In defending himself

)rocedv..r e typical in his reviews.

He is

mystified by the language of the arch:;ishop, for his words indi

56

cate th~::.:.t he has undoubtedly incurred excommunice.tion. Brownson,
however, refuses to believe that the illustrious .9rel1:te has
l4

ss.lly meant to separate himself from the 6hurch.

11

All the pre-

sumptions are thtJ.t, both as a Catholic and a man, he agrees ·,vi t
the c.i::u.rch o

o •• "

Oonseq r!en tly he c oncl uclo s that n:ie can accept

--54 XVIII, 404.
55 XVII, 179-210.
56 XVII, 204.

- · - - - -··-------------
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no such interpretation of his language, and even if we were unable to explain it away, we would still insist that he did not
and could not mean it, and should wait with our confidence in hiD
unimpaired till he should see proper to favor us or the public
with his own explanation."

67

This is cited as an instance of the logic-chopping which,
while in this and many other instances was confessedly irrefutable, did not

hel~

Brownson's position. Whether through the in-'

fluenoe of Archbishop Hughes or some one else in an authoritative
position whom he offended in a similar way, Brownson's Review
was delated to Bome for examinationo Somewhat gleefully, Brownson announces, in an article entitled "The Ohurch

no~

a Des-

potism," that Rome, while somewhat puzzed by certain things,
could find nothing contrary to faith in what he said.

58

Some time later, however, Brownson apologized very humbly
for his general attitude:
I must myself confess, to my shame and deep
sorrow that for four or five years, ending in
1864, I listened with too much respect to
those liberal or liberalizing Catholics ••• ·•
My faith was firm, and my confidence in the
church unshaken, but I yielded to what seemed
at the moment a wise and desirable policy.

69

During this period of his life Brownson*s political views
altered radically. Almost to the outbreak of the civil war, he

57 XVII, 204-206.
68 XX, 216-248.
59 VIII, 220-221. His son adds a note saying that this was the
most humble passage his father ever wrote.

had taken the position of Calhoun in commenting upon practical
60
problems. In the period immediately 9receeding the civil war,
Brownson found himself defending the Union.

In order to main-

tain his position oriasistently he was obliged to investigate
more carefully the nature of the Union.

The results of his in-

vestig'-tions are embodied in ilis vvork entitled The .American
61
I~epublic.

Brownson's book was motivated )rime,rily by patriotism.
believed sincerely that American republicrmism

-~)reserves

He

certai

inherent charaJteristics vihich represent the reason why America
has sec1Hed for the individual the greatest liberty man has ever
kno'lvn.

Brownson endeavored to transcend. immedL"te issues and to

expose its essential elements.

In doing so he belioved he was

contributing to the welfare of the reDublic.
During this same :Jeriod, ill
facto1·s such

~~s

hcs~lth,

along vii th other

he.rsh and imprudent attacks upon individuals

61..
and. institutions

and his support of Fremont for president nee-

essitated the discontinuance of his review in 1864. From that
3
time until 1872, when his wife died, he wrotet. for Oatholic

60 In his Heview of JtO~nu<:cry, 1844, Brovmson is lE;vi sh in his
·oraise of Calhoun. Somewhat naively, he closes his discussion by avovving th:::~ t tt • • • we hccve introduced l.Ir. Calhoun
into our os~R:es, v.ri thout 1·e:.::.·erence to the i'act thet he is now
befo1~e the .Americ :·'n .;;:;eople :_,s a ~Jrominent candidate for the
presidency. 11
61 XVIII, 1-222.
62 Brov;nson discl.<:dmed [~ny conr·entiel dlslike for the Irlsh or
the Jesuits, though his remarks V'iere unduly h~.rsh.
63 These articles ·were unsigned. They are included in the
collection of his son.
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pe :riodicals, particularly the Ca tho lie ·;;orld.

Lirs. Brownson, realizing that her husband was too inde_pendent to submit cheerfully to editorial revisions and restrictions
( es··;eoially those of one vvho ...-vas formerly his devoted follovmr,
Isaac Hecker of the Catholic ;;o;-ld) requested on her death bed
tb.at her husband revive his ?.eview. In order to gratify her ·wish
<::cs well as to prove to the :'ublic the"t he \laS, and had always
been, devoted to the Ohurch, Brovrnson' s heview ap_pe ared again
in January of 1873.

In October of 1875 ill health again re64
CJ.'l'"ired. him to cea2e its )Ublicc.tion. In his valedictory

Brovmson says that it is only -r:i th consid.erable
can grasp a _pen.

He makes his final

-~· ain

that he

:rofession of faith and

1

e:x:_p1·esbeS p:rs.titud.e to tho3e vilo suJo;_Jor·ted. him during the
thirty one years he had t-'-}~·et;,red 0et'ore them as a Catholic reviewer.

he indi:J tes -J.lso that he Yiil~ :Jontinue to labor for

the Ch"G.rch de:::;)ite t1::.e discontim;_ance oi' .his I.eview.
Appro _:;rL tely, IJel·ha~JS, 3ro';·ms on argued to the last.

In

his fine 1 contro ve:rsy, 3r ovmson' s son -.las un:: ble to see the
force of his

t"a ther

1

s lor;ic.

A£te1· retiring to his room,

B::.·.y;mson re olied to E~ knock on Lis U.o0r: 11 If the"t 's you, :i:'rancis,
65
I'm too til·ed to make it any :,Jlainer tonight." He died on
~)ril

17, 1876.

He is buried in a cry}t, in the center aisle

of the lfni ver :::;i tJ Ct.l.a.::,;el at iTotre Dame.

-------------------·-----------64 :X.X, 436-438.
65 L.a.:;rn rd, 420.
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His son, Hanry 1.

3ro~mson,

ioz~r~bss

hi$

f~ther

as

very generous and vn',rm he rted, observing that he ·;les l\Ot a
''self-seeking, cold hearted, c.lcul:;.ting man v,rho looks at
every tiling vii th a v ieVI solely to his ovm sa tisfE.ction or
emolument, natu:rally

c~lltivc::tos

the s.ttr::'.ctive, £Jlea,:;e,nt ex-

teTio:c or manners v.rhich ·,;.J:Ul coHstitute to the gaining of his
})Urgose, end wins the re gute. tion of amiauili ty t::nd gocd
66
This then, is 3ro-::mson the man.
na tU!t' e • "
Irovv v1e will :.Jrocoed v:ith a study of his political
Jhilosophy.
rLd1t~3

The

ex~o3ition

of the incU vidual.

begins with a discussion of the
3ronnson also Dakes right the basi

oi' lJ,w, v:zb.ence it is neJessary to Jresent his concerltion of
l~lR.

Afi'irL1ing .ti:-:"hts o:Z beth the individual and society,

1ossible to determine the

~es~0ctive

limits of each.

Thus he

endee.vo:cs to solve the .i:,roblsm of individual libeTty in
reL:tion to nuolic c,utl1ority, '.vhich is, after all, the fundamental ·Jro blem of

~poli t

ioal '1 hilosophy.

ll1ollowing the

exposition of his solution of the Jroblem, there is an
:;ttem)t to evaluate Brownson.

·---- --·------------66 Brownson, :,;orly Life, 481.

CHAPTER II
!HE RIGHTS OJ' THE INDIVIDUAL
In

one

o~

his

~irst

l

politioal essa7s Brownson tells us

that the idea of individual libert7 is so ingrained in the

.

minds of the Ameriean people, for whom he was writing, that it
is unneoessar7 to prove philosophioallJ that the individual has
rights whioh the state ma7 not violate.

2

fhese rights have been

enumerated more or less oompletel7 b7 the people in the formation of the government.

While being keenly aware of their

rights, the Ameriean people are rather ignorant
ples whioh legitimate them.
of exhortation.

o~

the prinoi-

OonsequentlJ his essa7 is a kind

the people are told what they must hold

theoretieally in regard to government and freedom in order to
justify and preserve their rights.
!he first requisite for the preservation

o~

rights is the

olear recognition of the fact that the state is not the ultimate sovereign.
limited.
proof.

lts sovereignt7 is derived and therefore

!hia again requires explanation rather than formal
Jor Brownson says that "lovereignty is that whioh is

highest, ultimate; whieh has not onl7 the ph7sioal foree to
make

itsel~

obe7ed, but the moral right to eommand whatever it

l XV, 1-34. (Written in 1838)
2

xv, a.

3

pleases." Thus tt th• state ia held to be sovereign, then it

mar

eommand whatever it pleases and there is no appeSl from its laws.
He Shows very well that it makes little differenee whether
sovereignty in this sense is vested in a king, aristoeraoy,
emperor, or the majority of the people.

If the state is supreme

there is despotiBB and no individual liberty.

therefore the

Amerioan people cannot hold an underived sovereignty of the
state; they must maintain that its authoritJ is derived from,
and limited by, something higher than the state.
Sinae the state ia not the ultimate sovereign, its
do not make right and wrong.

•omma~a

Every person feels that he has a

right to do that whioh is just regardless of what the state
eommands.

!hat is, he feels'that the state itself has the right

to do only that Which is just.

lustioe, in other words, is not

dependent upon the state; it is above the state, superior to it,
not derived from the state.

4

Conse~uently

Brownson says that the

enaetmenta of the state "••• are not in and of themselves laws,
and oannot be laws, unless they receive the signature of absolute justice.

If that signature be withheld they are null and

void from the beginning."

5

Justioe, therefore, is the ultimate soTereign.

It is

" ••• the sovereign of sovereigns, the king of kings, lord of
lords, the supreme l&w of the people, and of the indi vidual!•"
3 XV, 4.
4 XV, 9.

5 XV, 10.
6 XV,- 9.

6

As sueh it is one law imposing obligations upon both ihe individual and the state.

~herefore

the iAdivi4ual is free onl7

beeause the law of justice forbids the state to enaot laws preventing the individual from doing what is right and just. Under
this law, however, the individual cannot do whatever he pleases.
He has no right, for example, to do what is wrong or unjust. I.a
other words, the law of justice gives to the individual freedom,
but not lieense.
lhus the freedom or right of the individual in regard to
the state eonsists 1n his abil1t7 to do that whiSh is just and
right.

!his is the essenee of his freedom; it is all the free-

dom that the individual has or ean have:
The highest eonoeption of libert7 is that
whieh leaves ever7 maa free to do whatever
is just to do •••• Freedom to do that whieh
is unjust aecording to the laws of God, or,
- Whieh is the same th.ing, - the law o1!
nature, is lieense, not libert7, and is as
mueh opposed to liberty as lust is to love.

'1

In virtue of the faot that justioe is one law, bindiag botk
the individual and the state and defining the respeetive rights
and duties of eaeh, it ia olear that there oan be no eonfliet
between individual libert7 and publie authorit7 in a state
founded upon justiee.
equal. to itself.

That is, being one law, juatiee is ever

Consequently its eommand to the individual

eannot eonfliet with its eommand to the state.

'1 XV, 19.

At this time, however, Brownson devotes very little eon'"

sideration to the praetiaal problem arising from the interpretation of this law.

He is perhaps unaware of the problem

arising from the faet that the individual oonoeption of what is
just and necessary might be different from that of the state.
Thus he disposes of it by saying that the law of justice is
God's law, written and discoverable in the universe.

The only

authoritative expounder of its decrees is human reason.

In

most instances it is the reason of individuals; in very few
cases it is the reason of the people collectively or the state.

8

Thus he would seem to hold at this time that the individual may
arrest the action of the state when it aommands anything lneompatible with his own peculiar sense of justice.
Brownson first attempts a more philoaophioal presentation
9

His theory at this ttme is
10
based to some extent upon Plato.
It is at this time that the
of his views five years later.

contribution of Leroux is also evident, aw will be seen in the
exposition of the theory.

Brownson was aware of the fact that,

since his articles were being published in a popular magazine,
his readers would be a little eonfuaed by the eombination. lhus

8 XV, 18.
9 (1843); XV, 296 ff ••

10 ~polities are, to no ineonsiderable extent, founded on the
Platonio dootrine of ideas, and to all who are not aequainted
with that doctrine, I must seem to be talking nonsense, When,
in fact, I am talking very tolerable sense." XV, 364.

5

he oommented:
I pray my readers to be as indulgent as possible
to this answer, and not too hastily pronounee it
a fine speeimen of transcendental nonsense. However unmeaning it may be to them, it has meaning
to me, and I know very well what I mean b7 it:
but what phraseologr will suffice to eommunieate
my meaning to their minds, I own, I am at some
lose to determine.
11
His diseussion here assumes that God's will in regard to
man is discernible in the natural order He has created.

Oon-

sequently in order to discover what rights God has given to man
it is necessary to investigate his nature with a view to determining what is necessary for its preservation.

That is, the

investigation is necessary to the extent that it furnishes a
basis for the oonelusion that man has natural rights whioh the
state must respe•t.
Sinee he was under the influence of Plato at the time,
Brownson tells us that man•e nature may be considered either as
oonoretized in the individual or as existing ideally in the
"Divine mind,

~'

or logos." As it exists in the divine mind

his nature signifies the human kind, raee or genus.
12
ferred to by the term humanitr.
In

It is re-

affirming that humanity has an ideal existenee in the

divine mind, Brownson means that its existence is real in 'the
highest sense of the term, that is, as a substanee. Sinee

11 Demo•ratie Review, (July, 1843), XV, 364.
12 XV, 36'1.

6

humanity has a substantial existenee, it ia an activity; an
activity, however, is likewise a substanae.

In other words ever7

aotive foree is a substance and every substanee is an aetive
foroe.

thus Brownson says that humanity is an activity and

nothing but an activity.

13

Sinee the nature of humanity is that of a distinctive,
aotive, eauaal foroe, God must preserve it as suah in order to
govern it; that is, sinee humanity's nature is oommensurate with
its power to act,. its aetivity oannot be destroyed without
destroying man's being.

Thus if God were to suppress the eausal

power of humanity, He would destroy His creature rather than
govern it.
Bow the preservation of this aetive foroe is the preservation of humanity's freedom, beeause freedom consists in the
14
power to aot, to do, to cause.
thus Brownson says that "I
am aetive only in that action which bas its eauae and origin in
me.

If I perform it only through neoessity, I perform it not at
15
all, but it is performed by that foree Whioh necessitates me."

13 XV, 359. Brownson, of course, oonfessedly refers to the "vis
aotiva of Leibnitz." XV, 358.
--14 Ii this view of freedom Brownson believes that he avoids &n7
dispute in regard to man's freedom: ~en have asked, is my
will free? Am I free? lonsense. This is not the question, bu ,
am I, am I at all. Bor I am only so far forth as I am free."
XV, 359.
15 XV, 359.

'

This meana, in other words, that a thing ia onlJ inaamu.h
as it is aetive.

In the case

o~

humanity, the activities result

ing from its unique and distinotive being is what is meant by
its freedom.

~hue

freedom is eoextensive with the power to aet.

And since an aotive foree is a substanee, and conversely a substance is an aetive foree, freedom is likewise eommensurate with
being.

Henee Brownson says that "•••

a~solute

slavery, slavery

extending to the whole being, were absolute death, total
extinction of being.

So long and so far as I exist at all, so

long and so far I am free."

16

It is therefore elear that tod

must preserve the freedom of humanity in his government.
Sinoe humanity is a ganerative prineiple or an active
power, its activity results in the produstion of individual mea
and women.

It is embodied and manifested therein as the eause

is manifested in its effects.

In other words, just as the

aotivity of an individual results in individual aetions, so
also does the activity of humanity result in individual men and
women.

Humanity is therefore related to the individual as the

individual is related to his aets.

On tbe basis of this

analogy the nature of humanity is more •learly definable.

1'

We see that sinoe the individual is the cause of his aets,
he is distinct from them as the cause is distinet from its
effect.

For the same reason, however, he is not entirely

16 XV, 359.
17 XV, 365,

8

separable from his aots; there is a sense in whieh the individual lives in hie aets, but the sum total of his actions do not
eonstitute the individual.

Likewise, therefore, there is a

sense in whieh humanity is inseparable from indiVidual men and
women.

Xevertheless humanity must be distinet from individuals

also, just as the cause is distinct from the effeet.

Thus

humanity is not merely the sum total of human beings.
In order to see the bearing of this analysis upon the
rights of individuals, it is neeessary to review briefly the
status of the question.

His discussion is based on the proposi-

tion that the Divine will must prevail in human affairs.

His

will in regard to a particular thing is disooverable in the
nature Be gave it.

Now the nature of humaaity is to aet.

to

preserve its nature intaet, humanity must be free to aot.

To

the extent to which this freedom is restricted, humanity is not
preserved intaet, but destroyed.
and women.

Its aets are individual men

Since government must preserve intaet the nature of

that whieh is governed, it is evident in the first plaee that
18
humanity must be free to actualize itself in individuals.
Further, a single action of an individual does not exhaust
his aetivity.
the individual.

Eaeh individual aot represents a eertain phase of
In other words, the aetive foree of an indivi-

18 "But, as the aets of humanity, generieally eonsidered, are
individual men and women, it follows that freedom for it to
fulfill its destiny, is freedom to obey the command to
'multiply and peplenish the earth'." XV, 367.

9

dual is not manifested onee and for all in a single aetion.
Aoeording to Brownson, "The greater the number and variety of hil
acts, the more fully will his being be represented, or aetualizec
••• And 3ust in proportion as you hinder the individuals

aetivitl~

do you •ut htm off from manifesting himself, and, therefore,
19
from fulfilling his destiny."
Consequently humanity fulfills
its destiny to the extent that it manifests itself in individuals.

Ben•• he says that "lhe highest·good of humanity must be tc

fulfill its destiny, that is to actualize itself in the greatest
20
number and variety possible of individual men and womaa.~
Therefore

~restriction

of this a•tivity is •ontrary to the

will of lod as Be expressed it in •onstituting human nature.
further, the preservation of this freedom in the ra•e
necessitates the freedom of the individual.

For in being born

an individual merely begins to represent the aet of humanity,
just as the individual merely begins to aet by the faot that he
is born.

Therefore the work of humanity does not oonsist in the

mere produation of individuals.

For ea•h individual, as we have

seen, represents a distinet aspect or phase of humanity, just as
individual aots represent distinot aspects of the individual.
As the individual grows and develops his potentialities he

19 XV, 36,.
20 XV, 36,.

10
represents, therefore, distinot and peculiar aspects of
21
humanity.
Bow we have seen already that humanity must be free to
actualize itself in individuals.

Therefore the individual must

be free to develop his eapaeities to the best of his abilitf;
that is, he must be free to work out his. own destiny as an
individual.

'o interfere with that freedom in any individual

is to prevent humanity from actualizing the distinct phase of
itself which was supposed to be actualized in the development
of that individual.

Oonlequently Brownson concludes that the
22

race is free only va the condition that the individual is free.
And since he has shown that government must preserve the freedom of the raee, it must likewise preserve the freedom of the
individual.
To say that man is free is not· sufficient, however. To
show what is involved in that statment it is necessary to discover what is necessary for him to develop and aetualize his
oapaeities.

lt is at this point that Brownson generates a

~But an individual is an individual, only so far as he
represents humanity, under a distinet and peouliar aspeet,
represented by no other. His destiny is to represent this
distinct and peouliar phasis of human nature." XV, 369.
22 "Renee, if by our social arrangements, we prevent this
individual from preserving, and so to speak, acting out his
individuality, we not only prevent him from fulfilling his
ow.n individual destiny, but humanity herself from aotualizin
that aspect of her being which it was the miSBion of the
individual, in his life, to actualize." XV, 369.

21

11

rather unusual intelleotual child.
parents is Plato.

As we have seen, one of ita

It now becomes evident that the other is

Leroux.
He has ooneluded that eaoh individual man must be free to
develop his oapaoities to the utmost of his abilit7 in order to
actualize distinet aepeets of the individual or the raee.

But

sinee man is dependent he can develop himself only to the
extent that he has the cooperation of something other than himself.

In Brownson's language, this development is aeaomplished
23

through oommunion with hie fellow man, with nature and with God.
He cannot actualize his capacities exeept in this way.

lhe7

are the conditions upon whioh he is free to develop himself.
Sinee government must preserve his freedom, it must preserve
likewise that which is essential to it.
Inaemueh as man develops his eapaeities through hie fellow
man, it is evident that government must preserve his right to
eommune as much as possible with his fellow man.

Briefly, it

should encourage education because thereby the individual •ommunes with the great minds of the raoe.

On the other hand, the

division of society into eastes or classes should be abolished
because it tends to restriot his freedom of communing with his
24
fellow man.
His oommunion with nature is signified by the term propert

23 XV, 371.
24 XV, 371.

12

Negatively, the state cannot determine what his profession will
be, nor abrogate his right to own property.

From a positive

standpoint, conditions should be such that the fruits of his
labor will be suffieient to provide for himself as the head of
a household.

In modern terms he has a right to a living wage:

The right to labor, that is, to such an organization of industry, as shall enable every man
to obtain his living and discharge his duties
as a husband and a father, by means of his labor,
is every man•s inalienable right, if any speoifie
right may be so termed.
·

26

Jinally, the state must guarantee man's freedom to worship
lod aeeording to the dictates of his consoienee.

Aeoording to

Brownson this means that the church must be entirely independent
of the state - it must be absolutely exempt from all eivil eon26
trol.
~he

rights enumerated thus far are termed natural rights

because they are consequent upon his nature.

~d

sinoe men have

the same human nature, the rights he has beeause of his nature
are equal.

The full and free exercise of his natural right is

what is meant by man•s freedom.

2'

Granted that man has rights which the state may not violate
it is necessary for him to determine when a given enactment has
violated his rights.

that is, he must determine when he may

resist lawfully, or rebel against, the authority of the state.
Secondly, eoneeding man's freedom of worship, his right of eonscience, .there is the question of what is to be done when his

13

oonseienoe is subwerwive to the authority of the state.

~hese

problems are p.raetieal, and very real, and therefore must be
solved.

In the solution one must not secure individual rights

at the expense of authority, nor seeure authority at the expense of these rights.

~he

problem, whether arising in oon-

aeetion with the rights of revellion or of oonsoienoe, is the
same problem.
inst~oes

It is stated in general terms before partieular

are diseussed.

It has been noted that the law of justiee is the ultimate
sovereign.

It is superior to the state and binds the people

eolleetively as well as individually.

It is agreed that &D7

enactments whioh violate this law are null and void from the
start.
On this basis, Brownson preseats his problem in the form
of a question: "Has this Higher than the people, this sovereign
of sovereigns, any outward, visible embodiment? In other words,
has he on earth a regular, formal, authorized interpreter of
28
his will?" Evidently one must answer either a definite affirmative or negative, or else try to prove that the question itself
is misleading and therefore unanswerable in sueh a simple
fashion.

In either ease serious difficulties are eneountered,

as Brownson himself disoovered in his attempt to answer the
question.

28 XV, 350.

On the supposition that there is no authorized interpreter
of the divine will, it is up to the people, whether individually
or eollectivel7, to determine what is and what is not the divine
will.

If eaeh individual has the right to deaide for himself

whether a given enaetment violateacGod's will, Brownson argues,
there is no eseape from anarchy.

Be writes:

In so doing, you then raise the individual above
government, and authorize htm to sit, in his own
right, in 3udgment on government, whieh is ineompatible with government, subordination, or sooial
order. ~his would be extreme individualism, whieh
cannot eoexist with government; beeause all government demands soaial eooperation, subordination, and
subjection.
29
On the other hand it is evident that the people eolleetively or the state, oannot be the judge of lod's will in relation ta
individual enactments.

~or

if they represent the divine will ia

human affairs, there is no appeal from their deeision. Praetioally, this asserts the absolute sovereignty of the state, thus
leaving no

rooa.:~'for

the rights of the individual.

For it the7

are authorized interpreters of the divine will it is of no
importanee, as Brownson says, " ••• whether you sa7 the people
are sovereign in their own right, or merely b7 divine appointment, if you make their sovereignty eomplete, and permit the
30
eubjeet no appeal from their deeision."
Another alternative is to make the

29 XV, 350.
30 XV, 352.

~hureh

the authorized

15
interpreter of the divine will.

On this basis it would be the

supreme court, from whose decision there eould be no appeal. The
state would be subordinate to the Ohureh.

Thus the rights of

the individual would be secured against the state because he
oould appeal to an authority higher than the state.
Brownson points out, however, that people generally distrust the Ohuroh.

they object to a theory of a supreme ehureh

on the ground that such a theory merely shifts power.

And since

the Ohureh can be as despotie as the state, there is no advantage to be derived merely by transferring power from the one to
the other.

Brownson maintains that such an objeetion is valid,

with one possible exeeption:
If we believed the Ohureh to be a divine institution, the real body of our Lord, the ground and
pillar of the truth, the house of God, in whieh
Qod's lpirit resides, and therefore, that it is
by divine authority that it exists and acts,
should we distrust it, believe it eapable of
tyrannizing?
31
Although not a Oatholie at the time, Brownson remarks that he
does not share the
Ohureh.

~availing hosil1~7

and distrust of the

He says he believes it to be the kind of institution it

elaims to be.
Nevertheless, sinee his countrymen rejeot the Ohureh, something else must be substituted in its place.

For the assertion

of individual rights is rather feeble and futile unless there is
a power above the state whieh oan proolaim infallible when these

31 XV, 349.

,I!

--

rights have been violated.
Hie will must be obeyed.

In other words, God is sovereign;

But Brownson argues that n ••• if there

be no established medium through whieh his word speaks, no auth·
orized interpreter of his will, having the right to speak to us
in the name of the sovereign, and to enforce our obedienee, we
are praotieally as if we had no sovereign, and actually living
in a state of anarchy."

32

Sinee the Ohureh is

re~eoted,

the only reoourse is to sub-

stitute for it the rather foggy thing oalled publio aonseienee.
this he desoribes as the sense of right expressed in what we
recognize as the highest and most sacred among us. "And this.
by whatever name it goes, is our Ohureh, our divine institution.
This it is, whether it be ealled the pulpit, the press, the
lyeeum."

33

He observes at the aame time that this substitute bas

all of the disadvantages but none of the advantages of the
reject:
The only difference there is or oan be between
the view we condemn, and the view we as a people
aooept, is the difference between a formal,
regularly eonstituted ohurch, able to trace its
descent from the apostles, and to show that it
speaks by divine authority, and an informal
.ehuroh, intangible, and at best only partially
able to demonstrate its legitimacy •••• We have
then in the oase of enthroning publ1e sentiment,
all that we find objectionable in the supremaey
of the Churoh, without any of the advantages.
34

32 XV, 351.

33 XV, 350.
34 XV, 350-361.

l7

Thus, in hie first attempt to formulate a theor,v

o~

govern-

ment, Brownson eame to the eonolusion that an infallible organiaation is neeessary to speak in the name of God.

It is only on

this basis that the will of God ean be aeeertained infallibly,
and thus it is the only basis whieh seeures both the rights of
the individual and the authority of the state.

Further, this

conclusion was arrived at before Brownson has eome into eontaot
with the works of Catholic theologians and philosophers.

36

His thought on the subjeet is brought out again when he
discusses "the .glorious right of rebellion and revolution." In
general terms the right to rebel signifies the right

o~

the

people to overthrow a government whioh has beeome oppressiTe,
35 Maynard argues that "Brownson, by going to the Founding
Fathers and the Ameriaan Ooastitution, obtained, while still
a irotestant, a good deal more datholie thought than he was
eonseious of at the time •••• They[the founding fathers]derived their ideas from Loeke, who derived from Booker, who
had derived from st. Whomas Aquinas." 352, n. 102. He adds
also that Jefferson read Filmer, who presented the dootrine
of Bellarmine for the purpose of refuting it. Thus Brownson
reputedly arrived at some knowledge of Oatholio politieal
philosophy in this circuitous fashion. This may be true, of
oourse, but it would be somewhat difficult to show that Brown
son derived from Jefferson {who derived from Filmer, who wrot
to refute Bellarmine) his view that an infallible authority
is neeessary to guarantee individual liberty - or his view,
stated in Chapter IV below, that the philosophy of these
founding fAthers is defioient. The extent to ~ieh the
founding fathers were influenced by the Seholasties is
discussed rather well by Sylvester J. MeNamara, Amerieaa
Demoeraor and Oatholie Doctrine, lew York, Bo date.

18
and to institute a new government whieh will secure to them a

greater measure of freedom.
Brownson argues that if the right to rebel is really a
right at all it, like all human rights, must be derived from
something.

Quite obviously it eannot be derived from the state,

for it is the right to overthrow the state.

~t

oannot be a

right inherent in the people eolleotively, for taken in this way
they are the state.

It it is a right inherent in the individual

then eaoh individual has the right to arrest the aotion of the
government Whenever he deems it advisable to do so.

But this is

inoompatible with the very notion of the state.

If sueh a rule
36
were adopted praotically, the state eould not exist.
Nevertheless, the right to rebel must be asserted against a
government which violates man's natural rights.

But the only

way in whieh it may be asserted without denying the authority
proper to the state is to go outside of the state to that Whieh
is higher than it.

Ibis is, as we have seen, the will of God.

fhe will of God must be represented by an organization above and
beyond the state.

He argues that there is and oan be no organ-

ization, other than the Roman Oatholio Ohuroh, whioh represents
3~

the will of God on earth.
superior to the state.

36 XV; 395-398.
3~ xv. 399.

Therefore it is the only institution

IDherefore the right to rebel against

19
the state ean be derived from this organization alone.

It is

therefore evident that it alone ean determine when it is lawfUl
to resist the state.

In order to elarify his point, Brownson

adds the following:
But suppose, as in Protestant eountries, the
ehureh has been perverted to a funetion o~ the
state, or that it has itself beeome eorrupt and
oppressive, as we aontend was and is the ease
with the Oatholie Ohurah, and that there is no
element of reform in the state on whioh you ean
seize to· sanation your movement, what then will
you do in order to get rid of bad government?
Nothing; for in sueh a ease nothing oould be done.

38

Brownson adopts the same line of argument after his eonversion.

Re hold that it is impossible, on Protestant prinei-

ples, to present a theory of government whi•h will guarantee
the rights of the individual as well as the authority of the
state.

He says that
The prineiple of private 3udgment adopted by
Rrotestants in religious matters, it is well
known, bas destroyed for them the ehureh as an
authoritative body, and put an end to everything like eeolesiastie:al authority; transferred
to eivil matters it would equally put an_end
to the state, and abolish all aivil authority,
and establish the reign of anarehy or lieense.
39

The reason for this is olear.

Without the Oatholie ehureh

as the infallible interpreter of the law of God, the right to
deeide when a aivil enaetment is eontrary to the law of God
must be lodged in either the individual or the state.

If it is

lodged in *llt4tadividual, he has the right to resist the aetion
38 XV, 398.
39 XVII, 8.
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of government.

Sueh a oourse of aotion, if praetioall7 adopted,

would result in anarohy.

On the other hand, i f the state is

authorized to interpret the law of God there is no appeal from
its deeision.

~here

is nothing higher than to state to whieh

the individual ma7 appeal.

Suoh a oourse· of aetion, adopted

praotiaall7, would result in despotism.

ihus Brownson says that

"Here is a sad dilemma for our uneatholie oountrymen, whieh
admirabl7 demonstrates the unsuitableness of Frotestant prinei40
plea for praotie&l ~ife."
In his estimation men oannot solve
this problem; the7 must reaognize the solution which God has
given.
The same sort of a dise.ussion ooours in eonneetion with the
freedom of worship, whioh is one of the natural, inalienable
rights of man.
eonsoienoe.

This right is referred to also as the right of

This right is the most fundamental, for it is the

souroe and foundation of all other rights.

41

Sinoe it is in-

eluded in the natural rights it is equal in.all individuals.
~erefore

the state must respeet this right equally in all indi-

~iduals.

+t has no right to prefer the eonseienee of one indivi-

dual to that of another.

Jor the state to suppress or to trample

upon the eonseienee of an individual is, as we have seen, absolutism.

If it may trample upon the eonvietions of any one group,

whether that group by Catholie or Protestant, it ma7 trample

40 XVII, 8.
41 XIII, 139.
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also upon the oonvietions of any other group.

To avoid state

absolutism it is eonsequently neeessary to preserve intaet the
right of eonsoienee.
However, Brownson says that the "••• notion of the unbounded license of eonsoienee no man in his sober senses oan undert&ke to defend."

42

He observes that some individuals and
43
groups hold rather queer eonvietions.
Some of these are ineompatible obviously, with the very existenoe of the state.

It

is ineontestable that the praotioal adoption of the unbounded
lieense of oonseienoe is anarchy.

44

On the other hand it is

equally certain that the state cannot extinguish the eonseienee
of the individual.

To assert that it is authorized to do so is

to deny that the right of consoienee is a natural right whieh the
state must respect.

~his

is despotism or state absolutism.

Brownson states the problem and its solution rather forcefully
rwhen he says:
Here, then, we are exposed to two powerful and
dangerous tendencies, rushing, on the one hand,
42 VI, 552-553.
43 Brownson mentions, for example, that "••• the eonseienee of
the Anabaptists required them to run naked through the
streets, and that of the early Quakers required them,
especially the women, to go naked into the religious
assemblies and prophesy • • • • There was,too, Matthias,
the famous New York prophet, whose queer eonscienee eommanded
him to elaim his neighbor•s property and his neighbor's
wife as his own. Was the liberty of consoienoe to be
allowed?" VI, 553.
44 In addition to factors suoh as those numerate~n n.43, Brownson mentions also that it would be oonvenient to develop a
oonsoientiors ob j ctio~1 to the : c,.yment of taxes, and to similar obligations. VI, 553.
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into social despotism, and on the other, into
anarchy. What, in this state of things, do we
need in order to escape them? We need, it is
evident, a power alike independent of the state
and of the individual, to step, as it were, in
between them and harmonise them, - a power strong
enough to restrain the state when it would beeome
deapotie, and the individual when he would •eeome
disloyal or rebellious. Without sueh a power we
cannot save our republie, and have that security
for individual and social liberty it was institu&ed to proteot and vindicate. With only the
state and the individual we have, and ean have,
only antagonism. The two elements are, and will
be pitted one against the other, eaeh struggling
for ~he mastery. They eannot be made to move
without eollision one with the other, unless
there is between them a mediating term • • • •
ihat term, power, or aonstituent element, is
religion, and I need not add, the Christian religion • • • • There is no other power eoneeivable
that ean mediate between the state and the individual, and prevent either from invading the
pro~inee of the other.
All history, all experienee
proves that the eontrivanoes of statesmen, the
playing off of interest, the division of powers,
and the nioely adjusted eheoks and balanoes so
mueh relied on by aonstitution-mongers, are,
and must be ineffioient without the presence
and energetie support of religion.
45
these examples, advoeated during different periods of his
life, are suffioient to show that there is a eertain similarity
and consistency in Brownson*s views on the rights of the individual.

He decides once and for all that the only intelligible

eoneeption of freedom is that it eonsists in the power to do
that whieh is just.

Renee freedom is not only based upon

authority but eonsists in obedien•e to authority.

The seareh

for the basis of man*s freedom, therefore, is identioally the

45 XII, 13.
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seareh for that whieh is ultimately sovereign.
The ultimate sovereign is God. He is the souree of man's
rights.

Hie will is written in man*s nature and diseoverable

therein by hie reason.

He oan disoover, at least, that the

state does not own man eompletely, and that man eonsequently
has rights whieh he holds independently of the state.
Whatever may be said of man's ability to read aright the
law of God written in nature, Brownson maintains that religion
is essential to guarantee praotioally that these rights will be
preserved intact.

Man has no guarantee that the state will not

violate his rights unless he oan appeal to something above the
state.

But in making the appeal he must be eertain that he

really appeals to the Will of God.

Henee there must be an in-

fallible representative of the Divine Will to whieh he oan make
his appeal.

This is Brownson's oontention before as well as

after his eonversion to the Oatholie lhurch.
!he most fUndamental of man's natural rights is, as we
have seen, the right of conscience; that is, true liberty of
oonseienoe as opposed to lieense,

Then too, he has a natural

right to propagate the raoe in the manner designed by God. He
has the right to hold property also.

These rights, and all tha

is implied neoesearily therein, are not held from the state,
Consequently they are not under the jurisdiction of the state,
but of the ehuroh.
Brownson applied this theory in eommenting upon numerous
praotieal affairs as was his task as a professional reviewer.
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In several plaees in his review he oondemns a Maine liquor law
46
beeause it is eontrary to the natural law. Brownson says that
a man has a right to as mueh food and drink, "even of that thin
47
and washy thing ealled lager beer" as he oan proeure honestly.
He admits that the state may punish one who is inebriated if he
disturbs or endangers the rights of others.
punish the abuse of a right.

It may therefore

But it eannot prevent the abuse of

a right by declaring the right itself to be an abuse.

In so

doing the state deelares itself a teaaher or morals, and thereby
·eneroaehes upon the domain of the Ohuroh.

~hus

a law preventing

the use of aleoholie beverages is null and void beeause it
violates a natural right.
In other instanses he shows that marriage pertains primar48
ily to the spiritual order. He argues therefore that the rights
and duties arising from that state are under the jurisdietion of
the spiritual authority.

Therefore when the state lays dow.n the

eonditions under whioh the marriage oontraat may be made or dissolved, it does so in violation of God's law.

'or the

~hureh,

not the state, has jurisdiotion over the spiritual order. In
49
assuming sueh jurisdietion, the state exeeeds its powers.
46
47
48
49

XIII, 339 ff.; X, 542.
XIII, 339.
XIII, 340-343.
He diseusses othe.r questions sueh as the respeetive rights of
the state, the ehurah anl parents in regard to edueation of
ehildren in various seaions of his Review. Of., i.e., XI, 401
-403; XII, 498; XIII, 403; XV,23.He holds that it is the provinee of the statesman and the theologian to determine these
matters praatioally; it is aonsequently unneeessary to present a detailed exposition of his view of these matters.
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It has been noted previously that there is a similarity
and oonsisteney in Brownson's views on the rights of the individual whioh he advooated during different periods of his life.
While this is true in regard to his aonelusions and the way in
whieh he applied them, it is not true of the arguments whioh
support them.

In the aourse of his philosophieal inquiries he

dropped, for the most part, the Pl&taatam whieh eharaeterized
his earlier essays.

However, he retained Leroux's dootrine of

eommunion and made it the basis of his later views.

~his

is

olear from the exposition of his doatrine whioh follows.
In his more mature view, Brownson again established the
thesis that man has rights against the state.

His exposition,

again, is based upon a consideration of man's nature.

lhia

time, however, man is eonsidered as a eonerete i.udividual. As
suoh he is first of all a ereature.
pendent being.

Consequently he is a de-

He exists at all only inasmueh as he partiei-

pates in or imitates, the being of God. In Brownson's language,
man must eommune with God.

50

He eommunes with Qod, or is related

50 Brownson aonsiders this dootrine of oommunion to be extremely important. It is applied in nearly every phase of his
philosophy. As is evident, he derived this doetrine from
Leroux. Although he defended what he held to be true in the
theory throughout hi~life, he says that "I did not and
eould not follow him lLerouxJ in all his applieations of the
great prineiple he had helped me to grasp and understand. He
sought to apply it in an un-Christian sense; I saw, or
thought I saw, in it a means of placing myself more in harmony with the eammon beliefs of Christendom, without
violenee to my reason." V, 130.

to

H~,

in three wtrs: through religion,

...
....
soeiety and nature.
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That is, man lives and aots and in doing so he imitates, in a
+aeble way, God.

He lives and develops hie eapaeities through

nature, for he eould not sustain his existanee even momentarily
without it.

He develops through soeiety beeause he is born into

and lives in a social group, and through religion beeause without it he eould not return to God, his final eause.

Eaeh one of

these is, therefore, a medium whereby man partiaipates in the
divine life.
The most important medium of man's eommunion with God is
religion.

God has not only ereated man, but through the Inearna

tion has given him the means whereby he ean return to Him and
thus fulfill the purpose of his axistenee.

And inasmueh as God

Himself has given him these means, man does not derive his right
to them from the state.

Renee it aan neither oonfer nor abro-

gate man's right to practiae his religion.

The right to prae-

tioe his religion, known also as the right of eonseienee, is
therefore the first and most important right whieh the individual holds independently of the. state.

52

Seoondly, man sustains himself in existenee and thereby
partieipates in the divine life by using the natural forees
52 "The right of eonseienee is exemption from all merely human
authority - a right to be held by all eivil soeiety as saered
and inviolable; and is the first and impassable barrier to
the power of the state. The state eu.not pass it without
violenee, without the most outrageous tyranny." XIII, 139, 22~;
Cf. also VI, 122.

ereated for that purpose.
through nature.

In this sense he oommunes with God

2'

Quite obviously the nature whieh sustains man's

life, the air he breathes and the food he eats, are not made by
soaiety •. They are made by God for man.

Consequently man's

right to them is held independently of soeiety.
53
termed the right to property.

This right is

thirdly, it is unquestionably true that sooiety eontributes to the development of man's life, and therefore that man
aommunes with God through it.

first of all the family, whi•h

ia aosaetety, is responsible for man•s existen•e•
into it and lives with it.

Be is born

The family is oonseq,.ntly ne•es-

sary to his growth and development.

But even the family is not

eompletely responsible for the existenee of an individual, for
the parents are generators, not ereators.

Beither is the fam-

ily eompletely responsible for sustaining his existen•e•

There

fore the individual has rights whioh are held independently of
the family.
Man is also dependent upon soeiety as a mature individual.
Outt.off from all eomm'Wlieation with his fellow man, he oould
not attain to his full stature as a man.

By living in soeiety

he oan actualize and develop potentialities of his nature to aa
63 "But the state does not ereate the right to property, and
its ohief right as its ohief duty in regard to it, is to pro
teet the proprietor in the free and full enjoyment of his
property. The right to hold property is prior to eivil
sooiety, and is one of those rights oalled the natural right
of man, whieh eivil society is instituted to proteet." XII,
361.
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extent impossible without it.

!eeause society is responsible

for the exietenee of aertain phases of the individual's life, it
is to that extent owner of them.

Oonsequently it has rights

over him.

Therefore it oan impose duties over as muah of the
54
individual's life as it has brought into existenae.
fhus man's threefold aommunion with God gives rise to three

institutions: religion, soaiety and property,

Man's right to

praotiae religion and to own property are held independently of
soaiety.

'hese rights and all that is implied in their preser-

vation are guaranteed by God who has given them to man, Soeiety
is not responsible for their existenee; it does not own them. It
has no right to abrogate them.

So•iety must protest them equal-

ly and in every individual beoause human nature is present
equally in every individual.
While the nature of eaeh man is equal, aonorete individuals
are unequal.

They oeaupy different positions in soeiety. For

example, some are lawyers, others doetors, politieians and
laborers.

Some men have a eomparatively large amount of proper-

ty: others have less.

In other words, the aetual possessions

aoquired by the aonerete individual as a member of society are
54 "Man does not depend exelusively on so•iety, for it is not
his only medium of aommunion with God, and therefore its
rights to him is neither absolute nor unlimited; but still he
depends on it, lives in it, and eannot enter into any eompaot
league, or alliance that sooiety does not authorize, or at
least permit. ~hese rights of soeiety override his rights
to himself •••• " XVIII, 34.
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unequal.

Rights whieh he aequires in this way are referred to

as vested or eivil rights beeause the individual holds and ae65
quires them as a member of eivil sooiety.
Now soeiety must proteet these vested rights, for if it
does not do so the natural rights themselves will be endangered.
This statement requires illustration rather than formal proof.
If, for example, a man is eleoted to Congress, society must
guarantee his right to be a eongressman.

If a man legally ae-

quires a pleee of property, society must protect his right to
hold it in order to proteet his natural right to property. If he
marries, soeiety must protect his right to be married to that
particular person.
Quite obviously, the natural law does not give to the individual the

ri~ht

to this partieular pieee of property or that,

or to have this partioular individual for a wife rather than some
other person.

Likewise, man has no natural right to be a oongre&s

-man. Thus these partieular rights vested in eoaerete individual&
are not precisely natural rights, and they are unequal.

Still i1

is elear that if soeiety does not protect the rights vested in
individuals who are members of society, the natural rights them56
selves would be endangered.
fhus far Brownson has based his argument for individual
rights on two distinet grounds.

56 XI, 168-171.
56 XI, 169-171.

The mature view just presented,
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when eompared with his earlier analysis of human aature, indicates the extent to whieh Brownson has divested himself of his
Platonism.
that

~aa

In the first argument presented Brownson has said
is an idea: his destiny is to aetualizl himself in in-

dividuals; the eonditions of this aetualization are expressed in
one word, eommunion, - eommunion with his kind, with nature, and
with God; and the conditions of this eommunion are expressed also
in one word, Freedom."

57

Later he argues simply that man is a dependent being.

The

nature God has given him requires for its preservation oommunioa
with God through religion, sooiety and property.

The rigbts of

the individual in regard to religion and to property exist independently of the state.

The state is not responsible for their

existenee; it does not own them.

Sinee these rights are held

independently of the state, the individual may arrest the action
of the state whieh deprives him of those rights.
It has been noted also that the most serious difficulty eneountered in regard to natural rights is a judieial one. Brownson will not countenance the theory that asserts as a principle
that the power to judge the validity of a state
be lodged in the individual.

la~

is, or ean

His reason is that if this princi-

ple is adopted and acted upon it would tend inevitably to anarehy.

On the other hand, the

p~wer

of judging the eonformity

or non-eonformity of an enaotment to the law of God eannot be

57

xv.

363.
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lodged in the state.

This asserts in pr1n•iple the supremaey of

the state, thereby permitting the individual,no appeal from its
decisions.

0onsequently he argues that there must be a 3udioial

power above the individual and above the state and independent
of both, whieh is aapable of determining infallibly whether or
not an enaotment of the state is contrary to the law of God. In
the absenee of such a power, or in the failure to recognize it.
soeiety must fluetuate between anarchy and absolutism.

~hue

the

praetieal recognition and guarantee of individual rights is due
to Ohristianity.
In

the enumeration of man's right as an individual and as

a member of society, no mention has been made of man's right to
participate in the administration of government.

In other words

Brownson's enumeration of rights has not ineluded the right to
vote.

The reason for this is the faot that the right to vote is

in a sense the right to partieipate in the exercise of authority
It implys the right to govern, and more partieularly, the right
to legislate.

Before discussing it in terms of suffrage, Brown-

son endeavors to determine the ultimate source of legislative
powe!. It is therefore necessary to turn to Brownson 1s exposition of law, whioh is presented in the following ehapter.

CHAPTER III
BROWNSON'S CONCEPTION OF LAW
In the preceding chapter Brownson has maintained that
society is not completely responsible for the existence of an in
dividual. It does not own him completely. Consequently its
rights over the individual are not complete and ultimate. Brownson adopts a similar approach to his discussion of law. He discusses law in terms of rights and ownership. In order to present
his thought accurately it is necessary to adopt his own approach
1

to the subject.
One of the most familiar and fundamental conceptions of an
individual, according to Brownson, is that of having a right to
whatever belongs to him. He goes on to say that whatever belongs
to a person is his because he owns it. Furthermore, he owns

1 Brownson undoubtedly assumes this point of departure at least
partially because of his audience. While his re~ders included
many professional philosophers, he does not, for the most
part, write exclusively for these. Consequently in treating
a philosophical subject in an essay intended for public consumption, he trys to begin with those ideas which are most
easily understandable and most readily acceptable to ordinarily educated persons. From these he proceeds to matters
more difficult, both from the standpoint of comprehension and
acceptability.
In applying this view to the point at issue, it must be
noted that Brownson believes that people are much more keenly
aware of their rights than of their obligation to obey law.
He says that ''We are deafened and wearied half to death with
the ceaseless babble about the rights of man •••• " XIV, 343.
Yet he approaches the discussion of law from the standpoint
of right to render the discussion more familiar.
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anything to the extent that he is responsible for its existenoe.
Now an individual is responsible for the existenee of a taing to
the extent that he is its maker.

The most fundamental notion of

right is therefore the right of the maker to his produet.

2

Continuing his argument, Brownson points out that ownership
or the right to one's produat is the source of obligations as
well as rights.

This is evident beoause whatever a person owns

is owed to him.

He has it as his due.

right itself is

unintelliiib~e

On any other supposition

and entirely devoid of meaning.

The preeise point Brownson attempts to establish by this
analysis becomes clearly evident when his argument is reversed:
He holds that because there is a maker there is ownership; be~ause

of ownership there is right.

Right is therefore conse-

quent upon ownership and coextensive with it.
Now it :!s important to note that it is beaause of ownership
that something is owed; for if there were no owners it would be
impossible to owe or to be obligated to anyone.

And because

ownership is in this way the souroe and origin of duty or obligation, the right identified with it likewise gives being to
duties.
From this viewpoint, therefore, Brownson says that right
3
defines duties and imposes obligations binding upon others.

2 XII, 300.
3 XIV, 330.

..

"
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To define duties and to impose obligations binding upon others
is, however, the distinot and peouliar function of a

legis~ator.

And in view of the fact that right does define the duties and
obligations of others in the manner already indieated, it is
therefore legislative in oharaeter.

Thus Brownson oonoludes

that the question or right is a question of law.

Oonsequently
4

the term right may be used legitimately in the sense of jus.
Having eleared the ground, Brownson*s own proeedure is
olear.

It is necessary to determine the ultimate maker of all

things, for He is their owner.

Ownership, furthermore, is the

source of right, whieh in turn is legislative in charaeter because it defines duties and imposes obligations.

Oonsequently

the source and origin of legislative power is determined in determining the ultimate maker of all things.
Aooording to Brownson Q.od alone is a maker in the striotest
8ense of the term.

The reason, of oourse, is that in making all

things He used no previously existing material.

He is therefore

eompletely and solely responsible for the existence of creatures
He owns them eompletely.

Consequently His right in regard to

creatures is complete and ultimate: It imposes and defines their
duties.

In terms of law this means that God is the ultimate

eame up n an ar io e on
,.-...,....,c-only in
e sense of jus • in the sense
in whieh right is leg slative, makes the law, and imposes and
defines duty. The question or right we showed to be a question of law, beoause man*s right is law for all but himailf,
and imposes and defines their duty to him ••• " XIV, 330.
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souree of authority over man•s free will.

The authority is His

in virtue of His creative aot whioh gives being to man a a
ereature distinct from God.

5

A brief examination of the view presented thus far indicates that Brownson has been interested in law only to the extent that it concerns man.

He has endeavored to show olearly

why God has dominion over man.

The easiest way to do so, in

his estimation, is to show that God owns man.
Having thus aonfined his discussion of law to man, Brownson says that it is an aot of authority over free will. Having
showed that God has iominion over man, he says that God is the

5 "Our duty to obey God is the correlative of his right to
eommand us, and his right to command us is in his right of
property in us, and his right of property in us is in his
having created us. All dominion rests on ownership, and all
real ownership on creation. We found, then, God*s sovereignty of the universe on his creative aet, by whioh he has produced it from nothing." XIV, 299-800.
In regard to the reason why Brownson puts his argument in
this particular form, he comments as follows: HNo doubt a
correct answer may be found to the question, Why are we bound
to obey God? in the current teachings of the schools; but
we have not met one in so olear, precise, and definite a form
that we oan easily use it in our controversies without our
modern deniers of the obligation to worship God, and of moral
accountability. We think, however, that a very simple answer
may be given, not chargeable with novelty, or of being
original with us, - though seldom stated in the precise shape
in which we present it, - and whieh will meet our wants."
XIV, 299. This, of course, substantiates the reason already
given for his point of departure. Cf. n. 1.

36

..,

souree of authority over man's free will.
It is not a sufficient explanation for the basis of law,
however, to state simply that it originates in God.

For al-

though One and Simple in Himself, He is conceived by finite mindl
under many aspects.

auoh a mode of conception follows as a eon-

sequence of the limited intellectual power of the creature.
The creature, for example, thinks of God as intelligent and
possessed of a free will.

Beoause of this mode of oonceiving

God it is necessary to determine further the basis of law by
assigning it to either one or both of these attributes.
On this question Brownson unhesitatingly declares that the
7

ultimate ground of law is God's will.

He does not, however,

attempt to defend the view that law is the product of will to
the entire exolusion of intellect.

He maintains rather that

6 XIV, 303. Brownson says also that he is aware of the fact that
the term law"··· is j»equently used in a wider sense than
that in which we here use it. It is frequently applied to
inanimate and irrational nature. Thus men speak of the laws
of matter, of motion, of plants, of animals; they speak also
of intrinsic laws, and laws of instinct; but in all these
instances the word is used in an analogical or metaphysical,
not in ita toe and prober sense." XIV, 303. This treatment o I'
law is, of course, vastly different from that of st. Thomas,
I-II, q. 90, a. 1, x., wherein is found the familiar "le•
!uaedam regula eat." However, in answer to the first "'"DJeotio~'n the same article, st. f.homas notes that law "lioitur duplioiter esse in aliquo ••• " The seeond of these includes
"••• quaelibet inolinatio proveniens ex aliqua lege potest
diei lex non essentialiter, sed quasi participative! et hoe
modo inolinatio ipsa membrorum ad oonoupisoendum lex
membrorum voeatur."
7 XIV. 304.
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alth?ugh both baoulties are necessary, will plays the dominant
role.

In order to understand the respective functions of in-

telleot and will in the promulgation of a law, it is neaessary
to note that tt is possible to view law from two distinot
aspeots.
In the first plaoe law may be oonsidered from the standpoint of its oontents and purpose.

That is, it may be viewed

for the preeise purpose of ascertaining what it is that is
oommanded and also the purpose to be achieved by the command.
From this viewpoint, Brownson readily oonoedes that law is
clearly an aot of the intelleot; for only an intelleot is
oapable of grasping the relationship between means and ends,
and therefore it alone is capable of formulating a plan or a
rule of action.

8

Aeoording to Brownson, however, this oonoeption of law is
deficient.

He argues that a mere plan as suoh does not bind

the will.

In other words, however reasonable a plan may be,

however good its purpose, it l88aoivth$•ebyt,n aot of autherity over free will.

Thus a plan requires the addition of
9
.
another faetor in order totransform it into law.

8 XlV, 333. Cf. also XIV, 305, and the following, "If we eonaider law as to its eontents, or in answer to the question
why the sovereign chooses to enaot it, it is no doubt aotus
intelleotus, but in that sense it is only improperly oalled
law." XIV, 347.
9 XIV, 305.
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In the seoond plaoe, therefore, law must be considered with
a view to aseertaining the oharaeteristie whioh determines a
law as such; that is, as binding upon the will.

In other words

it is necessary to determine what it is that gives law its
formal oharaoter as law.
From this Viewpoint law must have its origin in the will,
for will is the moving power.

Only the will oan oommand, and

without it a legislator eommanding or imposing a rule, there is
no law.

Consequently law derives its eharaater as a binding

foroe from will and not from the intellect.

Sinee this is the

formal element which determines a law as suoh, it is clear that
the divine will is for Brownson the source of law.

Brownson

summarizes his view of the question as follows:
Law is not actus rationis, but aotus imperii,
therefore an aot of will, for will, not reason,
is the imperative faoulty. Reason enlightens
will, but will oommands reason. Reason is
declarative, not legislative, does not found
the law, but deolares what the law is. It
tells us what is good, what is bad, what is
desirable, what is undesirable, but does not
bind us to seek the one or avoid the other.
Law is the voice of authority, and derives
its binding force as law from Him who eommands,
not from what is commanded. To know whether
it is law or not, we ask not, What is said?
but, Who speaks? God speaks - is the ultimate
reason for all obedienoe; for who may say unto
him, What doest thou?, or, Why oommandest
thou thus? law undoubtedly is reasonable, but
it is law not beeause it is reasonable, but
beeause it is the expressed will of the
sovereign, of him who has the right to impose
his own will as law.
10 XIV, 303.

10
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In dissussing law with a view to determining its ultimate
souroe in either the will or intellect, Brownson is not at all
interested in attempting to settle the question in terms of the
respective funetions of these faculties considered in themselves
He is much more interested in the question from the standpoint
of the praetiaal difficulties encountered in adopting either of
these views.

Thus he pursues the same question still further in

terms of the eonsequenoes involved in adopting either the
primaey of the will or intelleot in regard to law. For he says
that "It is only by means of plaeing obligation solely in the
fact that God wills it, that we know how to oarry on the war
11
against the peculiar errors of our times."
Brownson contends that if reason in the sense of intellect
is legislative in oharaoter it is impossible to show that God
legislates freely.

The argument whereby he supports this con-

elusion is very brief:
If, to get law in an obligatory sense in whieh
it is law for the will, we go further, and
assert reason not merely as deelarative, but
as striotly legislative, we then lose all free
legislation, for reason is neeessarily, not
free. By plaoing the obligation as well as
the rectitude of the law in reason, we plaoe
it in the eternal and neoessary essence of
Godt and then God is no longer a free legislator, for in his essence he is necessary being.
The law, then, is of necessity, and God has no
freedom in governing the world.
12

ll XIV, 344.
12 XIV, 342.
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In this argument

Brown~on

identified with His essence.

says that God's reason is
Consequently it possesses all of

the attributes of that essence.

Therefore God's reason is

eternal, immutable, neeessary being.

Sinee reason is neeessary,
13
the laws originating therein are neeessary laws.
Now in saying that God's essenee is necessary, Brownson

means that He exists necessarily.
under compulsion.

He does not mean that God is

But again, creatures cannot, because of thai

limitations, express all they know about God in one eonoept.
The conceptions of God as eternal and immutable essence, for
example, is not the conception of God as free. The conception
of something flowing from His eternal and immutable essenee is
not the conception of something produeed by His free act. In
order to grasp this aspect of God it is neeessary again to
speak of

H~

in terms of intellect and will.

Brownson readily ooneedes that both intellect and will are
necessary for a free act.

Without intellect there eould be no

will, for it is only because the intellect presents objeets to

13 At this point one might objeet that God's will is likewise
identified with His essence and is therefore necessary being
Thus it would follow also that laws originating therein are
likewise necessary. Bhile Brownson neither proposes the
objeetion nor answers it explicitly, it oeours rather
obviously. That it is not an objection for Brownson is
brought out in the course of the discussion.
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it that the will oan function.

14
Nevertheless he holds that the

intelleot is determined by its object.
15
compels its assent.

The evidence of truth

He refers to the will, however, as the monarch of the
mind. Its assent is not eompelled by an external object. It is
not determined to adhere tD any one of the objects presented to
it. Consequently will is the ultimate ground of freedom: "The
reason presents the end and the motive for seeking it, and the

14 Cf.,for example, IX, 240; III, 124; X, 156.
15 Now it is clear that the truth or falsity of Brownson's view
depends upon the truth or falsity of his view that intelleot
is neoessary, not free. It is impossible, of oourse, in a
work such as this to treat such a2subjeet exhaustively.
This would require a thesis of oonsiderable length, sueh as
the study of Sidney Raemers, America~ Foremost Philosopher,
(already referred to), who wrote the work for the purpose of
explaining what Brownson meant by his theory of knowledge.
The soope and importanoe of the problem concerning the
nature and respective functions of intellect and will in a
~':free aet, as well as the factors entering into its solution,
are indieated elearly by Anton-Hermann Chroust, ttHugo
Grotius and the Seholastie Natural Law Tradition," New
Soholastiaism, (April, 1943), XVII, No.2, 101-133.--Brownson himself has no formal discussion of the problem.
If he appreeiates it as a problem he attempts to avoid it
by saying the important consideration is the fact that man
knows and wills by means of faculties. He does not .ooniiter
intelleot and will separately in order to discover what they
are in themselves and how they are related. Cf. I, 105-115,
230; XIV, 194; VI, 33; IX, 240-241; II, 33 ff.
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will ehooses or rejects it, determines to gain or not to gain
16
it.
Brownson's view of the respective functions of intellect
and will in a free aot is consequently a very simple one. The
intellect seeks knowledge at the command of the will. Having
been thus oommanded, the intellect in turn enlightens the will.
But since the will is superior to the intelleot, it is under no
obligation to aoaept any particular object presented to it. Thus
the final decision in regard to the object to be adhered to is
made by the will.

It is consequently the ultimate source of the

free act.
On the basis of this view of intellect and will, it is
alear that God's intellect cannot be the source of law.

For if

it were, law would be conceived as existing prior to the oommand
of God's will. And if it is prior to the command of His will, it
eannot oome into existence as a result of His free act, because
His will must be viewed as the ultimate source of His freedom.

16 X, 156. Of. also the following! "Reason enlightens will, but
will oommands reason." XIV, 303. Further, "But though the
soul operates simultaneously in all of its operations as
intellect and will, the will is the commanding faculty, the
monarch of the mind, as it has sometimes been called, and it
is in some sense as its servant, not as its master, that the
intellect •••rates. The motive power of all intellectual life
is the will, love, the love of the good •••• It is the spring
and motive, or rather mobile, of all our actions, and must
therefore hold the first plaoe in our philosophy, whether we
speak of the subject or of the object." I, 352-353.

Thus if the divine intelleat were the source of law, God would
have no choice in the promulgation of the laws whereby He
governs His creatures.

In

fact He would not be free to command

or not to command the existence of creatures, for His will
would be limited by laws existing prior to the command of His
will. Thus Brownson concludes that if law were grounded in
intellect "••• no sovereign will would be requisite to constitute it law.

Ita obligation would be in what it commands, not

in him who oommands, whiah no Catholio theologian, and none but
an infidel or liberal Christian ean admit."

17

17 XIV, 347. Brownson adds that St. Thomas treats law from an

entirely different viewpoint. His concluding statement,
however, involves a large question, on Which Brownson has
spoken hastily. st. Thomas explicitly makes law a thing of
reason in s.Th., I-II, q. 90, a. l, a, and eertainly seems
to exclude will as suoh. He makes the relatiQ4 of will to
law its regulation by the reason. Ibid., ad 3~: "•••
voluntas de his quae imperantur, aa-Eee quod legis rationem
habeat, oportet uod sit ali ua ratione re
ata: et hoe
modo intelligitur, quo vo un as princip s ras quoted in the
objection1 habet vigorem legis ••• " Cf. als~ q. 93, a. l, c:
"••• ratit divinae sapientiae moventis omnia ad debitum
finem obtinet rationem legis." Obviously, this is a difficult
question, and I am only trying to show the radioal difference between Brownson and st. ~homas. !he metaphysieal
difference ia perhaps made clearout ins. Th., I, q. 16, a.4.
~hee,,B.&d22•, st. Thomas says "Primo est ratio entia,
seoundoratio veri, tertio ratio boni ••• " This unequivooal
ptiority of being and true over good is one with which
Brownson was not in sympathy. His constant tendency was to
platonize. Moreover, he did not make the necessary distinction between the speculative and practical reason, even
in God. However this is not an explanation of st. Thomas•
doctrine, but an attempt to indicate that he and Brownson
are on divergent lines of thought.
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Suoh a view is, however, clearly incompatible with the
Christian conception of God, for God is free.
law.

He is above all

His will eannot be conceived as being restricted by law.

He is under no compulsion in regard to creatures or to the laws
whereby He governs them.
free act of God.

In

Both are produced from nothing by a

order to conceive of God as a free legis-

lator it is therefore necessary to oonolude that God's will is
the ultimate source and foundation of law in the sense in which
law imposes an obligation.
Thus far Brownson has shown that legislative power is
derived from ownership and is coextensive with it.
has shown that God is sole and

ex~lusive

Further, he

owner of creatures be-

oause He alone is responsible for their existence.

Since he

takes this position it is clear that Brownson must hold that
legislative power is vested solely and e xolusively in God.

On

this point is is very explicit:
God is sole legislator. He is not merely
supreme legislator with subordinate legislators under him, each a proper legislator
within a given sphere, but sole and universal
legislator, not in the sense of eminent legislator only, as he is the eminent cause of
all that is done by tacond causes, but in
the sense of direct legislator, so that all
legality, all the binding force of law, all
law as law, emanates directly from his will.

18

In this case Brownson's meaning is quite clear. He says

18 XIV, 332.
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simply that creatures do not participate or share God's
tive authority as they do His causal power.

legisl~~

This means that God

aommunieates His causal power to oreatures but He does not oommunioate to them His authority as a legislator.

Consequently

there are second causes but no seoond legislators.
This view of Brownson is in harmony with and is neeessitated by the general doctrine presented thus far.

First

he has shown that right is legislative in oharacter.
turn, is based upon ownership.

o~

all

Bight, in

And sinoe God is solely and oom-

pletely responsible for the existence of creatures, He owns all
that they are and oan acquire.

Beeause he owns them in toto,

no part is left over for anyone else to own.

Consequently no

one else has any right to any part of the creature or of his
activity.

And since God alone has right, it follows that He
19
alone is legislator.
Now it is olear that beoause Brownson denys legislative

authority to creatures he must also deny that they have rights.
Consequently they cannot be owners.

While this is clearly

Brownson's doctrine it is equally evident that he does not deny

19 "We can owe only on aondition that we are, to the extent of
our indebtedness, not our own, and oan owe only him whose we
are. We owe God because we are his, and all we are and have,
because all we are and have is his, sinoe he is its author and
giver. We eannot owe beyond all we are and have, this is,
beyond our whole being, and if we owe the whole to God, it is
olear that we oan owe no one else." V, 2'12.
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the reality of second causes, for he has Just said that God is
20
the eminent cause of all that is done by second causes.
It is hardly necessary to point out in detail that these
views of Brownson seem to be mutually incompatible.

For in

conceding that a creature is a cause, Brownson must obviously
concede that he is responsible for the existence of things, for
this is the function of a cause.

Since the creature is to some

extent responsible for the existence of things, he must be, to
that extent, owner.

Consequently he must also have right and

with it legislative power.

Sinoe such a conclusion is ineom-

patible with Brownson's view of God as sole and exclusive legislator, he is obliged to show how he oan maintain consistently
that creatures are real second eauses but not real legislators.
Now in order to understand Brownson's view it is obviously
necessary to understand precisely what he means when he says
that creatures ere second causes.

His meaning is discernible b7

comparing and contrasting the activity of seaond causes with
that of the first cause.

In doing so it will be shown why God's

20 Of. also the following: "But either creatures are second
causes or they are not. If not, they are merely phenomenal,
and we must be ~antheists, for the essenoe of Pantheism is
in denying second causes. If ereatures are second causes,
then, as they have confessedly their type or exemplar in
God, they must in the order of second causes copy or imitate
the divine creative act." I, 376.

L
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sotivity gives Him right while that of creatures does not.
In the first place the creative activity of God presents
itself under two aspects.

According to Brownson one of these is

"••• the procession by way of creation, not emanation, of
existences from God, as their first or efficient cause, and the
other their return, without being absorbed into God, ••• to him
21

as their final cause or last end."

The procession of oreatures

from God is referred to as the initial order of creation or its
first ayale. Their return to Him is referred to as the second
22

oyele or the teleological order.
Now the aetivity in the initial order, and to some extent
in the teleologioal order, is distinctively God's. Creatures do
not and cannot participate or share in the act by whioh God
has produoed them from nothing: "To assert such participation
would place us in the order of the first cause, give us at
least a share in the work of creation, and thus assert, if not
23
pantheism, polytheism."
God has willed not only that creatures exist, but also
that they return to Him as final cause.

God has created them,

but He has created them for Himself alone.

The plan according

to which creatures proceed from God and return to Him is also
distinctively God's. He is sole creator, acting for an end; as

21 XIV, 206.
22 III, 363; XIV, 206.
23 XIV, 313.

suoh he alone designates the end and imposes the obligation or
the law aocording to whioh His creatures must act in order to
attain their end.
24
no activity.

Thus far the creature has no voioe, no will,

In Brownson's estimation, therefore, the aativity of the
creature is confined to the teleological order.

As causes their

activity is produetive, but it is productive only in relation to
their end.
eanc~ot

This means that while the divine plan does not and

give the creature any share in the aot whereby Me is

created and obliged to return to God, it does include the
existence of man as a second cause whose own aetivity is required

~gr

the attainment of·the end God has willed him to

attain.
The position and the activity of the ereature is thus more
elearly defined.

God has imposed upon His creatures the obliga-

tion to return to Him. Further, each ereature must tend toward
God or return to Him according to his nature.

This is the only

eonceivable way in which he can tend toward God because the
nature of the creature is the only center of his activity. From
a different viewpoint this means that God direots all things to
their end in accordance with the nature He has given them. That
is, having given a nature to a creature, He ;overns it accordingly. Sinee man•s nature is rational, God governs him accord-

24 III, 74.
25 XIV, 206, 312; III, 74.
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ing to it.

God imposes upon man the obligation to return to Htm;

sinoe his nature is rational, the return to God must be ·rational..
In terms of the teleologioal order, this means that man's
activity is confined to the seoond oyele of creation.

It is the

sole sphere of his activity. His return to God must be intelligent; but man has a faculty whi•h is superior even to his intellect, and is more truly the source of his own activity.
his free will.

This is

Consequently man is obliged to tend toward God

by his free, voluntary aet.

Thus Brownson says that the seeond

oyole of oreation "••• is the sole sphere of man's,aotivity, and
26
it consists in voluntary obedienoe to the law of God •••• "
Brownson does not, therefore, deny the activity of second
oauses. He concedes to them the highest activity compatible with
their position as creatures who owe everything to God:
The activity of second causes is none the lese
activity because confined to the second •yale, or
return to God as the end for which they were made.
Undoubtedly all activity is, in a oertain sense,
productive, otherwise it would not be aotivity;
but the activity of second causes produces only in
the order of the end, and in man is termed virtue,
whioh is the product of dut.f discharged, and therefore is inaluded in the return to God. This return
to God is in man more than an instinctive, more even
than an intelligent return; it is a free, voluntary
return, in whioh the end is not only apprehended,
but freely willed. There is no higher conceivable
activity of seaond oauses than this, none which
approaches nearer the similitude of the divine
activity. Man is never more truly or distinctively
man, and never performs an aot more properly his
own, than when performing an act of obedienoe, or
discharging a duty.
27
26 III, 76.
27 XIV, 313.
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Now it is olear that Brownson's dootrine, while denying
absolute ownership, does not ·deny ownership to ereatures in
every sense of the term. For he has asserted that God has
_!iven to the ereature a nature whioh is the souroe of his
activities.

But it is elear that whatever God gives, He has

the right to give, for He is absolute owner.

•·

Consequently what

ever He has as a faot given to oreatures is really their own.
He merely denies that suoh ownership originates in the oreature
and affirms that its ao.uree is God who wills him to have it.
On this basis, however, it is clearly impossible for the
oreature to own anything, even his own existence, absolutely.
For if the creature were absolute owner, he oould do with himself whatever pleased his fancy.

Thus his aotivity would not

be subject to God's law.
This is impossible, however, for God Himself aannot dispense the creature from the obligations arising from his position as God's subject.

For God's dominion over the oreature is

founded on His oreative aot.

He is absolute owner of man by

the fact that He is his maker or creator.
man owes everything to God.

For the same reason

Therefore he is obliged to render

to God the tribute of his being.

Thus God's dominion over man

remains as long as His creative aot persists.

And sinee man

is and must remain a 0reature, he is, and must remain, subject
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to God's

law~

...

It is olear, therefore, that man*s ownership of all things,
including himself, is and must remain ownership subject to God's
will.

Consequently his ownership is never absolute. This, how-

ever, is not ownership in the strictest sense of the term. For
anyone who owns a thing absolutely has the right to do What he
pleases with his own.

Consequently man*s ownership, or that of

any creature, is more aeourately deseribed by the term steward29

ship.
Now in view of the faet that creatures are owners as stewards or trustees of God, it is clear that they have rights in
the same way, for right is consequent upon ownership and ooextensive with it.

Thus it is convenient to speak of the rights

and duties of creatures to themselves and to eaoh
same way that they are spoken of as owners.

othe~

in the

But since the

ereature has rights only as a steward of God, it is clear that
his rights must be respected only in that way.

That is, the

creature is not and cannot be the ultimate recipient of that
which is due to him.

For if he were, he would own his rights

28 Of. above, n. 6, wherein Brownson says that God's sovereignty
is founded on His creative aot. In V, 271, Brownson shows
that God oannot dispense us from the obligation to worship
Him, whioh "inoludes all our obligations," without annihilating His own essenoe.

·ao

in his own name rather than as God's steward.

This means that areatures have rights and duties to themsalves and to others, but their rights and duties are binding
because of God's law.

For as absolute ow.ner God doos not de-

mand direot and immediate payment of all that is owed to Him.
He has, in His goodness, transferred part of that devt to His
31
creatures and made it paya~le to themselves on His order.
For example, in willing the existence and preservation of
men, God wills them to have and to preserve that existence.
Consequently each individual has not only a right to his existenee as God's 'gift, but also the obligation to respect it in
himself and in others.

For if God had not willed the obliga-

tion to respeot the rights He has given, the rights themselves
would be meaningless.

Beeause the creature does not have in

and of himself the right to his existence, he aannot in his own
name bind himself and others to respect it. Consequently it is

30 "I am aware that moralists are s~eoustomed to divide our
duties into three classes - duties to ourselves, duties to
our neighbor, and duties to God, and that some persons suppose that each class stands on its own ground, independent
each of the others, so that we might deny our duties to God,
and still assert duties to ourselves or duties to our neighbor. But this is, as you perceive, a grave error. The division of our duties into the three classes just mentioned is
convenient and perfectly proper, when the question is not
as to the ultimate ground of duty, and it is only proposed
to treat our speoifio duties simply in relation to their im
medi&te objects; but when we are treating of the principle
of duty itself, the ultimate ground of all obligation, it i
not admissable; for then all duties resolve themselves into
duties to God •••• " V, 273.
31 XIV, 301.
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alear that the righ$s and duties of areatures to themselves and
32
to others derive their binding foree direetly from God's will.
This means simply that in the event a ereature is deprived
for example, of his life, to whioh he has a right as God's gift
he suffers a loss of something God has given to htm. The one
who deprives him of the right sins, or oommits a moral evil beeause he has broken God's law whieh binds his will to respeot
the lives of others. Brownson says "The evil ts to the sufferer
moral wrong is to God, whose property is injured, and whose
33
law is broken."
t~e

Thus far !rownson has maintained that the sole purpose of
the ereature is to return to God. His return must be made in
sooordanae with his nature, for that is his only source of
aativity.

Sinee man is a creature endowed with a free will,

ae

must tend toward God by his own free, voluntary aot. He does
this by freely willing to obey God•s law.
It is impossible, however, for man to eonform his own will
to God's unless he has some knowledge of What it is that God
has oommanded.

Consequently, sinoe God's plan requires man. to

obey His law, it also requires him to have some knowledge of
it. Without suoh knowledge obedience would be impossible.
As a matter of faot God has made it possible for man to
disoover the law aoaording to whioh he is governad. In the

32 XIV, 336-339.
33 XIV, 337.

firs~
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place He has made a revelation to man.

The positive commands

embodied therein are referred to as the supernatural law.

34

Beeondly, God's command is embodied in the universe He has
created, and it is diseoverable therein by the light of the
reason natural to man.

Brownson does not prove this statement

by any elaborate argumentation.
has willed the existence and

He says simply that since God

preserva~ion

of the natural order

it is evident that "••• when we have aseertained that this or
that is necessary to its preservation, we may know without
further inquiry that God commands it."

35

It is termed natural

because it is promulgated through natural reason.
While the term natural law is a convenient one, it cannot
be used in any sense which implies that there is a law whieh
the natural order itself imposes or originates.
the natural order, is a creature.

For nature, or

As suoh it has no right or

ownership absolutely, or in its own name, independently of God.
Therefore it has no authority whatsoever to impose obligations.
Consequently in speaking of the natural law one must be
careful to refrain from using the term in a sense which implys
that nature is a seeondary or intermediate legislator.

Thus

Brownson says that "The law of nature is, we grant, true law,
but it derives its character of law directly from the will of

34 XIV, 385.

35 XIV, 306.
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God, not from nature as second oause."

Brownson describes accurately the sense in whioh he uses
the term natural law when he says:
We do not deny the obligation of the law of
nature, but we do not call it law precisely
because without fulfilling it we-cannot fulfill the purpose of our existenoe, nor the
law of nature precisely because it is impressed
upon nature, innate, intrinsic, and operative
in all natural actions, but because it is
the law of God, the will of our sovereign,
commanding us to observe the order of nature,
and forbidding us to depart from it.

37

This means that the natural order must be preserved because God
has willed its e:x:istenee and preservs.tion. Whatever is neoessar
to the existenoe and preservation of the natural order is, ipso
faoto, willed by God. The souroe of the obligation to obey
nature, to preserve its existence, is not in nature itself, but
in its Author.

In this sense the natural law is in no sense

distinct from God's law, or from His direet and immediate command. It is called natural only beoa.use it is promulgated not
supernaturally, but through the reason natural to man.
Before proceeding with the discussion it is necessary to
examine the position Brownson has taken thus far.

The chapter

is, in a sense, an outline of what Brownson intends to say
specifically about the state. A summary is presented with a
view to determining why Brownson has taken the position he has,

36 XIV, 332.
37 XIV, 312.

~
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and what it means to him as a politiaal philosopher.
He has held that God is the sole and exclusive legislator
of the universe.

He derives His right to legislate beeause He

is its maker, and therefore ow.ner with absolute right.

There

are no intermediate legislators having authority to impose obligations in their own name, beaause there are no intermediate
ereators.

There are none who have the kind of ownership that

is consequent upon creation.

The natural law is the command of

God, promulgated through nature or natural reason, which obliges
man to preserve the natural order created by God.

Anything

necessary to its preservation is by that fact authorized or
commanded by God.
On this basis it is clear that Brownson must show that
society is in the natural order whose existence and preservation
is obligatory beaause God oommands it.
tion to

~eserve

posed by God.

In this way, the obliga-

the existence of soeiety is an obligation im-

Obedience is consequently a duty, a moral virtue;

disobedience is a sin, a violation of God's command.

Thus

Brownson's position requires him to defend the view that the
authority of society is derived from the natural law.
An

analysis of his view of right presented above indicates

that it is merely a continuation of his exposition of individual
rights presented in the preceding ehapter, wherein he has shown
that the right of the state must be derived - it oannot be absolute. If its authority is absolute, underived, there is no plaee
for the rights of the individual.
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In the present Qhapter he has merely

ap~lied

view to the individual rather than the state.

that same

For he has said

that the individual has no native, inherent, underived right.
The rights of the individual must be derived from God - as muoh
so as those of the state.
He has endeavored to show, somewhat eireuitously perhaps,
that God alone possesses right in the
sensa of the term.

absol~te

and unqualified

Consequently all other rights must be not

absolute, but deriwed - and from God alone.

Thus it is false to

hold that the right of the state is underived and absolute.

On

the same ground it is equally false to hold that the right of
the individual is underived and absolute.
Further, to say that God gives man rights is not to deny
that man has sueh rights.
faat thut

~od

They do not lose their reality by the

gives them to man.

Sinae man derives his rights

from God, who wills him to have them, anyone depriving a man of
suoh rights violates God's law.

Thus if man•s rights are eon-

sidered as gifts from God, their preservation is more certain
than if they are considered as his own.
Brownson's discussions of right inalude, in a sense, the
limple statement that he will not present his conception of the
state until he has shown that there cannot be in it any absolutes whieh may eollide.

Again, in the preceding ahapter he has

Ehown that the possession of a right carries with it the right
to define, to judge, to determine its limits.
state, sueh right involves absolutism.

Affirmed of the

Affirmed of the indivi-

,.--
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dual, it is nothing more than the extension of the Protestant
38
prinaiple of private judgment in the politieal order. It is
anarohy.
Having stated the conditions under which he will discuss
the problem of individual liberty versus publia authority, Brown
son endeavors to prove the proposition that the authority of the
state must be derived from God through the natural law. In doing
so Brownson must show that society is natural and that its preservation is consequently commanded by God.
of the

p~oblem

Thus his solution

of the·respective rights of the individual and

the state must begin with his discussion of the origin of
soaiety and its authority.

38 XIV, 308, 344.

CHAPTER IV
TEE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT IN CONTRACT
When he deals with certain questions, the analyst of
son's thought sometime's feels that there is

mue~

B~own

justiee in

James Russell Lowell's fine lines:
The worst of it is, that his logic'• so strong,
That of two sides he commonly chooses the wrong;
If there is ohlr one, why he'll split it in two,
1
And first-pummel this half, then that, black and blue.
One suoh question is the origin of government.
wrote a good deal on it.
Catholic reviewer.

Brownson

But he wrote as a reviewer, and as a

Consequently he not only dissects and criti-

cizes other men's views but oomplieates his dissection and
oritioism by his zeal for retaining truths he may find in them.
As Arthur Schlesinger says - not altogether unfairly - B;.?wnson
"••• usually decided that eaeh side of a question has its truth,
and his inclination was to build a complete answer by heaping
2

the truths together."
Whether or not Brownson's theory of government is a mere

1 "A Fable for Crities", cited by Schlesinger, 278.
2 Schlesinger, 287. Brownson's own attitude is illustrated in
the following: "We regard it as the mark of an ill-natured, a
narrow minded, or carping eritie to read a book simply to find
in it something that he ean pounee upon, and hold up to publie
execration as unsound in morals or incorrect in theology ••••
The great aim of the generous and noble-minded Catholic eriti•
is to recognize what there is in his author that is true and
good, worthy of commendation, and to pass lightly over small
ar incidental errors, for our great work is not so much to avoid error as to bring out and appropriate truth.•' XJl~ 293- 294

----------------------------------~~~----~~~~~~~~~~~.
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congeries of truths, the fact is that his theory of the origin
of government must be constructed partially from his criticisms
mf ot~er men, and other possible.theories. Prior to his conversion, when he was unfamiliar with the scholastics, Brownson
recognized four possible theories or grounds for the origin of
government and of authority. Some time later he expanded his
list to include eight such theories.

3

In each of these lists appear theories which endeavor to
aooount for the origin of authority on a purely human basis.
They appear under the oommon name of the sooial contract. Now
the sooial contract for Brownson has two principle variants: thE
authority of society is derived from a contract entered into by
sovereign individuals; the authority of society inheres in the
people collectively who possess authority as a unit. The first
of these Brownson regards as more properly the social contract,
and we shall present it in this chapter. The second he prefers
to oall the democratic theory, and we shall present it in the

3 In his first essays on the origin and ground of government
Brownson finds that government may originate in: 1. The express appointment of God; 2. The spontaneous development of
human nature; 3. The authority of the father in the family;
4. The social compact formed by the people in convention
assembled. XV, 310. In his American Republio Brownson expands
his list to eight. Government originates: 1. In the right of
the father to govern his child; 2. In a convention or oompact; 3. In the people collectively; 4. In the spontaneous
development of nature; 6. In the express appointment of God;
6. Further its authority may be derived from God through the
pope; 7. through the people; a. through the natural law.
XVIII, 18-19.
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ehapter whieh follows.
That "government is and must be authority exercised over
... 5

subjects " was for Brownson axiomatio.
use for the term self-government.

Therefore he had little

Sinoe government without a

alear out distinetion of governor and governed was for him an
impossibility, he looked on self-government as a misleading,
even a perniaious misnomer. Names have more power than we oom6

monly think.

A failure to distinguish in so oalled self-gov-

ernment between governor and governed may lead to a loss of
aatij.ori ty:

''~he

influence of names is greater than is

e~ommonly

imagined. A misnomer involves usually an error as to the thing.
If we oall our government self-government, and contend for it

4 In his first discussion of the theory that the authority of
government may originate in the people, Brownson observed tha~
the term people may be used either distributively or collectively. Thus he aritiaized one theory which has distinot
phases or aspects. In his Ameriean Republil he retained the
same idea, but for the sake of elai"l""fylie treats these
variations in distinct places under the headings: the origin
of government in convention ( XVIII1 27-40) ana the origin
of authority in sooiety or people eolleetively which he calls
the demooratie theory. XVIII, 41. In his oritioism ~f the
contract theory he mentions that it has been advocated by
Hobbes, Loeke and Rousseau. XVIII, 41-42.
5 XV, 413; XVIII, 16.
6 He maintains that the masses are free from all subtlety,
taking words in their most obvious sense, paying little or no
attention to the refinements of philosophers. Thus a people
will interpret the term self-government to mean that they are
under no government as a people, and conseuqntly under no
restraint except that which they impose U»On themselves.
XV:, 306-307.

62

under that namet we shall of necessity run in our theories, and
in our praotioe, into no-governmentism."

'1

We oan put Brownson mosisimply thus: self-government is
tolerable if the self does not destroy the government. It oould
destroy it if the distinction between governor and governed is
lost.

Now let us see what Brownson thought of the theory in

which individuals establish authority ove! themselves.
He makes the theory older than that of the author of the
Sooial Oontraot. In faat he soes baek .to Hobbes who

n •. •

is

among the earliest and most distinguished of the advocates of
8

this theory."

Its purpose is to aooount for the origin of auth·

ority on a purely human basis.

It endeavors to

aeaomplis~

its

purpose by showing that authority to govern arises in a oonvention or an agreement, either between the people and their
or between the people themselves to appoint rulers.
have authority beoau3e the people give it to them.

ruler~

Thus ruler1
People agreE

'1 XV, 305.
8 XVIII, 28. Brownson's exposition of the social contract
theory does not represent in detail the complete view of any
one of its exponents. This objection might be a serious one
if Brownson intended to refute any one of these philosophers.
This is not his purpose. He oritioizes here a theory whioh
trys to aeoount for the origin of authority on a p~llY human
basis. He does not criticize it as held preoisely by this or
that individual. He tries to make his refutation complete
by showing th~_t sueh a theory is false regardless of its
possible interpretations.

,..-
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to -be- governed-; they enter into a. aontraot a.n.d this contraot is
the basis of the authority to

govern~

On this basis it is ob-

vious that no government is just which does not have the consent
of the governed.

For the people are the only souroe of author-

ity, and if a government does not have the consent of the people
9

it can have no authority - it is therefore unjust.
Further, sinae the purpose of the theory is to aaeount for
the origin of government on the conventional basis, it must suppose that civil society is not as old as men.

It must suppose,

prior to the formation of oivil society, a combination af circumstances necessitating a convention to institute government.
Otherwise there would be no need for a theory to aooount for the
origin of government.

The situation in which men found

~hem

selves prior to a convention authorizing government is referred
10
to as the state of nature.
In general terms, the state of enture is one of continual

w r :::·a:r · · ~

~ch

man has equal rights and each trys to appropri-

ate everything. "The strong oppress the weak; the cunning air11
There is no law but the will of the
aumvent the simple."
strongest.

At length, weary of perpetual warfare, men decide

to form eivil society.

They surrender their own natural free-

dom in order to secure the benefits of society.

9 XV, 311.
10 XVIII, 27; XV, 310.
11 XV, 311.

Without sueh a.

~·
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a surrender of rights, society has no legitimate authority•
Looke states rather aoourately the position Brownson intend
to criticize:
Man being, as has been said, by nature all free,
equal, and independent, no one oan be put out of this
estate and subjected to the political power of another,
without his own consent. The only way whereby anyone
divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on
the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other
men to join and unite into a community, for their
comfortable, safe, and peeceable living one amongst
the other ••• This any number of men may do, because
it injures not the freedom of the rest: they are left
as they were in the state of nature. When any number
of men have so consented to make one a·ommuni ty or
government, they are thereby presently incorporated
and make one body politio, wherein the majority have
a right to aot and conclude the rest.
11
Having stated the theory, Brownson proceeds to criticize
it. He is concerned first of all with the state of nature whieh
must exist, on the supposition of the theory, prior to the
tion of government.

forma~

He observes that philosophers have arrived

at a state of nature by mentally separating man from his exist13
~noe in so·ciety.
Now Brownson argues that in making suoh an abstraction it
should be at least complete.

In other words, if one will insist

upon removing mentally an individual from society, he must be
careful not to remove a man alre.ady civilized, imbued with the
habits, manners, customs and knowledge of society, to some re-

li "Treatise of Oivil Government," sited from Locke, Selections
edited by Sterling P. Lamprecht, New York, 1928, 70-71.
13 XVIII, 30.

...-- -------------------------------------------------------------,
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mote island.

In order to be consistent with its purpose the

theory must suppose that soaiety is not natural, but purely
artificial.

There <Jannot be even the slightest trace of sooiety

in such a state of nature; for if there were, it would be unnecessary to institute society.

The theory would account for

the development or perfection of an existing society and not, as
it professes to do, for the origin or institution of

~overnment.

Furthermore, man himself oan have no natural urge, no inns.te tenceney for society; if he had, society would be natural and man
would be a social animal and consequently society would be as
old as man.

Therefore it would be unnetessary to aocount for

its origin in convention.

14

Brownson argues that in terms of an abstraction consistent
with the purpose of the theory, the people in the state of
nature could not institute government.

In the first place, if

the primitive state of man is natural to him, then civil society
15
must be "supernatural, preturnatural, or subnatural."
Man is, however, limited by the nature whioh he has; it is
inseparable from him.

It is his only souroe of activity. Con-

sequently he oan neither divest himself of it, nor by his own
unaided efforts give himself a nature other than the one he has.
Thus Brownson says that "If his primitive state was his natural
state, and if the political state is supernatural, preturnatural,

14 XVIII, 31.
15 XVIII, 30.

66
or subnatural, how passed he alone, by his own unaided powers,
. 16
from the former to the latter."
furthermore, "In the alleged state of nature, as the philosophers describe it, there is no germ of civilization, and the
transition to civil society would not be a development, but a
aomplete rupture with the past, and an entire new creation."

11

In other words, it has been noted that there is not, and eannot
be, present in the state of nature, a germ of soeial organization - not a root tNlt eould be nurtured or developed. But man
is a dependent being and not a creator.

Re is not strictly a

creator even in the intellectual oxder;·he cannot create an
Consequently it
18
would be extremely diffieult to oonoeive of civil sooiety.
idea any more than he could ereate a universe.

Even supposing that some individual, unusually gifted,
would aonoeive of civil sooiety, it would be impossible for him
to execute his aonoeption.

It is diffieult to introduce

reform~

among people already imbued with the notions of authority and
obedience.

To modify already existing institutions and to

adapt them to meet changing circumstances is a task that requires a great deal of time, skill and ingenuity.

But the

16 XVIII, 30.
17 XVIII, 33.
I
18 In Brownson•s terms, mans activity is confined to the teleological order or the seeond cycle of creation: his causality, ~ile real, is productive only for the attainment of ~
end. Consequently he does not originate; he can develop,
explicate, combine, but there is no sense in whieh he oan
create.
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people in the state of nature have no habits of obedience, no
habit of aammanding one another.

Consequently the introduction

of government ia at least a mueh greater aohievement than the
most radical modification of an existing institution. Consequently Brownson oonaludes that:
When it is with the greatest difficulty that
necessary reforms are introduced in old and
highly civilized nations, and when it can seldom
be done at all without terrible political and
social convulsions, how o~ we suppose men without society, and knowing nothing of it, o~n
deliberately, and, as it were, with •malioe
aforethought' found society? To suppose it,
would be to suppose that men in a state of nature
••• are infinitely superior to the men formed under
the most advanced civilization.
19
B~ownson

observes also that the advocates of the state of

nature assume, unconsciously, that the people living in it have
the habits and trJditions of a people already civilized.

Oon~

sequently the advoeates of the theory beg the question because
they assume the existenee of oivil society as the eondition upon
whieh it aan be instituted.

He elarifies this point in the

illustrations which follow.
Brownson maintains that it is obviously impossible to establish an ideal government aueh as that p~oposed by the various
20
authors in their Utopias.
He eontenls that they "••• remain
Utopias not solely beeause intrinsieally absurd, though so in

19 XVIII, 33.
20 Brownson mentions,of eourse, !he Utopia, or 'he Land of Nowhere, by Thomas More, published i i 1516.
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faet, but ehiefly beeause they are innovations, have no support
in experienee, and require for their realization the modes of
thought, habits, manners, eharaeter, life, whieh only their
21
introduetion and realization oa..n supply."
Likewise, the introduetion of eivilization is an innovation.

It has no support in experienee. It requires for its

realization the things which only eivilization oan supply. Unles
it is assumed that the people of the state of nature have the
habits of a eivilized people, it would be mueh more diffieult to
introduee a eivil order de novo than a Utopia in a eivilized
state. Sinoe the latter is impossible, so also is the former.
Thus the advoeates of the theory must beg the question; failing
to do so they suppose a oombination of eireumstanees from whieh
it is impossible to institute government. In either ease the
theory fails to accomplish its purpose.
By the same fallaey the advoeates of the theory assume uneonseiously that government is essential to progress. For if
progress were possible without it, there would .be no need for
the people of the state of nature to institute government. Without government people are therefore unprogressive. Consequently
in pieturing the people as oapable of instituting government tbe
advooates of the theory pioture

t~em

as a progressive people -

therefore as a people already in possession of one of the

21 XVIII, 33.

~·
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elements essential to progress, namely, government.

22

Thus far Brownson's objeotions to the eontraet theory have
,.

been aimed at the state of nature whieh preeeeded oivil soeiety. If the state of nature is not prior to soaiety, then
soeiety is as old as man.

Consequently there is no need for a

theory to aeoount for the institution of eivil soeiety. Therefore a state of nature prior to eivil soeiety must be asserted.
The state of nature is arrived at by mentally removing maa
from eivil soeiety.

In order to be eonsistent with the purpose

of the theory, the abstraction must be eomplete - no root, no
germ, no natural inolination for soaiety ean remain. If any of
these factors are present in the inhabitants of the state of
nature, the theory ean aoeount only for the development or perfeation of an already existing soeiety.

Thus it would not ae-

oount for the institution of eivil society.
On the other hand, if all traoes of soeiety are removed
from the state of nature, man would have to be a ereator in
order to institute eivil society.

First of all he would have

to disaover a means whereby he eould ehange his original
nature. Seaondly, he would be required to oreate the idea of
eivil soeiety. If he eould get the idea, he eould not exeeute
it.
Consequently Brownson eoneludes that the advocates of the

22 XVIII, 30.
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theory either beg the question or else pioture a eombinatioA
of oireumstanees whieh render impossible the institution of
eivil sooiety. This point was illustrated with referenee to the
utopias and to the fundamental assumption that government is an
indispensible eondition of progress. And sinoe the theory must
either beg the question or present a state

o~

nature from whieh

it is impossible to derive eivil sooiety, it must be rejeeted.
Brownson eontinues his objeotions to the eontraet theory
on still another ground. Even supposing the state of nature and
granting a eonvention to institute government, it is still impossible to aoaount for the authority of government. His objeetions are based upon the view stated in the beginning of the
ohapter, that government is authority exereised over subjeots.
Now in the state of nature there is no sovereign, no oivil
authority, beoause a oonvention is oalled for the purpose of
establishing a government with authority. In other words,
individuals presumably institute a government to whieh they are
subjeet, whioh has the right to oommand and to exereise authority over them. But Brownson argues that individuals oannot
oreate a sovereign, beoause the ereator is, obviously, not subjeet in relation to the oreature. Consequently, if government
is ereated by individuals, individuals are sovereign and the
government thus established is subjeot to them as oreature to

71
areator. Government is then the

agen~

of the oreature.

23

That government must be eoneeived as the agent of the individual is also indioated by the manner in whioh government
reputedly originates. The individuals who meet in oonvention
are sovereign, and therefore free, with equal rights. Eaeh must
be sovereign in relation to the other beeause there is no authority above the individual to whiah he is subjeoted. In establishing a sovereign, the individual agrees to surrender some of
his own sovereignty to a governor; in doing so, the governor
has the right to govern beoause of the voluntary oonsent of the
individual.
Now Brownson argues that the individual is obliged, on the
supposition of the theory, to surrender all of his sovereignty,
a part of it, or none of it, to the government.

It is evident

that if the first alternative is taken there is no basis for
individual freedom.

For if he surrenders all to soaiety, he

has no rights left. He is oonsequently a eomplete slave of soei
ety with no rights of his own whioh he may plead against it; he
is no longer an integer, but a fraction of a whole with nothing

23 "In the state of nature, there is no sovereign; the oonvention is oalled for the purpose of oreating the sovereign.
But is sovereignty a thing to be ereated? The sovereign is
over and above the individuals to be governed; that to whieh
they owe allegianoe; whioh has the right to command them.
Can these individuals ereate it? Can the oreator be subjeat
to the ereature; owe allegianoe to it; be loyal to it?
Obviously, then, if there be in the state a sovereign~·
power at all, it is not ereated by those who are to be subjeeted to it."XV, 314.

,...- ---------------------------------------------------------------,
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exoept that whieh sooiety ohoses to give to him. In that ease,

as Brownson observes, "However unjust or oppressive the aots of
the state, he has not only no redress, but not even the right to
24

oomplain."
Supposing the last alternative, the individual retains his
sovereignty but merely delegates instead of surrenders his
rights to sooiety. Yet if he retains his oomplete sovereignty,
then it follows that as sovereign he may revoke at his eonvenience the powers delegated to his agent, and government would
have no authority over him • Brownson observes that this is a
very eonvenient theory for some, beeause "The disaffeeted, the
eriminal, the thief the government would send to prison, or the
murderer it would hang, would be very likely to revoke his eon25
sent, and refuse to permit his agent to punish him." Thus it is
a perversion of language as well as of eommon sense, to eoneeive
of government as a mere agent of the individual with no authority exoept that whioh is given to it by the individual.
The other alternative is reputedly a via media between the
extremes, but praotieally it is redueed to either one or the
other of the extremes.

If the individual surrenders a portion

of his rights and retains some, who is to deoide where the line
is drawn? If the interpretation is left to the individual he

24 XV, 315.

25 XV, 316; XVIII, 37.

~·

----------------------------------------~------------7,3
ean, obviously, interpret his rights to the extent that it

virtually denys all authority over himself. If the government
defines the rights of the individual, determines their boundaries, the individual has, practically speaking, no appeal from
the decision of the government.

On the supposition that the

state has the sole authority to define the rights of the individual, there is no guarantee against absolutism. Thus Brownson
says that "If then, we found government in eompaet, we either
leave the individual his natural freedom, and then we have no
government; or we sub3eet the individual to the state, and then
no individual liberty.
21
rejeet the theory."

Either oonsequenee should lead us to

Further, sinee the authority of

governme~t

is derived from

a eompaat, it is evident that its authority extends only to the
contracting parties.
equal rights.

For in the state of nature all men have

Consequently no one has the authority to govern

another, for the supposition is that authority to govern originates in a eontraot.

Therefore it follows that government has
27
authority only over those whose eonsent has been given.
Now it is apparent at onee that few people aetually eonsent
to be governed. While voting may be eonstrued as an aet of assen
very few people, espeoially in Brownson's day, eould vote.

26 XV, 316.
27 XVIII, 38.

women and ehildren, for example, were excluded. Government
therefore has no rights over them, for they have entered into no
aompaot and therefore the terms of a oompaet cannot bind them.
Furthermore, Brownson notes also that Jefferson maintained (and
he was logical in doing so) that the oontraot must be renewed
28
by eaoh generation. This means that an existing government
would of neoessity expire with the expiration of each generation
Consequently, an existing government has no legitimate authority
unless it has the free, formal, explioit oonsent of eaoh individual it governs.

29

In other words, Brownson denies that eonsent to an existing government may be tacitly given by oontinued residence in a
territory. He argues that residenee may be a matter of neeesaity
Likewise, the silenee of individuals, or their lack of opposition to an existing goyernment, may be a matter of necessity
rather than formal approval.

Sinae eaeh individual is pre-

sumably free and equal, "••• by what right can individuals form
an agreement to whioh I must eonsent or else migrate to some
strange land?"

30

A summary of the seoond series of arguments shows that the

28 Of, Jeferrson, Writings, (Memorial Edition), Washington,
1905, III, 459: "No society ean make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law."
29 XVIII, 35.
30 XVIII, 36.
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origin ot government in eontraet is incompatible with the idea

ot government as authority exereised over subjeets. The theory
is eritieized on the basis ot the
adoption of sueh a theory.

eonsequenees,t~owing

trom the

It individuals instituted government

it would be the agent ot individuals.

Consequently it would not

be an authority above them. This is illustrated in the manner in
whieh individuals reputedly institute government. They must surrender either all or none of their· rights. A !!! media is inadmissable beeause it is resolved praetioally into, either ot the
extremes. Thus the theory if adopted would lead logieally to
anarchy or absolutism.
Furthermore, on the supposition that eaeh individual has
the right to eomplete freedom, equality, independenee, government eould extend, rightfully, only to the eontraoting individuals. This means that government eannot be extended to women and
ehildren, for they are deemed incapable of entering into sueh
a eontraat. It means also that each individual of eaeh sueeeeding generation must renew the eont;a•t; tor no group ot individuals have the right to negotiate a eontraet to whioh other
individuals, with preeisely the same rights, must either assent
or move to a foreign land.

In terms of the soeial oontraet

theory, sueh power eannot be legitimate - it is not authority o
the right to govern. Thus government in the sense of authority
exeraised over subjects cannot be derived from a eontraet of
sovereign individuals.
'inally, Brownson objeets to the soeial eontraot theory ot

•tQ

soeiety and government on the ground that a soaiety resulting
from a voluntary assoeiation of individuals is merely an aggregation; it aan be held together by nothing stronger than the
will of individuals to assooiate. Consequently there is nothing
to prevent any number of individuals, whether the group be large
or small, from withdrawing from the assoaiation and setting up
a state of their own.
This oonelusion follows beeause the individual, aeoording
to the theory, is sovereign in virtue of his manhood. Sinee he
is a man ::·:"·regardless of time or plaoe, the individual is sovereign at any time and at any plaae.

Consequently any three or

more individuals may at any time or plaoe oall a convention and
institute a government of their own, thus bidding defianee to
the offiaers, tax-eolleetors and agents authorized by other and
similar oonventions.

On what grounds is suah a right denied?

Certainly not beaause a oonvention of one hundred is stronger
than that of merely three individuals.

This would identify

right and might, thereby legitimating every aat of might, however oppressive it may be.

In other words, however absurd it

may seem, there is no authority in a state grounded on the oontraot tb:eory whieh eould prevent any three individuals from
seaeding, aalling a eonvention and instituting government.

31

In order to maintain itself, it is quite evident that gov-

31 XV, 411-413.

''
ernment must have the right to exercise authority over all who
are within a given area. Ita jurisdiction must extend, not only
to those who ehooae to aeknowledge it, who assent or eonsent,
but to those who are in a territory.
If government has sueh authority, it eannot be derived from
a eontraet, voluntarily entered into by individuals who are
sovereign in virtue of their manhood whieh they retain irregardless of time and plaee.

If it does not have jurisdiction over a

territory, government oould not maintain itself because any
number of sovereign individuals would be authorized, at any time
or plaee, to oall a eonvention and institute government.

In

order to avoid sueh an absurditt the oonoeption that government
has no power exoept that whiah it derives from the voluntary
eonsent of individuals, must be rejected.
This final objection to the eontraot theory of government
is in a sense similar to those previously stated. It rejeets the
theory because the oonsequenees flowing from its adoption are
inoompatible with the ooneeption of government as authority
exereised over subjeets.
It is, however, different from the other objections, inasmueh as it introduees a new element into the eoneeption of
government -that its authority must be territorial. Further,
territory has not been introduced as an ineidental element of
government.

It has been viewed as something essential, inasmueh

as government eannot exist as authority over subjeets unless its
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authority extends to all within a territory.
In

simple and positive terms, Brownson's theory will emerge

the more olearly if we now sum up the grounds on whi•h he objects
to the soaial eontraot theory.
The Soeial Oontraot Theory is untenable:
A· because soeiety is natural to man, whereas the soeial oontrao
theory postulates
1. a man who is a soeial being only subsequently to his own
free deeision to beeome a social being. Therefore it
postulates
2. an unreal state of nature
3. a history for man prior to the formation of soeiaty
4. a society whioh is totally artificial, a production de
~

rather than a development;

B. because man, being naturally soaial, is governed naturally,

whereas the social eontraat theory postulates
1. government as

~urely

contractual; therefore,

2. any three individuals m~ convene and oontraot to form
government;
3. the eontraet binds only the contracting parties;
4. under the eontraet the individual must surrender,
a. all of his rights - despotism
b. none of his rights - anarahy
So mueh, then, for the theory which looks to men taken
individually for the origin of authority and government. There
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is another sense of "the people" as the origin and ground of
government and its authority. We have already mentioned it. We
must now tura to what Brownson oalls the "demoeratie theory."
Can the people, as a eolleotive whole, be the souree of a
valid and morally binding government?

CHAPTER V
THE DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Demoeratie theories and demoaratie principles have for
Amerioans a sacred eharaeter. Brownson was no exception. Of the
"prineiples of demosraoy" he himself says: "They were given me
by the publie sentiment of my oountry. I had taken them in with
my mother's milk, and had never thought of inquiring whether
1
they were tenable or not."
Brownson had a too sineerely inquisitive mind to let his
prineiples rest in this unexamined state. He inquired what
people meant when they prated so piously of majority rule, of
universal suffrage and eligibility, of demooraoy as asserting
and maintaining equality as a aatural right - whieh means "I am
2

as good as you, if not a whit better."
He inquired also whether the people would have the good
sense to adopt the measures necessary to prevent universal auffrage and eligibility from being a mere hoax. He says that at
one time he "••• had had the inoredible folly of treating the
equality asserted as if it meant something, as if it oould be
3

made a reality, instead of a miserable sham."
Both inquiries were answered in his "Essay on the Laboring
1 v, 114.
2 V, 103-114; X, 33.
3 V, 117.
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Classes." He proclaimed, somewhat bluntly, that if people want
equality, they must be prepared to remove heads protruding above
the eommon level. For.this Brownson says that "I was denouneed
in the press, from the pulpit and the rostrum. My friends shook
their heads, and were very sorry that I had been so imprudent;
•••• The doetrines of my essay were reeeived by my eountrymen
with one universal seream of hozror ••• "

5

Brownson had diseovered that politieal equality means soeia:
equality; his eountrymen were not ready.to adopt the measures
necessary to secure it.

Having reeeived a praetieal demonstra-

tion of the faet that theory and reality did not eonform, he reexamined his position. He oontended, both at this time and later
that his reasoning was sound. His eountrymen had said two and .
two - he had merely added four.

6

Having found no fault with his reasoning, Brownson began to
examine his premises. He defines democraey as the sovereignty of
the people. Taken negatively, it may mean the denial of "••• the
king, the nobility, or the right of any one maa, or any set of
7

men, easte, or elass, to rule over the people," Taken

positivel~

5 v, 103.
6 Of., e.g., the following: "People, though adopting the demooratie prinoiple, told me I went too far, but I knew I was
logieal." XVIII, 224. Also, "But I ean hardly read the essay
over without being myself ehooked, and wondering at my temerity in publishing it •••• plaoe me where I stood then ••• and
I would today repeat and endorse every paragraph and every
w.ord I then wrote." V, 104.
7 XV, 408.
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it means the assertion "••• of the absolute right of the people
to govern, or their native, inherent, underived sovereignty."

8

In the same plaee he notes also that the term may be used also tc

designate the end of government - that it is to be administered
for the good of the whole people. Brownson oonoedes that he is a
demoerat in this latter sense of the term, but in no other.
In diseussing the demoeratio theory, the term is used in ite
positive sense to designate a doetrine that the people oolleetively or the politioal oommunity, is the souree and origin of
the authority to govern. The objeotions to the theory are stated
from two viewpoints.

It will be shown, very briefly, that the

theory itself is erroneous; more important for Brownson is the
faet that, despite its error, there is a tenden•y to adopt it.
Consequently the tendeney itself must be exposed as erroneous.
In asserting that the people originate authority, it is
evident that the first requisite is to determine what is meant
by the term - not to define it, for that has already been done but to limit the extension of the term. For obviously in speaking of a people the term does not inelude all of the inhabitants
of the globe. Rather, it refers to.! people, to the inhabitants
of a more or less definite portion of the globe. This is evi9

dently what is meant by the people who institute government.

8 XV, 409.

9 XVIII, 42; XV, 409.
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The first problem whieh arises, therefore, is to determine
whether or not the people who reputedly institute government in
habit a e1early defined territory. The problem is a very import
ant one. If the territory in question is undefined, it is evidently impossible to define the people who are to institute
10
government.
Even on the supposition that an undefined people, inhabiting an undefined territory, could institute government, the
government thus established would have no authority over a
definite territory. Its authority would be eonsequently popular
'

only, and not territorial. This, of oourae, is to return to the
eontraet theory whieh has been rejeeted already.
On the other hand, if the term people signifies the inhabitants of a territory that is clearly defined, the difficulties
are equally serious. Then the problem is to determine by whom,
and on

~at

authority, territory is marked out and defined. The

organized people eannot determine it, for the theory presumably
aeeounts for the origin of the organized people.

Thus to say

that the people themselves fix their own territorial boundaries
is to say :thattlilleJlpep!Jler,aes eul::;.!lpeople before they exist as
11
sueh. For the same reason government eannot mark out a defin10 XVIII, 43. The problem is a problem only with referanee to
a theory which aeeounts for the origin or institution of
government, and is consequently not a problem in relation
to nations whieh are already established under a government.
11 XVIII, 42; XV, 410.
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ita territory; for there is no government until authorized by a
people, and no people until a territory has been defined.
It is therefore neoessary to go outside population in order
to diseover what constitutes a people as sueh. Without that
faGtor the people are not sovereign beoause they are not even a
people. With that faator they are not sovereign
that which

f!lV3S

becs.ust=j it;

is

t:ing to population as a people. Therefore a

people is dependent upon it as a cause is dependent upon its
effeat.

Consequently that factor, whatever it is, is more ulti-

mate than the people. On either ground it is eertain that people
12
alone are not the souroe of authority.
Furthermore, supposing a definite territory and therefore
a people, it is still impossible to aeoount for the authority of
government. It eannot be aooounted for on the basis of a unaaimous eonsent of individuals, for that again is the theory that
has been rejeoted in the preceding ehapter. It eannot be asserte
that the majority has the righ' to authorize government and
enaot laws, beeause it then beoomes neaessary to determine
in the majority derives its right to govern. Obviously, it does
not have right because it is a majority and therefore strongest.
For this reason Brownson says, "••• would identify right and
might, and legitimate every government able to maintain itself.
Every aet of power, however oppressive, on this ground would be

12 XVIII, 42; XV, 411.
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13

right, just."
Therefore the right of the majority to govern must be
grounded upon some'thing more ultimate than its might. The only
alternatives possible are that it is somekow based upon nature
or is authorized by government. However, neither of these alternatives are admissabla.
The nature of one man is equal to that of any other. Consequently no two men have an inherent natural right to govern a
third. If the theory were asserted within sueh a limited sphere,
it would tend to many absurdities. If no three individuals have
the natural right to govern any two, why should the will of the
hundred prevail over that of ninety nine? The right of the
14
ity cannot be a natural right.

major~

It is intelligible, however, to base the rule of the majority upon oivil regulation. The politioal body adopts it as the
most praotioal rule possible to secure the good of the governed.
In this sense, however, the majority of the people does not institute or

m~iginate

the authority of government. It supposes

an authority already existing whioh authorizes majority rule.

15

Thus the fundamental objeotion to a theory whieh states
that a people is the souree of its ow.n authority is that it must
argue in a viaious circle,

Bora ooneeption

of~

people, or a

eommunity, must be that of a people united in some way, as by

13 XV, 339,
14 XV, 339,
15 XV, 321.

~·
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the oooupation of a definite territory.

~ut

this is precisely

the conception of the people as a nation and therefore already
invested with authority.
Now Brownson has maintained consistently that few people,
if any, would maintain theoretically that the people as a unit,
16
a nation, or a soeiety, is the source of its own authority. The
reason for this is that the theory, as he has stated it, asserts
despotism, absolutism, or as he prefers to call it, Caesarism
or Soaialism. The fact that few people would maintain sueh
theories openly is evineed suffieiently well by the reeeption
given his ow.n essay on the laboring elasses.
The faet that the democratic theory as he has defined it
involves desf'Otism, is not diffieult to establish. He has said
that government is authority exercised over subjects. Considering it striotly, and from the viewpoint in Which it is authority
its authority is unlimited. For in relation to tha.t whieh
tra~~s

~es-

.,,_,

or limits its authority in any way, government is obvious

ly not the authority, but the subject. Therefore government, so
far forth as it is government and nothing else, is that whieh is
sovereign. The eeareh for the origin of authority is therefore
17
the searoh for the sovereign.
further, the right of the sovereign to eommand admits of no

16 XV, 439-441; XVIII, 575-576.
17 XV, 414.
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limitations whatsoever, for inasmueh as a sovereign is limited
he is not sovereign, but subjeet. Sinae he has the right to
oommand, his subjeets have the duty to obey. Therefore his eommand is the basis of all rights and duties, as has been indioated in the ehapter on law. Thus it is that man has no rights
in the sense that •a ean plead them against the sovereign. Jor
if he had, the sovereign would be subject in relation to those
rights.

18

Jurther, it has been noted that man*s freedom eannot eonsist in freedom from law - Whioh aaoording to Brownson is the
conception prevailing in Amerioa.

19

~ather,

man's freedom eon-

slats in obedience to the law of the sovereign - freedom from
all restraint, whether ofoonscienoe or anything else, is lieense
and inoompatible with government.
Therefore, if the people are sovereign, and if man's freedom aonsists in obedience to the sovereign, it follows that man'1
freedom consists in obedience to the wtll-"-·ofetl).e people. In eawe
18 XVIII, 266; XV, 414. "Now, if the people are, in their own

native might and right, the primary and fundamental sovereign
ty, then, they have the inherent right to eommud, and, whatever they eammand, is law; therefore right; and therefore,
binding in foro eonseientiae." XV, 415.
19 Of,, e.g., ~following: "••• we put it to our young friends
in sober earnest too, whether with them freedom is something
positive; or whether they are in the habit of regarding it as
merely negative? Do they not look upon liberty merely as
freedom from eertain restraints or obstaeles rather than as
positive ability possessed by those who are free? "XV, 272,

sa
the term people is interpreted demoeratioally, this means that
the individual does not have the moral right to resist the will
of the majority:
The sovereignty, whioh is asserted for the people,
must, then, be transferred to the ruling majority.
If the people are sovereign, then the majority are
sovereign; and if sovereign, the majority have ••••
the absolute right to govern. If the majority have
the absolute right to govern, it is the absolute
duty of the minority to obey. Who who ehanee to be
in the minority are then completely disfranehised.
We are wholly at the mer•y of the majority. We hold
our property, our wives and ehildren, and our lives
even, at its sovereign will and pleasure. It may do
by us and ours as it pleases. If it takes it into
its head to make a new and arbitrary division of
property, however unjust it may seem, we shall not
only be impotent to resist, but we shall not have
the right of the wretehed to aomplain. Qonsaienee
will be no shield. The authority of the absolu~e
sovereign extends to spiritual matters, as well as
to temporal. The •reed the majority is pleased to
impose, the minority must in all meekness ani submission reoeive; and the form of religious worship
the majority is good enough to prescribe, the minority must make it a matter o~ oonsaien•e to observe.
Whatever has been done under the most absolute monarehy or the most lawiess aristooracy, may be reenaetec
under a pure demoeraey, and what is worse, legitimately too, if it be onoe laid down in prineiple that
the majority has the absolute right to govern.
20
But this is to disrobe domooraay - it is demoara•y in its
pristine purity. No one will aeeept it in its nakedness. Brownson eoneedes this: "We aheerfully admit that there are probably
21 XV, 5. Brownson wrote this in 1838 two years before the publication of his essay on the laboring olasses during the
eleetion of 1840. This indicates that his view of demoeraoy
has remained substantially the same. His eontinual berating
of democracy after the publication of his essay is therefore
a ohange of emphasis; or rather a ehange in what it was neeessary to emphasize in order to eombat evil. Thus the essay
and the eleetion orystalized ideas formerly presented vaguely.
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few men in the eountry who would, in general thesis, maintain it
21
as we have statal."
Brownson's thesis, stated most simply, is that there is a
tendeney toward absolutism, existing both here and in Europe,
and espeaially in Young Italy and Young Germany, whieh has not
22
as yet been aetualized. He speaks of seeds of dissolution whieh
23

are sown and germinated, but have not as yet attained fruition.
He says that even in his own day:
Not a few of the European democrats recognize
in the earth, in heaven, or in hell, no power
superior to the people, and say not only peopleking, but people-God •••• The people not only
found the state, but also the ahuroh •••• Yet
this theory is the dominant theory of the age,
and is in all oivilized nations advaneing with
apparently irresistible faree.

24

His thesis is, further, that the tendenoy toward avsolutism
25
or soaialism or humanitarian or eaesaristie demoeraey is latent
in demoeratio theories and principles, and is promulgated, although not avowedly so, in the promulgation of demoeratie prineiples.

21
22
23
24

XV, 4:39.
X, 86.
XV, 440-441.
XVIII, 42.

25 Brownson's meaning of these tarms is clear from the eontext;
they signify the sovereignty of soeiety, the eolleetive
people, the state.
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His reasons as to why the theory cannot be avowed openly
are plausible. In order to gain a•eeptanee for a theory, it
must be presented under the aspeit of the good and the true.
Falsehood as such is never embraced by the intellect, nor does
;he will accept anything under the aspeet of evil. Consequently
he says that "Soeialism commends itself to the intellect of its
adherents only in the respect that it is trp, and to their
26

hearts only in the respect that it is good."
Therefore, for Brownson the domoeratie theory is so extremely dangerous beeause it is eombined with what is good. In
aecepting what is good and true about it, people unwittingly
aecept the evil along with it. As a Catholic reviewer, he felt
obliged to expose this tendeney bectau:Je he believed that if it
were uneheeked it could result only in absolutism.
The demoeratie iendeney or theory is eehoed in the dominant sentiment of the day. It is expressed in the slogans adopte
by the press, and by the politieians who speak of the sovereign
people, of government •f the people and by the people. The
people are told that democracy reeognizea the equality of man,
whieh "••• is not displeasing when applied to those above us,
but is very disgUsting, unreasonable, unnatural, when applied

, to those below us."

26 X, 532.
27V,ll3.

27

jeing equal, all men must partieipate

,....- -------------------------------------------------------------,
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equally in the administration of government. Thus demoeraey must
seoure to everyone the right to vote and to be voted for - and
it must enoourage reforms neaeesary to se•ure universal suffrage
and eligibility.
Brownson!s eontention is that if these slogans are aeeepted
and acted upon by the masses who invariably fail to say,

~

tinggo, it is only a matter or time before some form of absolutism is aeeepted. In eontending for politieal equality, for example, Brownson says that one must demand, in order to be eon28

sistent, social equality.

Theoretieally, the vote of the poor

pan is equal to that of his more wealthy neighbor. Rr,etieally,

.

however, the vote of an individual aounts for nothing unless he
aasts his

ball~t

for either of two parties.

To organize and to eontrol a party requires a great deal of
both skill and money. Those who have neither the skill nor the
money to exert influenee in shaping the polioies of a party are
therefore not the politieal equals of those Who are so endowed:
"Now pretend that you and I are equal, when you oan influenee a
thousand votes, while I ean hardly eontrol my own, unless I have
29

the spirit of a martyr."

This aaeording to Brownson is "••• the

great and stubborn faet, whieh knoeks in the head all your finespun temocratia theorizing."

28

v,

114.

v 103.
30 XV, 423.
29

t

30

~------------------------------------------9,2
The point is, of Gourse, that demoeratie principles encourage reforms necessary to secure political equality. Having
secured the privilege of voting and bein! voted for, it has by
no means secured genuine politieal equality. Thus the causes
which led the reform thus far have not spent themselves; they
must of neeessity remain in all their force to earry the reform
still further. In other words, reforms are not inaugurated to
stop with a sham - agitation for equality fostered by demooraey
cannot stop logieally at the ballot box. It m•st extend to soeiety itself in order to aecomplish ant good that it has set out t
accomplish.

31

Since the tendeney of the age is toward political, and
therefore social, equality, it oan stop at nothing short of •ts
ultimate goal: complete social equality. If there is property in
sooiety, it may be distributed unequally; therefore logie demand
the elimination of property. Sinee individuals exist, they are
unequal; their continued existenee is a barrier to the social
equality demanded by the logic of the age. Therefore, eliminate
the individual - make him not an individual, but a part of soeiety. This is the goal of the age; whether he knows it or not,
this is the aim of the

h~anitarian

31 Schlesinger adds, "His

democrat:

flin~y in~elligenee saw how tragically
the favorite liberal remedies fell short. Universal suffrage
is little better than a moakery where the voters are not
aoeially equal. No matter what party you support, no matter
what men you eleet, property is always the basis of governmental aetion." 107-108.
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Yesterday he' agitated for the abolition of
slavery, to-:iay he a~:L tates for negro suffrage,
negro equality, and announoes that when he has
seeured that he will agitate for female suffrage
and the equality of sexes, forgetting or ignorant that the relation of equality subsists only
between individuals of the same sex; •••• Having
obliterated all distinotion of sex in polities,
in sooial, industrial, and domestie arrangements,
he must go further still, and agitate for the total
abolition of property. But sinee property, if
reeognized at all, will be unequally aoquired
and distributed, he must go further still, and
agitate for the total abolition of property, as
an injustiee, a grievous wrong, a theft •••• It
is unjust that one should have what another wants,
or even more than another •••• Nor ean our humanitarian stop there. Individuals are, and as long
as there are individuals, will be unequal: some
are handsomer and some are uglier, some wiser or
sillier, mora or less gifted, stronger or weaker,
taller or shorter, stouter or thinner than others,
and therefore some have natural advantages whioh
others have not. There is inequality, therefore
injustiee, whish oan be remedied only by the aboli•
tion of all individualities, and the reduetion of
all individuals to the raoe, or humanity, in
general.
32
Commenting upon the politieal upheavals in Europe in
1848-1849, Brownson says that the reforms sought are basieally
sooial, not merely politieal: "Young Italy is sooialistie; so
is Young Germany; and it was its sooialistio oharaoter that
gave to the movement of Ronge and his assooiates its signifi33
oanoe and its moderate sueeess."
Even in 1849 Brownson held
that the reform movement of the age oan find no logieal resting
plaee short of absolutism:

32 XVIII, 186-186.
33 X, 86.

~~--------------------------------------9~4
Onee eoneede that even politioal equality is a
good, an objeet worth seeking, you must eoneede
that sooial equality is also a good; and soeial
equality is neoessarily the annihilation of religion, government, prope~ty, and the family. The
same prinoiples whieh would justify the Moderate
Republicans of Franee in dethroning a king would
justify M. Proudhon in making war on property, deolaring every rioh man a robber, and seeking to
exterminate the bourge.oisie, as these have already
exterminated the nobility. There is no stoppingplaoe between legitimaoy - whether monarohieal or
republiean legitimaoy - and the most ultra socialism. Onee in the eareer of politieal reform, - we
say politieal, not administrative, reform, - we are
pledged to pursue it to its last results.
34

While soeial reform oulminates neeessarily in the annihilation of religion, government, property and family, its suoeess
is not attained by stating suoh things explieitly. People would
reeoil from the eonolusions on the ground that they are radieal
and destruetive. Consequently with the exeeption of a few who
are regarded as idle dreamers, the soeialistie theory is not
36
drawn to its logieal eonsequenees.
Soeialism is therefore presented under its aspeet of good.
It is developed, not merely as harmonious with Ohristianity, but
as more Christian than organized Christianity itself. It proelaims the great truth that God has ereated all men free and
34 X, 86. Brownson does not say explieitly that Italy and Germany will be totalitarian states. He says that sooial reforms,
and he mentions those in Italy and Germany partioularly, will
oulminate in absolutism, if anarrested. In XIV, 471, he
suggests that the Catholieity of Franee would save it from
absolutism.
36 X, 83.
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equal. Consequently He gave etual rights to all men. He waa no
diseriminator of persons, so obviously He did not intend possession by the few while the many are dispossessed of the good
things He has areated. The mal-distribution of God's ereation
is therefore an evil whieh should be remedied. Consequently
socialism urges the removal of evil. In doing so it plants itself upon an apparently solid Christian foundation.
Sinee soeialism is presented as a truth of Christianity and
in its garb, Brownson says that:
We eannot deny it without seeming to them to be
warring against the best interests of soaiety, and
also against the gospel of our Lord •••• How
adroitly too, it appeals to the people's envy
and hatred of their superiors, and to their love
of the world, without Skoeking their orthodoxy
or woulding their piety. Surely Satan has here,
in Soeialism, done his best, almost outdone
himself....
36
The evils pointed out by soaialists are real evils. Soaialism emphasizes the evil; it presents a remedy whieh is at onee
simple, understandable, appealing to men's passions while not
seemingly at varianee with orthodox eonvietions. This aspeet of
it gives socialism its driving foree and renders it aaoeptable.
In presenting its ease soeialism dwells exelusively upon physieal evils. It thereby exaludes moral evil. Thus it goes along
with the spirit of the age, whieh is worldly, and whose eoneeption of evil is restriated to physieal evil. Likewise in

36 X, 94.

,.--·
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emphasizing that good should be sought, it refers to physical or
temporal good. The assumption that man's good lies in the temp37
oral order alone is the root evil.
Furthermore, socialism states axiomatically that in order
to avoid evil and attain to the good, men must organize and
cooperate. Being attainable through organization rather than
isolated individual action, it follows that " • • • the social
organization must be such as to avert equal evil from all, and
to secure to each an equal share of temporal goods."

38

The reasoning of socialism is therefore based upon an ambiguous conception of good and evil. Its advocates proceed on the
assumption that there is no good other than a material good and
no evil other than physical evil. However, in retaining the
familiar terms, good and evil, those who have inherent convictions of moral good and evil will be deceived more easily. Failing to perceive the real purpose of the reformers, they accept
pious platitudes. The package is pleasing and acceptable because it is wrapped in terms which are pleasing and acceptable.
Now if man's good lies in the temporal order, there is no

37 "Analyze these reforms and the principles and motives which
lead to them, which induce the :people in our days to
struggle for them, and you will find at the bottom of them
all the ass~~ption, that our good lies in the natural
order •••• 11 X, 95.
38 X, 95.
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need for a two-fold organization to seeure man's good. Consequently the Ohureh must be

re~eeted.

Yet Christianity eannot be

rejeeted openly:
The Christian symbol needs a new and more Catholie
interpretation, adapted to our state in universal
progress. Where the old interpretation uses the
words God, ehureh, and heaven, you must understand
humanity, aoeiety, and .earth; •••• But while you put
the human and earthly sense upon the Catholie words,
be oareful and retain the words themselves.
39
In thus retaining familiar terms, people will not pereeive

so readily that their familiar ideas have vanished. Consequently
the opposition of Christians will be neither immediate nor
violent. Nevertheless, in retaining the term eharity, while
ohanging ita meaning so that it signifies philanthropy, eharit.y
is no leas effeetually destroyed; if religion is used to signify
a religion of humanity, religion is destroyed. The destruotion
is rendered all the more effectual beeause it goes on under the
40
pretenee of preserving them.
In thus presenting Brownson's analysis of the aoeialistie
tendency of his age, it is elear that he was not eombatting
absolute or eaesaristie demoeraey as a reality whieh had attaine
already its fruition in Amerioa. His avowed purpose is to draw
from the demooratie prineiple of equality its ultra-soeialistie
eonelusion. He maintains that the delusive demooratie doetrine

39 X, 93.
40 X, 93-95. Cf. also his essay, "Charity and Philanthropy,"

XIV, 428 ff.

of equality fosters unrest, agitation for reform, first for politieal equality.

Politieal equality requires soeial equality

as a eondition for its praetieal realization. This in turn is
not realized eompletely until the individual loses his identity
in the raee. Having disrobed demoeraey, Brownson hoped· that his
41
country-men would disavow its destruotive tendeneies.
It is abundantly elear also that in protesting against a
tendency toward oaesarist or absolute demoaraey, Brownson is not
protesting against the simple idea that people should have a

41 Of. the following: "As a protest against an absolute or
Oaesarist demoeracy, a demooraey whieh deifies the people (or a ahanee majority of them) - if sueh really existed outside his imagination- Brownson's political writings undoubtedly did real aerviee." Maynard, 403. Of. also Maynard, 181 a~d
the following: "Brownson ••• destroyed an enemy who was
hardly more than a figment of his imagination •••• he triumphantly disproves what no sensible man ever doubted.n 346.
One wonders at the outset what real serviee Brownson
might have rendered by eombatting an imaginary opponent. one
wonders also whether Mr. Maynard ever heard of Hitler, who,
as Mr. Erik R. Y. Kuehnelt-Leddihn points out, was a Fuhrer.
"He marehes ahead but is, theoretioally at least, an 'equal.'
As a modernized tribunis plebis he is not only the produat
of politieal but also of soeial demoeraay." "A Critique of
Demoeraey," The New Saholastiaism, (July, 1946), XX, 229, n. r
49.
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voiee in the administration of government.

42

He is protesting

against a theory whieh holds that the people are sovereign, and
against a tendeney to adopt sueh a theory. He has defined the
people as the eolleotive people, the politioal oommunity, the
state, the nation. Consequently he objects to any theory or
form whieh leaves the popular will supreme, subjeet to no
43

authority, bound by no higher law.

Whether the authority of the

nation is exeroised by one, by few, by many, is of no eonsequenoe to his argument. He says that the demoeratie prinoiple
of the supremaey of the people "••• is not eonfined to a popularly eonstituted government, but is aooepted and aeted on by
most modern governments, espeeially by the Sardinian, the
Prussian, the Russian, and we fear also the Austrian •••• "

44

Beeause of his opposition to demooratie prinoiples, Brownson also eondemned the tendenoy toward aooepting them in America. He believed that the adoption of popular demoeraey is a
step toward politieal atheism, or the denial of any law above,

42 "I am not arguing against a republie, or a government
largely popular in its eonstitution and administration ••••"
XVIII, 226. "I repeat, I am not warring against the politi•al eonstitution of my eountry, nor am I seeking in any
respect to ehange it; ••• "XVIII, 228.
43 XVIII, 226.
44 XVIII, 226.
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and binding the oonseienoe of, the will of the people as a
45

nation.

In presenting his argument for this oonolusion, Brown-

son observes that the legislators are eleeted by popular vote.
In order to seoure votes one must be popular; he is required to
please at least the majority of his eonstituents.
Brownson oontends that the easiest way to please the
people is to flatter them, to defer to them, to take the law
46
from them. To flatter them, the eandidate for offiae must appeal to the wisdom and virtue of the people, 'telling them also
that they are sovereign. As a subjeet the aandidate avows his
intention to asoertain, and to bow to, the will of his sovereigJ.
Having been imbued with the idea that they are sovereign, that
\

their will must be obeyed, the people repeat to the legislator,
47
aeeountability
to
remember
your
the
people."
•
•
•
"
It is rather a grevious offenee for a oaaditate to oppose
popular opinion.
offiee.

The penalty for the erime is removal from

Consequently there is, aoeording to Brownson, an in-

sidious eirole inherent in the nature of the demoeratie form.
Appeals, both in terms of the people to the legislator, and the

46 He opposed it as a radieal departure from the inherent
nature of our politieal constitution, whieh he believed to
be a eonstitutional republie rather than a demoeraey. Of.
Chapter IX below.
16 XV, 438.
47 XV, 440.
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legislator to the people, are, and must be. primarily popular.
It is nearly impossible to get outside of the eirole of popularity and appeal to justiee, truth, right, as a basis for legislative aotion: "If you repeat always to your statesmen 'remember
your aoaountability to the people,' you must expeet them to ask
48
always, not,. what -is right? but, what is popular?"
For this reason Brownson says that "In praatiee, demoeraey
will assume but one meaning - a meaning whiah has passed into
the axiom, 'The majority

.!!!!

rule;' whieh again is always

49
praotieally translate, 'The majority have a right to rule.'"

In this way the will of the people, popular opinion, is the
eriterion whieh determines whether or not a legislator should
support a meansure. Consequently he seldom, if ever, supports or
opposes a

measu.r.tJE~beeause

it is right or just. Sueh faetors ean-

not enter into an argument, beeause it is assumed that the
majority have the right to rule.
This, for Brownson, evinees the faot that the people eolleotively, as a politioal people, are adopting politieal atheism. For truth, justiee, right, the moral law above the will of
the people is not reeognized and appealed to either by the legislator who prates of his obedience to the will of his majesty
who put him in offioe, or by the people who, having been told

48 XV, 40.
49 XV, 40.

~
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that they are sovereign, demand only that the legislator remain
50
subservient to their will and to no other.
Thus Brownson oontends that demooraey does not beget

~ust

habits of mind. It is not, as a system, eondueive to the develop·
ment of the virtues neoessary to sustain its existenee. On the
eontrary he says that:
It ereates a multitude of demagogues, pretending a
world of love for the dear people, lauding the people's
virtues, magnifying therr-sovereignty, and with moek
humility, professing their readiness ever to bow to
the will of the majority. It tends to make publie men
lax in their morals, hyproeritioal in their eonduet;
and it paves the way for gross bribery and eorruption.
It generates a habit of appealing on nearly all
ooeasions, from truth and justiee, wisdom and virtue,
to the foree of numbers, and virtually sinks the man
in the brute. It destroys manliness of eharaeter,
independenee of thought and action, and makes one
weak, vaoillating, - a time-server and a ooward. It
perverts inquiry from its legitimate objeets, and
asks, when it oonoerns a eandidate for offiee, not,
who is the most honest, the most eapable? but, who
will eommand the most votes? and, when it eonoerns
a measure of poliey, not what is just? what is for
the publie good? but, What ean the majority be indueed
to support? Now, as men, as friends to good morals, we
oannot assent to a doetrine whioh not only has this
tendeney, but which declares this tendeney legitimate.5J
Having adopted publie opinion as a oriterion for the morality of statesmen, Brownson believes that it is only a matter
of time before it is adopted, almost universally, as an ethioal
standard for individual aotion. If the phrase, everyone wants

50 XVI, 88.
51 XV, 6.
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it, will justifY the action of a legislator, why is it wrong for

the individual to justify his action by the phrase, everyone doeE
52
it?
Popular demooraoy tends to oreate an atmosphere in whish
even the individual is required to guide his aotivity by publie
opinion. :&at the people will ao, say, or think about what he
does beeomes a criterion of what may or may not be done. The
The standard of moxality, popular opinion, is material rather
than spiritual. Consistently with that eriterion of marality,
material well-being is the sign of respectability. There is a
universal struggle to acquire riohes as a means of equality. Not
a few are induced to live beyond their means to make a show of
53
wealth which they have not, in order to be equal.
The tendenay toward popular demoeraoy is, then, a tendenay
toward politieal atheism. It involves a materialistie standard
of morality, It tends to recognize, practieally, no right above
the popular will. This, then, is Brownson's eonelusion:
No man ean attentively study our politieal history
and analyze with some eare our popular institutions,
but must pereeive and admit that our state eontains
the seeds of its own dissolution, and seeds whieh
have already begun to germinate. Unless the tendeney
we have thus far obeyed ean be arrested,. and a
stronger and more eoneervative prineiple be bro~t

62 XV, .440-441.
53 "As a rule, men live for their families, especsially for their
wives and daughters, whom they would see live as well, be as
well edueated, and as well dressed as the wives and daughters
of the better-to-do, whom demoeraey teaehes them to regard
as equals." XVIII, 235.

in to our relief, all hopes of a sueoessful
issue must be abandoned.

54

Stated briefly and simply, the demooratio theory of government and authority asserts the absolute, underived sovereignty
of the people oolleotively. In its nakedness it is repugnant;
Brownson has therefore endeavored to show that The Demooraoy,
clad in the apparently appealing garb of politiaal equality and
the right of the majority to rule, ooneeals the despotism.
Phrases like majority rule and political equality evoke an
emotional response and oonsequently are not subjeoted to rational analysis by the multitude.
As a Oatholio reviewer, Brownson oould not approve of the
tendency of statesmen to aaeept popular opinion, with the eonsequent rejeotion of the moral law, as the standard of right.
Of the "democratic politieian" who professes to defer to nothing
other than popular opinion, Brownson said:
No man has so muoh aonfidenee in the people;
no man has so deep, so ardent a love for the
hard-handed and sun-burnt-faeed many; none
so ready and willing to defer to the wishes,
the opinions, the instincts, the will of the
masses. He has no interest, no opinion, no.
will of his own; he is one of the people, and
knows only one thing, to serve the people by
merging his feeli3gs, wishes, interests, and
eonviotions to theirs. Find a man who so professes, and you find one you may set down to
be satan attempting to disguise himself as an
angel of light.

54 XV, 441.
55 XV, 346.

55
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Rejecting the spiritual, there is no alternative but to
substitute the material. On a materialistie basis, good and
evil ean mean only one thing: material possession or a laek of
them. Refor.ms to seeure equal good for equal individuals,
fostered by the demooratio doctrine of equality, may attempt,
on this basis, to secure the good expressed by the term politieal equality. For Brownson, individuals, unequal soeially, are
not transformed into equal politiaal powers by the mere possession of a ballot. Consequently a genuine refora for politieal equality_finds no logieal resting plaee at the ballot box.
Its resting place is a sooiety in whieh the individual is a
fraetion rather than an integer.
Brownson has now disposed of the most important of the
erroneous theories of government and authority. Authority has
been attaehed to the people. Viewed thusly, government is
fixed to a pendulum which has swung away from individualism,
in the soeial eontraot theory, toward the despotism of demoeraoy. In Brownson's theory it rests in the eenter of the
extremes.

,....-· _________________,
CHAPTER VI
THE NATURE Alffi ORIGIN OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY
Brownson presents his doctrine of the nature and location of political authority before proceeding to a discussion
of its origin. He sets forth his view rather clearly, although
somewhat circuitously, in his American Republic, where he
pursues his discussion of authority in terms of its historical
1

origin.

He proceeds by stating the

patria~chal

theory of

government. He says that it endeavors to account for political
authority by tracing its development in the evolution of the
2

family into the tribe and nation. It may be viewed either as
an attempt to determine the origin of government as an historical fact or as a theory which accounts for the moral rightness
3

of civil government.
In his criticism of the theory Brownson concedes that it
is a true explanation of government if the question is con1:.. ::<•~

solely to its historical origin. l!1 or the family,_ Adam

and Eve, is the first society. As it grows the family expands
into a tribe and finally into a nation. Thus Brownson says
that the transition from the family to the tribe is

1 XVIII, 18-26.
2 XVIII, 19.
3 XVIII, 19.

-
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natural and easy, as also from the tribe into the nation." Just
as all soaiety is derived from the family so also is government.
It has been noted already that government exists whenever soeiety exists. Consequently it is obvious that government begins
with the family.
Having thus aeeepted the patriarahal theory as stating a
truth whiah is more or less obvious, Brownson proaeeds to •ritiaise it as an attempt to aecount for the authority of government
In order to present his aritiaism aeaurately, it is neaessary
to state briefly Brownson's position before advaneing the line
of argument whioh whioh he justifies it.
Brownson maintains that a soeiety invested with politiaal
authority is radieally distinet as an entity from the family.
Consequently it aannot be developed from the family by a proeess
of direet growth or simple evolution. He tells us that if there
is nothing but mere growth and expansion, the family develops
into a barbarous tribe or nation. Thus he says that "With barbarians the authority of the patriaroh is developed simply by
way of explieation; in eivilized states it is developed by way
of transformation."

I

Repeating substantially the same opinion

4 XVIII, 19.
5 This view aoinaides with an earlier opinion: "I do not regard
the family as the germ of the state. It aontains elements
whieh are not in the state, and wants elements without whiah
the state aould neither be aonstituted nor preserved. Both,
in my view, are primary institutions, and neither is
seeondary; aertainly neither is derivable from the other."
XV, 325. ·

~·---------------------lo_a...,
Brownson says that the direet development of the family results
not in a eivilized state, "••• but gives us barbarism or what
is ealled oriental despotism."

6

Brownson•s interpretation of the terms barbarism and despotism are indieated in his eritieism of the patriarehal theory
as an attempt to aoeount for the authority of government. In
aommenting upon the development of parental authority, Brownson
observes first of all that the authority of the family is vested
in the father who is its natural head. Being in possession of
authority in his family the father may as a faet eontinue to
exereise it with the growth and expansion of his family. Thus he
may beeome chief of a tribe or king of a nation.
Now Brownson argues that the mere faet that a father eontinues to exereise authority in beeoming ehief or king, is not
7

in itself sufficient to render that authority legitimate. This
is obvious beeause rights eonsequent upon fatherhood are

~egit

imate only within the limited sphere of immediate parental
relationship. Beeause he may govern his own ohildren, it does
not follow that a parent has the right to govern anyone else,
or any ehildren of others. Therefore if the father retains his
authority to govern in the expanded family, something other than
the mere faot itself is required obviously to legitimate it.
6 XVIII, 26.
7 XVIII, 26.
8 XVIII, 26.

a
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Consequently it may be eonoluded at the outset that politieal
authority oannot be deduoed or evolved from parental authority.
Thus Brownson argues that the patriareh has no inherent
right to govern in virtue of the faot that he is a patriareh.
His oonelusion does not depend upon the way in whieh patriarehal
authority is exeroised. For if he has no right to govern others,
the patriareh has no authority to govern them leniently or
affeetionately. In order to legitimate his government it is
therefore necessary to go outside of the family itself.
Having dismissed the patriarohal theory as a basis of the
moral rightness of oivil government, Brownson proeeeds to
analyse the politieal system based upon patriarehal authority
9
with a view to determining its essential element. His view has
been indioated to some extend for he has maintained that the
distinetive eharaoteristios of authority in regard to the family
is the faet that it inheres in the father as a natural right.
Transferred to the state, this means that the ruler possesses
politieal authority as his own personal right.

10

Possessing

authority as a personal right, the ruler may exereise it aooordingly. Thus its exereise depends upon the pleasure of the person possessing it.

It is therefore arbitrary. Thus the way in

whioh the ruler exereises his authority is aeeidental; his

9 XVIII, 20.
10 XVIII, 20.

~
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government may or may not be tempered with affeetion. Consequent·
lY the essential eharaoteristie of a patriarehal government is
the faet that authority inheres in the individual as a personal
right, thus giving him the opportunity to exereise it arbitrarily.
In other words, Brownson's argument is based upon the faet
that authority is exereised in the same way that it exists. To
the extent that authority exists as the right of an individual,
he may use his own authority aecording to his own pleasure. This
is despotism. In view of the faot that the patriarehal system is
based upon the prinoiple that political authority may inhere in
an individual as his personal right or privilege, Brownson
maintains that it is despotie in prineiple.
Now Brownson refers to any government based upon the eonoeption of authority as a personal right as a barbarie government.

11

In using the term to designate a oertain type of politi-

eal organization Brownson denys that iis radical meaning is
.
12
"foreign, wild, fieree" as Webster indieates. He argues that
foreign eannot be its primitive meaning beeause the Greeks did
not refer to every foreigner as a barbarian. Furthermore, sqme
of the nations whieh they designated by the term were rather
eultured and refined, having made oonaiderable progress in
seienee and in art. Consequently the terms wild and fieree oan-

11 XVIII, 21.
12 XVIII, 21.

lll
not signify the essenoe of barbarism. Sinee the primary meaning
of the term is at least dubious it may be eonjeetured, aeeording
to Brownson, that the Greeks used the term in a politieal sense
to "••• designate a soeial order in whioh the state was not
developed, and in whieh the nation was personal, not territorial
13
and authority was held as a priyate right." Having used the
term baraarian or barbarous to signify a politiaal order that is
patriarehal in eharaeter, thus using them synonymously, Brownson
says that the essenee of barbarism consists in the faet that
authority is privately owned.
Brownso~

argues further that barbarism and eivilization are

opposed to one another. Therefore the essential ebaraeteristia
of the eivil order is the direet opposite of the barbarie order.
Thus the essence of the civil order is the faet that politieal
authority is a publie trust instead of a right privately owned.
This is signified very appropriately by the term !!! publiea,
whieh means, in regard to authority, that it is publie rather
14
than private.
Now in order to make authority a publie affair, it is not
suffieient to say that it is invested in the population as a

13 XVIII, 21.
14 "All tribes and nations in whieh the patriarehal system remains, or is developed without transformation, are barbarie ••
•• In aivilized nations the patriarehal authority is transformed into that of the oity or state, that is, of the republie; but in all barbarous nations it retains its private
and personal eharaeter." XVIII, 22.
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whole rather than in one individual. In the nature of things no
man has the authority to govern another as a natural right, Consequently no group of men, merely beeauee tbey are men, however
great their number may be, have in and of themselves the authority to govern any other man. The reason for this is that all men
are naturally equal, Consequently to give any one man authority
over another by reason of his nature, is to assert the natural
inequality of men. Therefore if authority is the right of a population merely beeause they are persons, authority is still personal. It cannot be eonverted into a publie trust merely by referring it to a whole population as persons or private individu-

15

als, "••• for what is private, partioular in its nature, is not
and oannot be general."

There is no reeourse, therefore, but to go outside of people
as population in order to discover the eharaoteristia whiah makes
it possible to eoneeive of authority as a publie trust rather

16
than a private right, This faator, Brownson says, is territory.
It was introduoed as an essential aharaeteristie of authority in
the politieal order of Gree•e and Rome. In Rome full politi•al
rights were possessed only by those who oeeupied "••• the saared

16 XVIII, 136, 24. Thus Brownson says that "••• when demoerats
assert that the eleetive franahise is a natural right of man,
or that it is held by virtue of the fa•t that the eleotor is
a man, they assert the fundamental principle of barbarism and
despotism." XVIII, 24,
16 XVIII," 20.
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territory of the eity whioh has been surveyed and marked by the
1f

god Terminus."

Thus its politioal order was organized on a

territorial, rather than on a purely personal, basis. Politieal
rights pertained not to the population as people, but to persons
18
belonging to a elaarly defined territory.
Territory is thus
introduoed as the faotor whioh determines who has politieal authority. Thus in Rome the state and its authority is no longer personal. It is based upon territory. Aeeording to Brownson the
introduotion of the territorial element marks the passage from
"••• the aeonomieal order to the politieal, from the barbarie to
the eivil eonstitution of soeiety, or from barbarism to eiviliza·
tion."

19

In other words, Brownson argues that if there is no oommon
or publia territory, than there is and ean be only that whioh is
personal and therefore private. Consequently if there is authority in a system that has

no~

publioa, it must be on a per-

sonal and therefore privata basis. It is not rendered lass
personal by inoreasing the number of persons. If authority is
personal, it oannot be publio. In order to make it publio, it
must be based upon a !!! publiea, a oommon wealth. Therefore
politieal authority respresented by the state must have a territorial basis.

17 XVIII, 20.
18 XVIII, 22-26.
19 XVIII, 21.
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Territory and population are therefore mutually dependent
·in Brownson's theory of ]Olitical authority. Without territory
there eould be

no~

publiaa, and oonsequently no republia.

Without a state or a people there eould be no public to inhabit
it. Thus territory is an essential element of politieal authority because it defines the republie in which authority inheres.
Thus Brownson says:
The state is territorial, not personal, and
is eonstituted by publie, not by private wealth,
and is always!!! publiea or commonwealth, in
distin~tion from despotism or monarchy in its
oriental sense, which is founded on private wealth,
or whieh assumes that the authority to govern,
or sovereignty, is the private estate.of the
sovereign. All power is a domain, but there is
no domain without a dominus or lord. In oriental
monarahies the dominus is the monareh; in republics it is the publie or people fixed to the
soil or territory, that is, the people in their
territorial and not in their personal or genealogieal relation.
20
Being thus organized on a territorial basis, the state and
its authority is in its very nature a publie thing, for political authority exists only in the republie. Existing only in this
way its activity is limited aoeordingly. From a negative viewpoint this means that the authority of the state eannot be
exereised as the private right of an individual or group be•ause
it does not inhere in them in this way. Thus the barbarie or
despotie element of the state is eliminated. Positively, it

20 XVIII, 21.
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means that the authority of the state, by whomsoever exereised,
must be exereiaed in the name of the republie and for its welfare. Thus the ruler may aot only as a representative or an
agent of the state because it is only in this eapaoity that he
possesses authority. Consequently ia lodging authority only in
the republie and therefore viewing it as publie, Brownson believes that he is eonstituting it on a prineiple whiah obliges
21
the state to exercise ita authority only for the publie welfare.
In presenting his view of the nature and loeation of political authority Brownson has used the terms barbarism and despotism to signify a politieal system in which the nation, and its
authority, is personal. He has used the term republie to signify
the eivil order or the state whose politieal order is based upon
a!!! publiea, whieh is territory. Thus its authority is publie
rather than private. Summarizing his meaning of these terms
Brownson says:
Monarehy and Republie are terms often vaguely
and loosely used. Ill governments that have at

21 Brownson does not believe, of eourse, that states whieh are
republiean in prineiple never abuse their authority. He says,
for example, that Rome was in theory, although not always in
praotiee, a republie: "However arbitrary or despotie some of
the eaesars may have been and eertainly were in praetiee, in
prineiple they were elective, and held their power from the
politioal oommunity •••• The sovereignty vested in the politioal oommunity, never in the person of the emperor. The
emperor represented the state, but never was himself the
state." XIII, 110.
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their head a king or emperor are usually oalled,
by even respeetable writers, monarehies, and these
that have not are usually ealled republie, whether
demoeratie like aneient Athens, aristoeratie like
Veniee prior to her suppression by General Bonaparte, or representative like the United States.
But this distination is not philosophieal or
exaet. All governments, properly speaking, in whieh
the sovereignty is held to vest in the people or
politi•al eommunity, and the king or emperor holds
from the eommunity or represents the ma~esty of the
state, are republiean, as was imperial Rome or is
imperial Franee; all governments, on the other hand,
in whieh the sovereignty vesta not in the politieal
aommunity, but in the individual and is held as a
personal right, or as a private estate, are in
prineiple monarohieal. This is, in reality, the
radical distinetion between republieanism and monarehy, and between eivilization and barbarism, and
it is so the terms should be understood.
22
Before proeeeding with the diseussion it is neaessary to
indieate briefly the position Brownson has taken as a eonsequenee of his eritieism of the patriarchal theory of government.
He has shown that the eoneeption of government as a private
right involves despotism. The despotic or barbaric element of
government is eliminated with the introduction of territory,
eommonly held, as the basis of government. In basing politieal
authority upon territory, it may exist only in a!!! publiea,
or a people fixed to a territory. Existing only in a republie
authority may be exeroised only in the name, and for the welfare
of the republie possessing it. Thus Brownson has indieated

22 XIII, 110.

~
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where politiea1 authority must be lodged and how it must be
exereised.
Furthermore, in rejeeting the patriarehal theory as an
attempt to aeeount for the moral rightness of government, Brownson has eliminated entirely the possibility of aoaounting for
authority on a purely human basis. For he has show.n already that
the authority of government is not something whieh may be instituted by the people, wither as individuals or as a politieal
eommunity. If the people as individuals institute its authority,
government ean be nothing more than the ereature of the individual. Having been ereated by individuals it eannot exeroise
authority over them, for the ereature has no authority over his
ereator.
On the other hand, government eannot be derived from the
people as a eommunity.

For if the politieal eommunity were the

souree of its own authority, it woUld be The Sovereign. This is
despotism, soeialism, eaesaristie or humanitarian demoeraey.
Thus the position of Brownson in regard to the origin of
authority is more elearly defined. Having demonstrated the impossibility of legitimating government on a purely human basis,
Brownson maintains that it is neeessary to rejeet, plainly and
unequivocally, the authority of eivil government, or else admit
that its authority is derived from God. Thus anyone eoneeding
the existence and the legitimaey of eivil government ean deny
the existenee of God only at the expense of logieal eonsisteney.
On this point Brownson himself was consistent for he says that:

,....-·

~~-~--------------------------------~--------------------1~-1~_8
"When I believed in no God I believed in no government •••• When
I renounced my atheism I derived all power from God, the source
23
of all law and of all justice."
It is evident, therefore, that Brownson must hold that
political authority is derived from God. Having shown already
that it must inhere in a republic, Brownson's theory must include
the view that the ruler derives authority from God through the
people. In adopting this position Brownson believes he is

accept~

ing the traditional view of Catholic theologians, including both
suarez and st. Thomas. He believes, however, that his own formulation of the theory is more accurate because it is more complete, for his own theory. includes the explanation that the
people derive authority through the natural law.

Conee~tly

he

amends the theory to read: "The right of government to govern,
or political authority, is derived by the collective people or
society, from God through the law of nature. Rulers hold from
God through the people or nation, and the people or nation hold
21
from God through the natural law."
Now it is in the light of this theory that Brownson endeavors to solve the fundamental problem of political philosophy,
the reconciliation of public authority and individual liberty,
thus avoiding both anarchy and despotism. In order to understand
23 V, 101. For Brownson's proof for the existence of God, of.
his "Essay in Refutation of Atheism," II, l, ff.
24 XVIII, 72.

~
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what is involved in his theory it is necessary to reoall briefly
that the natural law is law in the striot and proper sense of
the term. It is imposed upon the rational creature by God. What
is authorized under it is therefore obligatory, just as muoh so
as that whioh is authorized by the revealed law. It is oalled
natural because it is promulgated through the reason natural to
man. It is distinct, but not separated from the supernatural.
Thus the natural and the revealed law are distinct parts of one
and the same divine law.
In view of the fact that the state derives authority
tbrough the natural law, which is an expression of God's will,
individuals are obliged to obey its enactments. In obeying them
the individual obeys God who has authorized tt to legislate.
Consequently civil allegiance is a moral virtue. Thus it is ole
that the state has authority, and that its authority must be
25
obeyed.
Since the people hold authority from God, they hold it as
they do all other things He has given them, as a trust, which i
forfeited by its abuse. Since the authority vested in the
people is not their own, they cannot do with it whatever they

25 "••• the state is guarantied against sedition, insurrection,
rebellion, revolution, by the elevation of the civic virtues
to the rank of religious virtues, and making loyalty a
matter of conscience." XVIII, 69.

,...-r---------------------+2C
please. Therefore any enactments contrary to God's law, under
which the people are authorized as legislators, are ipso facto
26
null and void. Furthermore, since the ruler holds authority
from God through the people he

~s

accountable to the people as

well as to God for the use made of his authority.
On this basis the freedom - not the license - of the individual is secured. For freedom, it has been noted, consists not
in being free from law, but in obedience to God's commands. The
individual is free to do that which is right, and he

h~s

the

right to do that which is not forbidden. In disobeying God's law
the individual is neither right nor free. Such action is license
not liberty.
The state, being authorized by God, has the right to legislate. Having the right to legislate, it cannot be right for the
individual to resist any enactments not contrary to the law of
God. If laws are contrary to God's law, they are not authorized
by Him. Therefore they are not obligatory. Consequently the
individual is free, and has the right to resist them, for the
individual is always free to obey God.
In this theory authority and liberty are therefare united
harmoniously. Individual rights are secured without resorting
to extreme individualism or anarchy. The authority of the state
is secured without asserting openly or by implication, social-

26 Brownson holds that this is the traditional doctrine of
Catholic theologians. XVIII, 66.
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ism or despotism.
While the theoretical solution of the problem of authority
and liberty is thus solved rather simply - inasmuoh as God's
will, whioh is never in

oontradi~ttan

with itself, is the souroe

of both authority and liberty - its praotioal application is
somewhat more difficult. For it is obvious that there may be,

ana

frequently is, a oonfliot between the liberty of the individual
and publio authority. Therefore it is neoessary to indioate
briefly the basis on which the praotioal problem of authority
and liberty may be solved.
It has already been noted that Brownson maintains that the
problem may be solved only by the praotioal recognition of the
supremacy of God and His law. If His law is not supreme, and
recognized as suoh, then there is no moral law, no moral right
or wrong. Being unable to demand obedience on moral grounds, the
state has nothing to appeal to exoept its might. The individual,
being unable to proteot his freedom on moral grounds, must resort likewise to might.

In

other words, the failure to recog-

nize God's law emancipates both the individual and the state
from all moral obligation. Consequently it is inevitable that
both will appeal or resort to might. Thus it is likewise inevitable that: "Today it [sooietyJ is torn by a revolution in favor
of sooialism; to-morrow it will be torn by another in favor of
individualism, and without affeoting any real progress by either

122
revolution."

27

Thus the problem of authority and liberty cannot

be solved with the practical recognition of God's supremacy.
Furthermore, the mere recognition of God's law, and the
appeal to it by both the individual and the state, is not sufficient to settle practically the controversy between

autho~ity

and liberty. It may be assumed that God's law is the criterion
of right and wrong for both the individual and the state, thus
defining the limits of the state's authority and the rights of
the individual. Yet who is to define God's law if a practical
conflict arises? If the political philosopher will concede
nothing more than God's law, individuals, and the state, he is
no closer to a solution of his problem than if he denied God's
28
law and God entirely. If the authority to define the limitation of the state's power is lodged in the individual he would
be in a position to justify any act of

disobedie~e

by appealin

to hie interpretation of God's law particularly when enactments
seemed inconvenient to him. Similarly if the state is the judge
of its own cause, it may justify every act of tyrany. Socialism.
for example, professes to be Christian, and it is in the nsme
of Christianity that it contends for equality and the subsequent abolition of property.
In this way Brownson endeavors to show that if political

27 XVIII, 46.
28 XVI, 69-70; XIII, 492-494.

authority is based either upon a total rejection of God's law.
or upon God's law privately interpreted, it is not based upon
truth. Its foundation is false. There is not the remotest
possibility of solving the problem of authority and liberty
since the truth, in the light of which it must be solved, is
lacking. Since a solution is impossible it is necessary to
assert principles which, if adopted, lead either to anarchy or
absolutism, revolution or passive obedience.
In order to solve the problem of authority and liberty it

is consequently necessary to recognize the truth that God is
not only supreme lawgiver, but also that He has constituted a
church capable of determining infallibly what He has commanded.
This is the truth. It is only by building upon it that individuals and society can progress. This is the message Brownson
endeavored to convey to his public. The following is typical of
his attitude:
Since the government derives its authority
from God, and is amenable to his law, evidently
it can be tried only under that law, and before
a court which has authority to declare it, and
to pronounce judgement accordingly.
But what shall be done in case there be no
such court of competent jurisdiction? We reject
the supposition. Almighty God could never give
a law without instituting a court to declare it,
and to judge its infractions. We, as Catholics,
know what and where that court i8, and therefore
cannot be embarassed by the question. If there
are nations who have no such court, or who refuse
to recognize the one Almighty God bas establiShed,
that is their affair, not ours, and they, not we,
are responsible for the embarrassments to which
they are subjected. They, undoubtedly, are
obliged either to assert passive obedience and
non-resistance, or to deny the legitimacy of any
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government by asserting the right of revolution;
that is, they have no alternative but anarchy or
despotism, as their history proves. But this is
not our fault. We are not aware that we are
obliged to exclude ~od and his church from our
politics in order to accommodate ourselves to
those who blaspheme the one and revile the other.
We are not aware that we are obliged to renounce
our reason, and reject the lessons of experienoe,
because if we admit them, they pr·ove that Almighty
God has made his church essential to the maintenance
of civil authority on the one hand, and of civil
liberty on the other, - because they prove that
the state can succeed no better than the individual
without religion.
29
This position of Brownson follows as a consequence of his
view that the natural and the supernatural order, the natural
and the revealed law, are distinct parts of one whole. Forming

a unit, the natural and the supernatural are not separated; botl
are parts of God's plan. It is therefore false to conceive of
them as separated and unrelated. A theory of political authority based upon the supposition that the state is or can be
separated from spiritual authority is based upon a falsehood.
It must fail.
While it is false to conceive of the state as entirely
separated from the church, it is equally false not to distinguish between them. For the channel through which the state
derives its authority from God is the natural law, which is
distinct from the revealed law. The state does not therefore

29 XVI, 70.

~~----------------------------------------~1~2~5
derive its authority through the church or the ecclesiastical
30
authorities. It follows that since the state and church derive

their authority from God through distinct channels and exist in
distinct orders, neither can absorb the other. They are and must
31
remain distinct as external governing bodies.
In order to complete and to summarize Brownson's views on

the nature and origin of authority, it is necessary to note that
he has criticised and rejected in part, seven contrary theories
32
before formulating his own. His criticism of each theory is
voluminous and somewhat repetitious, and not at all essential to
the comprehension of his own theory. The brief statement of each
theory which follows indicates that his reasons for rejecting
it have already been incorporated in the chapter.
I. The patriarchal theory is rejected as an attempt to
account for the moral rightness of government. It is essentiall
despotic because authority is considered a private right. In

30 "Yet, though derived from God only through the people, civil
authority still holds from God, and derives its right from
him through another channel than the church or spiritual
society, and, therefore, bas a right, a sacredness, which
the church herself gives not, and must recognize and respectV
.XVIII, 66-66.
31 Brownson's view of the ideal relationship between the church
and state is indicated in Chapter IX wherein be maintains
that the American republic is a concrete illustration of the
ideal relationship.
32 XVIII, 18-74.
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.---------------------------------------order to transform authority into a public trust territory must
be introduced as a constituent element of political authority.
33
Thus the state and its authority is a!!! publica.
II. The social oontraot theory must be rejected because
government is the creature of the individual. As suoh it can
34
have no authority over the individual, who is its creator.
III. The democratic theory must be rejected because it
goes to the opposite extreme. The practical adoption of the
theory would result in despotism or absolutism. It has an element of truth inasmuch as it invests authority in the people
35
oolleotively or the community.
IV. There is a theory which states that government is a
development of nature. If the theory holds that it is nature in
the sense of a spontaneous development independently of God's
will the theory is wrong. It is the natural law, whiCh is an
expression of God's will that aooounts for the moral rightness
36
of gCIII'ernment.

v.

The next theory whioh is oritioised maintains that

rulers hold their authority directly from God and not through
the nation. This is the doctrine of the divine right of

ki~s.

The sole redeeming feature in the theory is that it derives

33
34
35
36

XVIII,
XVIII,
XVIII,
XVIII,

18-26.
26-40.
40-47,
47-54.
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power from God. But "••• it consecrates tyrany, and makee God
37
the accomplice of the tyrant." In other words, it asserts the
unlimited power of the ruler which is despotism.
VI. Another theory of the origin of authority states that
political authority comes from God

thro~

the pope. This

theory must be rejected because the state derives its authority
38
from the natural law which is distinct from the revealed law.
VII. The traditional doctrine of Catholic theologians
asserts that rulers derive authority from God through the people '
This view is sound and must be adopted without reservation.
However, it does not state explicitly that authority comes from
39
God through the natural law.
VIII. "The right ·of government to garern, or political
authority, is derived by the oolleotive people or society, from
God through the law of nature. Rulers hold from God through the
people or nation, and the people or nation hold from God through
the natural law."

40

When the implications of this theory are

unfolded, it is discovered that it contains all of the truths
and none of the errors of the previous theories. It asserts,
neither openly or by implication, anarchy or despotism. Thus it
solves the fundamental problem of political philosophy, the
reconciliation of authority and liberty.

37
38
39
40

XVIII,
XVIII,
XVIII,
XVIII,

54·58.
58-61.
61-72.

72-74.
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It solves the problem not only theoretically, but also
practically. In viewing the natural and revealed laws as distinct but not separate parts of one divine law, the state can
never be separated from the church, whiQh is the representative
of God on earth capable of declaring infallibly God's law. On
any other basis, aueh sa a denial of either God's law or His
church it is impossible to reconcile public authority with
individual liberty.
Having thus disposed of the question of the nature and
origin of

autho~ity,

Brownson turns his attention to the state

in which that authority resides. He has already limited the
state in terms of its function, for the extremes to be avoided
in its activity are anarchy and absolutism. In doing so Brownson obviously places a limitation upon the nature which he
may attribute to it, for the nature of anything is the source
of its activity. He cannot on the one hand attribute to it a
nature whose parts are held together so loosely that it is in
constant danger of disintegration, for he has affirmed the
necessity of its continued existence as an organization having
the authority to govern. Otherwise there would be anarchy.
Again, he cannot give it a nature whose parts form a unit so
sompletely that the existence of the individual, as a being
with rights of his own, is endangered. Thus the boundaries
within which Brownson must pursue his discussion of the state
are already clearly defined.

,r·r-------------------.
OHA.PTER VII
THE liATURE OF THE STATE

Brownson's exposition of the nature of the state rests
1

upon various philosophical foundations. Unfortunately he bas
no formal treatise on the state in which he presents in an
orderly fashinn his view of the constituent elements of the
state. It is consequently necessary to impose an orier upon
Brownson's view of the state, ani perhaps correct certain terminological inaccuracies.

2

In order to select a starting point which will serve to

unify Brownson*s doctrine, it is necessary to commence with
his statement of the elements which constitute a state. He says
that: "Sovereignty, under God inheres in the organic people,

1 For example, when he was a Platonist Brownson's theories
were based largely upon his interpretation of the Platonic
theory of ideas; later he based his views partially upon
Leroux's doctrine of communion.
2 Inasmuch as Brownson wrote so voluminously on political
problems this may seem at first sight to be a statement that
is slightly,exaggerated. In the first place, however, many
of Brownson's views are expressed in rather brief articles,
some of which were composed hastily to meet a publisher's
deadline. In his American Republio Brownson does profess to
organize doctrines previously expressed briefly and
hurriedly. Still a glance at its table of contents indicates
the fact that not one of its fifteen chapters is devoted
explicitly to a discussion of the state. He has many chapters on government. In these he discusses the state. These
discussions are extremely confusing because Brownson's position demands a sharp distinction between state and government. In the light of his doctrine which follows there is
no excuse whatsoever for Brownson to use these terms interchangeably.
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or in the people as the republic; and every organic people fixed
to the soil, and politically independent of every other people,
is a sovereign people, and, in the modern sense, an independent
sovereign nation."

3

Brownson's conception of tba state as an organism is derived from his interpretation of the Platonic theory of ideas.
This theory has been treated in a previous chapter on the "Right
of the Individual." In order to understand how it supports the
conclusion that the state is an organism, it must be recalled
briefly that humanity is an idea. It exists in the divine mind
as a simple, indivisible, generative principle. Its activity
results in the production of individual men and women. It is to
the individ:ual ''••• what the principle of vitality or vital
4

farce is to the human body."
Now according to Brownson the vital force of the individual
is its unif,ving principle; it makes the members of his body

part~

6

of one whole. For example, the eyes and ears of the human body
are related as members of one body because they derive their
vitality from the simple, vital force which pervades the entire
body and makes it one. Similarly, individuals derive their
vitality from one and the same vital force. This is humanity.
Since it is one and simple, it pervades all individuals equally.

3 XVIII, 100.
4 XV, 372.
6 XV, 372-374.

,...-
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Therefore it unites individuals as members of an organism; it
makes them parts of one body. Thus Brownson says that society
is not merely an association of individuals, but a "Living
Organism."
The

6

de~elopment

of this analogy gives us a true picture of

the nature of society. Since it is an organism, it follows
that society has different members. It follows also that each
individual, considered as a member of the organism, has a specific function, just as the fUnction of the eye is to see and the
7

ear to hear. However, Brownson points out, "What is essential
to the life and growth of the whole is, that each member be preserved in his sound and healthy state, so as to be able to per-

a

form, without obstruction, his special function." In other words,
the welfare of the body as a whole depends upon the welfare of
its members. Just as the

~an

organism suffers if the function

of the eye is obstructed, so also does the social organism
suffer if the function of an individual is obstructed.

6 "This [ h1l1Ilanity] is essentially one and identical in all men,
and is to the great body of individual men and women, under
the relation I now consider it, what the principle of vitality, or vital force, is to tm human body. It is the one
vital force active in all, the life-current that flows throug
all individuals, making them all members of one living body.
It is to establish this fact, that I have insisted on the
Platonic doctrine af ideas, and attempted to demonstrate
man's existence as an idea or as the genus, to speak the
language of science." XV, 372.
7 XV, 372.
8 XV, 372.

~
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This means, therefore, that man's welfare and that of society are intimately interwoven. Society is in a sense the comple·t~on

of man because it fills up a need that is rooted in his

nature. The reason for this is that man's nature is at once
individual and social. The humanity whiQh constitutes him an
individual is the same humanity that unites him to others as a
member of an organism. Consequently he cannot exist without
deriving life from the organism of which he is a member, any
more than the eye could exist apart from the body.

8

Thus far Brownson haa said nothing explicitly about the
state. He has given us a conception of individuals who cannot

8 Brownson never modified his conception of society as an organism, although he did modify his Platonism, as is evident from
the following, written in 1867: "We confess that we are not
able to make out from Plato a complete, coherent, and selfconsistent doctrine of ideas." II, 289. His later view is
grounded on Leroux's doctrine of communion, which has been
stated in a preceeding chapter. Presenting his view in terms
of this doctrine, Brownson holds that man is a dependent being
and cannot exist without God. He depends upon him directly
through religion, and indirectly through nature and society.
Without society he can neither be born nor sustained in
existence. Therefore society is necessary to man and consequently as "••• indestructible as human nature itself." V,
131. This is another instance in which Brownson maintains one
conclusion consistently but supports it on different grounds.

2
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exist apart from society. Since the individual cannot exist
apart from it, his relationship to society is that of a member
who cannot exist if it is out off from the body to which it
belongs. His pnDoedure is clear, however, inasmuch as he has
already established the fact that government is necessary to
society.

He has shown that the family, which is the smallest

society from the numerical standpoint, cannot exist without
9

government because it would fail for lack of unity. Consequently
government is introduced as the factor which renders effective
10
man's existence as a member of an organism.
In other words, government is necessary to society just as
society is necessary to man. Being essential and indispensable
to society, which in turn is necessary for man, government must
exist as the condition upon which man expresses or actualizes
his nature. Thus Brownson says, "Extinguish government and you
ll
extinguish society; extinguish society and you extin~ish man."
Now government exists in both the family and in the republic or a people fixed to a territory. Parental authority, however, is confined within the narrow limits of an immediate family. Being legitimate only within a family, it ceases to be
legitimate with the natural growth and expansion of the family.

------·-···- ...
9 XVIII, 14.
10 XVIII, 15.
11 :!VII, 10.
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Consequently the government of the parent or the patriarch must
be replaced or transformed into that of the state in order to
be lagitimate. The family grows and expands naturally into a
larger society, but the father can have no natural right to
govern a society larger than his immediate family. Consequently
authority in such a society must be based upon something other
than the conjugal relationship. It has been indicated already
that the basis of this authority must be

somet~ing

res publica, or a territory commonly held.

common, a

12

Being an organism, the state is required to secure the
good of the individuals constituting it as the condition of securing its own welfare.

It has been noted previously that the

welfare of the whole depends upon the welfare of its parts. Now
18
the individual is at once an individual and a member of society.
Therefore in order to secure the good of the individual the
state must permit him to fulfill his function both as an individual and as a member af society.
Since government is necessary for society, which in turn is
necessary for man, there is no intimation in Brownson of the
view that gaFernment is a necessary evil, or that it is rendered
necessary by man*s fall. Ita function is positive rather than
12 XIII, 110.
13 Brownson maintain's consistently that the recognition of the
fact that the individual is an integer aswell as a part of
society is due to Christianity. The following is typical of
what he holds: "The doctrine af individnal freedom before the
state is due to the Christian religion, which asserts the
dignity and worth of every human soul, the accountability to
God of each man for himself •••• " XVIII, 45.
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negative. It is the oondition upon whioh man may develop and
perfeot his natural oapacities. Consequently it is a good for
mgn, aeoond only to religion. In Brownson*a words:
It is needed to render effeotive the solidarity
of the individuals of a nation, and to render
an organism, not a mere organization - to oombine
men in one living body, and to strengthen all with
the strength of each, and each with the strength
of all - to develop, strengthen, and sustain individual liberty, and to utilize and direot it to
the promotion of the common weal - to be a
social providence, imitating in its order and
degree the action of the divine providence itself,
and, while it provides for the common good of all,
to proteot each, the lowest and meanest, with the
whole force and majesty of sooiety. It is the minister of wrath to wrong-doers, indeed, but its
nature is beneficient, and its aotion defines and
proteota the right of property, oreates and maintains a medium in whioh religion oan exert her
supernatural energy, promotes learning, fosters
soience and art, advanoes oivilization, and contributes as a powerful means to the fulfillment by
man of the divine purpose of his existence. Next
after religion, it is man's greatest good; and even
religion without it can do only a small portion of
her work. They wrong it who call it a neoessary
evil; it is a great good, and, instead of being
distrusted, hated, or resisted, except in its
abuses, it should be loved, respeoted, obeyed, and,
if need be, defended at the cost of all earthly
goods, and even of life itself.
14
fhus far Brownson has said that the state fulfills a need
existing in man•s nature and that it is consequently a good. He
has said also that its authority inheres in the people as a
whole and is oonsequently the attribute of the whole organism
rather than of any individual.

14 XVIII, 15.

~
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At this time, however, Brownson introduces doctrines which
are not precisely ordinary, at least not with respect to the
manner in which he expresses them. The first of these doctrines
is introduced to explain why or how people come to be organized
into particular states. That is, he endeavors to indicate the
basic factors which unify a people and give it a distinctive
existence as a people.
Adopting his usual procedure, Brownson begins by criticising
contrary theories before presenting his own view. He begins by
denying that a written dootUI.I!Ult, ordinarily referred to as a
constitution, is the basio or fundamental factor which organizes
people into a state. A written constitution, being the act of a
community or a people, obviously presupposes the existence of
individuals already organized in some way. Since it presupposes
organized people, a constitution cannot be the sole organizing
15
~actor of a people.
In other words, on the supposition that a
~n

~ritten

constitution is the fundamental factor which unifies a

people or gives being to them, it would be possible to conceive
pf a state as a purely artificial production. The nation would be
similar to

" •••

a temperance society or deyating club, a simple

voluntary association which men are free to join or not as they
16
please."
~hus Brownson rejects entirely the view that states
15 As is evident Brownson is again criticising the contract
theory, that people can get together voluntarily, draw up a
written constitution and thus bring a state into existence.
This theory has been treated in some de,ail in a previous
chapter.
16 XVIII, 75.
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oome into existence or oan be formed suddenly, oreated!!

~·

by the formulation of a written constitution.
In opposition to the oontraot theory of Rousseau, Brownson
says that states oome into existenoe by a prooess or growth or.
development, rather than a production. That whioh constitutes or
gives being to a people is its own internal organization, represented in the habits, the manners, the oustoms, the living tradi·
tions whioh grow and develop as a people grow and develop. It is
this internal organization whioh gives the state its vitality,
"••• that whioh oontrols or governs its aotion, and determines
17
its destiny."
Now the habits, manners, traditions, ouatoms of a people
that oome into existence by a prooess of growth or development
represent, for Brownson, an internal unifying faotor whioh preaedes, and is more fundamental, than its written constitution.
He speaks of the sum of these faotors in terms of an organio,
18
or unwritten, constitution, or in terms of its unwritten or
19
living law.
The point that Brownson endeavors to oonvey, in terms whiah
appear somewhat confusing, is the faat that an individual government must be adapted to, and be an expression of, the fundamental and distinotive ha'its and traditions of a people. It aan-

17 XVIII, 80.
18 XIII, 44-46.
19 XIX, 368-360. Brownson also refers to these faotors as the
Providential Constitution.

~
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not be created artificially and imposed from without. "It must
be born and developed with the nation •••• Constitutions ot
states are not things that can be made to order, and imposed by
authority, regardless of the habits, manners, customs, and traditions of the people who are to live under them."

20

This means that if, for example, a monarch is included in
the fundamental, internal organization of a people, it is the
sheerest folly to remove the monarch and attempt to impose another form which has no basis in the traditions of a people.
The French people adopted constitution after
constitution of the most approved pattern, and
amid bonfires, beating of drums, sound of
trumpets, roar of musketry, and thunder of
artillery, swore, no doubt, sincerely as well
as enthusiastically, to observe them, but all
to no effect; for they had no authority for the
nation, no hold on its affection, and formed no
element of its life.

21

Brownson believes, therefore, that the fundamental and
primary organization of a people determines the particular form
of government which is most suitable for that people. He could
never bring himself to consider seriously the question as to
whether or not one form of government is inherently better than
22

another.

"The constitution of government must grow out of the

constitution of the state, and accord with the genias. the

20 XIII, 44.
21 XVIII, 81.

22 Of. Summa Theol. l-2, q. 95, a. 4, c., in which St. Thomas
enumerates the various forms of government and indicates
briefly the merits of each, and the merits of a combination.
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oharaoter, the habits, oustoms, and wants of the people, or it
will not work well, or tend to seoure the legitimate ends of
23

80Vernment."
In other words, Brownson holds that a people develops a
unity or organization whioh is distinctively their own. Anything
rooted in that organization as an integral element, cannot be
uprooted without destroying the people. Consequently a government imposed from without tends to eliminate or destroy a radical element of that organization. Such a government seldom, if
ever, has a hold on the people and is consequently seldom a
good government. It must be maintained by force because it is
not the expression of a living organism.
Brownson also attempts to answer the question as to why or
how people beoome organized on a territorial ba?is and thus begin to exist as states, and why some survive and others are
extinguished. His answer, whether philosophical or not, is that
the providence of God is the only ultimate explanation. God in
His providence has permitted states to be extinguished, and some
of them by violence. Why He has done so "••• is no question for
the statesman; it is the seoret of Providence. Failure in this
world is not always a proof of wrong; nor success, of right. The
good is sometimes overborne, and the bad sometimes triumphs; but
it is consoling, and even just, to believe that the good oftener

23 XVIII, 97.
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triumphs over the bad."

24

Likewise, God in His :providence is ultimately responsible
for the existence of a particular :people, state, or nation. Consequently Brownson also refers to the organic or unwritten constitution which gives being to a state as its :providential con25
stitution. In order to discover what he means by it, it is
necessary to discover what he means by :providence and thus determine the respective roles of providence and human agency in
the formation of the state.
Providence, for Brownson, means the action by which God
sustains, cooperates with, and directs His creatures:"J?roVidence
is as necessary as creation, or rather,_providence is only continuous creation, the creative act not suspended or discontinued
26
or not :passing over from the creature and returning to Go d." He
distinguishes between'God's providence and God's natural law:
"The law of nature is not the order or rule of the divine action
27
in nature which is rightfully called providence •••• "
The necessity for the divine action in nature called providence is to be found in the nature of the creature. He is a
second cause, a substantial existence, but nevertheless dependent; consequently God must concur, cooperate with, and direct
every action of every creature. Having given man a nature which
24
25
26
27

XVIII,
XVIII,
XVIII,
XVIII,

107.
74-75.
67-68.
72.
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is free, God must direot him, but he

must leave his freedom
28
intaot •••• How this can be done, we do not undertake to say."

" •••

Applying this doctrine to the state, Brownson says that men
cannot produce a state de novo. A germinal organization must be
given them to start with. This germinal organization which men
cannot produce is present in families, in families united into
tribe. It develops in the migrations of families and in colonies
through wars, conquests, rebellions, amalgamation of conquered
and conqueror. In a word, the development of a nation presup29
poses a germinal organization which may be developed.
Now Brownson maintains that· it is by reason of

circumstance~

such as those mentioned that nations begin to exist. These circumstances are providential in his estimation, but not therefore
30
fatalistic. The germ whioh is given to a people by reason of
these events is not, properly speaking, made; it is rather a
generation. Granted such a germinal organization, men may develo]
it. They may deve.lop distinctive habits, oustoms, and instinctivE
unity as a people, but they oannot by their own voluntary effort1
bring into existenoe or produoe the germinal organization they

28 III, 365.
29 XVIII, 77.
30 In traoing the development of Rome, for example, he says that
the "Roman people, had they ohosen, could have given a different direction to the developments of their constitution.
There was Providence in the course of events, but no fatalism." XVIII, 89.
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have to begin with. This is the work of providence.

31

As an indication of what Brownson means by the providential
constitution with respect to human liberty in its formation the
following brief passages are cited:
•••• cohstitutions are generated, or developed, not
created de novo, or made all at once. But nothing is
more sure-tnan-that a nation can alter its constitution by its own deliberate and voluntary action, and
many nations have done so, and sometimes for the
better as well as the worse.
32
Providence is always present in the affairs of
nations, but not to work miracles to counteract the
natural effects of the ignorance, ineptness, shortsightedness, narrow views, public stupidity, and
imbecility of rulers, because they are irrepraachable and saintly in their private characters and
relations.
33
The doetrine presented thus far means that Brownson has
established the fact that the state is an organic people fixed
to a territory. On the basis of his analysis of man's nature,
he has show.n that man is related to society as an organ is

31 As is evident, Brownson derived this doetrine from Joseph De
M.aistre, (Anon. trans.), Essay on the Generative Principle
of Political Constitutions, Boston, 1847. Brownson's review
of this essay indicates that he accepted it rather enthusiastically at first. This first discussion is characterized
by extremely confusing terminological taexactitudes. While
he accepts the terms of the doctrine, such as providential
and generated constitutions in his later works, they appear
to have an entirely different meaning. He refers to the
doctrine rather f~~quently, e.g., XVII, 494-600, and XVIII,
74-92 where he says that the doctrine is not true as held
by that "illustrious Count."
32 XVIII, 76.
33 XVIII, 91.
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related to the body from which it draws life. Society requires
authority, whioh in turn exists only in people related territorially. The possession of both territory and living traditions are unifying factors of the state which precede the
adoption of its written constitution. Thus the state is an
organic people fixed to a territory.
The consequences whioh Brownson draws from this position
are, if nothing else, at least somewhat startling. Brownson
argues that if political authority is an attribute of the people as a whole, it cannot be prior to, but must be consequent
upon, the existence of an organism. Unfortunately, Brownson
states the conclusivn derived from this position rather abruptly and without sufficient warning, for he says in no uncertain
terms that "A nation de facto is a .nation de jure, and when we
have ascertained the fact, we have ascertE:ined the right. There
is no right in the case separate from the fact."

34

It is rather unfortunate that Brownson 1 s arguments are
stated somewhat vehemently and abruptly on any side of a
question because it is rather easy to select certain passages,
such as that abuve, and prove that Brownson was an advocate of
the doatrine that.might makes right. It is also easy to select
passages from Brownson to prove that he was an anarchist.
Brownson himself notes this, and rather frequently, when he

J't·,_XVIII, 105.
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says that HWe are not infrequently aooused of being one-sided,
narrow-minded, and disposed always to push the prinoiples we
36
may have happened to adopt to extremes. Nothing is more untrue.n
.And again,
••• if we oppose false liberty, or lioense
presented under the name of liberty, we are
oharged with being enemies of true freedom;
if we assert authority, however legitimate
or neoessary, then we are despots or advocates
of despotism. The press opens its cry against
us, and the age votes us mediaeval dreamers,
behind the times, relics of the past, with our
eyes on the baokside of our heads, and the
truth is drowned in the floods of indignation
or ridioula poured out against us.

36

Since Brownson was notoriously imprudent and extreme it is
neoessary to present his doctrine more prudently, without thereby presenting it less acourately, or with a view to suppressing
his dootrine for the purpose of vindicating it.
In view of the fact that Brownson main tai~s that poli tioal
sovereignty vests in the politioal oommunity, or the state, or
the people as an organism, he distinguishes sharply between the
state and the government commissioned under it: "The government,
~s

distinguished from the state or nation, has only a delegated

authority, governs only by a oommission from the nation. The
revooation of the oommission vaoates its title and extinguishes
37
its right."
In other words, the people, being sovereign, may oommission

36 X, 632-633.
36 III, 338.
37 XVIII, 108.
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this government or that; they may entrust authority to a king
or·an aristoaracy, or to a combination. The distinction between
the sovereign people and the government is that between the
38
sovereign and his agent. This means that no ruler, whether he
be king or emperor, holds his authority as he does a piece of
39
property. The people may, for a good and sufficient reason,
dismiss their agent, whether he be called king or emperor, without depriving him of any indefeasable right, as they would do
if they deprived him of property. "The right of a nation to
change its form of government, and its magistrates or repre40
sentatives, by whatever name called, is incontestable."
This, according to Brownson, is nothing more than the
logical application of the doctrine that sovereignty vesta in
the people, and that rulers are consequently justiciable by the
people as well as by God for the use made of authority.

41

Al-

though sovereignty is delegated to rulers, sovereignty itself
is in the people and persists in them. The powers delegated to
government "••• are still the powers of the sovereign delegati
them, and may be modified, altered, or revoked, as the soverei
42
judges proper."

38 XVIII, 92.
39 XVIII, 92-94.
40 XVIII, 99.
41 XVIII, 99.
42 XVIII, 99.

~
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Applying this doctrine still further, Brownson holds that

an existing government may be destroyed entirely without thereby
destroying the state or the sovereignty of the people. If the
people survive the destruction of their government, "••• the
sovereign remains in the plentitude of his rights, as competent
to restore government as he was originally to institute it."

43

It may happen further that a particular ruler or a particular government may be overthrown, not by the people acting as
sovereign, but by a mob. Subsequently a new ruler may acquire
his position by an act that is manifestly unjust.

44

In suoh a

case Brownson contends that the people still maintain the right
to legalize, or to legitimate, the title of the new ruler. The
faot that the people will to retain a ruler is in itself suffioient to give him legitimate authority. His right as a ruler
is not derived from any right prior to the will of the people,
for "He holds his power, as the emperor of the Frenoh professes
to hold his, by the grace of God and the national will - the
only title by whioh a king or emperor can legitimately hold
45
power."
It is clear therefore, that Brownsonis dootrine does not
mean that a government de facto is a government de jure. One who
acquires title by violenoe may be the ruler de faoto, but he

43 XVIII, 93.
44 Brownson refers to conditions in France in 1848 and subsequently to Napoleon's suppression of the legislative assembly in 1851. XVIII, 93.
45 XVIII, 93.
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does not rule de jure unless the people he rules will to retain
him as ruler. If he maintains power by mere foroe he is a
tyrant, a usurper without authority.
Aooording to Brownson a olear out oase·of a government that
is de faoto imposed upon the people without being de jure is
46
England's dominion in India. Its dominion is de faoto, but it
is without right and consequently tyrannical. It is government
without legitimate authority to govern and therefore barbaric
and despotic in principle. England may succeed in maintaining
it, according to Brownson, but if it does it will "••• wreak a
vengeanoe on the unhappy Hindoos that will establish her char47

aoter for cruelty and barbarity down to the end of the world."

With the distinction between state and government clearly
in mind it is impossible to maintain that Brownson holds that
every government able to preserve itself by force is a de jure
government. It is consequently necessary to examine his assertion that every nation de faoto is a nation de jure on the basis
of this distinction.
In asserting that a nation de facto is a nation de jure,
Brownson was endeavoring to discover the basis on whioh the
state derives authority from God. He rejects the view that a
state, in order to be legitimate, must have oome into existence
rightfully. His reason for rejecting this view is made on the

46 XVI, 538-544.
47 XVI, 546.
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ground that it would be impossible to justify, or to assert the
rightful existence of, a single civilized state:
A hundred or more lost nationalities went
to form the Roman empire, and who can tell
us how many layers of orushed nationalitieg,
superimposed one upon another, serve for the
foundation of the present Frenoh, English,
Russian, Austrian, or Spanish nationality.
What other title to independence and sovereignty,
than the fact, oan you plead in behalf of any
European nation? Every one has abso1·bed
and extinguished - no one can say how many nationalities, that onoe had as good a right
to be as it has, o~ can have.
48
This argument is typical of Brownson. He says that if a
nation must be founded rightfully in order to be just, acoept
the principle and apply it regardless of the consequences: " ••• I
have never in my life been able to persuade myself that a principle, really sound and true, will not bear pushing to its last
49
logical consequences." He continues that if a principle cannot
be applied, it is proof that it is untrue and aannot be adopted.
Obviously, as has been indios ted, he maintains that the pr'inciplE
that a nation must be founded rightfully in order to possess
legitimate authority oannot be a criterion for determining its
legitimacy.
Rejecting this view as untenable, Brownson accepts the oonSequenoes of the dootrine that authority inheres in the state as
an attribute of the whole organism. As suoh it is necessarily
consequent upon, and not prior to, the existenoe of the organism.
48 XVIII, 107.

49 XVIII, 224.
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Therefore it begins with the existence of the organism and is
extinguished with its death: "There is no right behind the fact
needed to legalize the fact, or to put the nation that is in
50
fact a nation in possession of full national righ1ts.n
The doctrine that a nation, not a government, de facto is
a nation de jure, taken in connection with his view on the
origin of authority, serves to unify and to render more definite
Brownson's view of the state. He has maintained that authority
comes from God through the natural law. It inheres in the state
as an organism for the good of the whole. The state is constituted or given existence by the possession of a territory and
by a distinctive internal organization of its own. Thus the
authority of the state inheres in the state itself. A written
enactment is consequently not constitutive; it is the product
ot, or is written by, a people already existing as a people.
Since Brownson maintains that a nation de facto is a
nation de jure, he maintains that the existence of a nation is
simply a question of historical fact. The functions of a sovereign are easily discernible, as easily as any other historical
fact. Briefly, the distinctive characteristic of sovereignty is
the exercise of complete authority, which is the management of
51
both internal and external, foreign and domestic affairs.
50 XVIII, 107.
51 These conditions are expanded in the following chapter wherein they are applied to a particular situation.
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Since Brownson maintains that the existence of a nation is
a simple question of historical fact, he is ma.rely applying his
doctrine that its authority remains and persists in the organic
constitution. With respect to India, for example, the historical fact is evident. The internal organizations have not been
broken. Consequently there remains the right to resist invaders,
who are of necessity tyrants. On the other hand, a people whose
distinctive organizations have been broken, who have been
absorbed, assimilated, conquered, are no longer de facto a
people. As scattered ramnants they have no longer the right to
52
institute and exercise complete political authority.
His thought is indicated clearly with respect to colonies
existing under the jurisdiction of their mother country. Such
colonies are not sovereign de facto. They may exercise some of
the functions of a sovereign such as the control of domestic
affairs. Such authority is legitimate; it is authorized through
the political sovereign. If the authority of the mother country
over its colonies is such that it is tyranical, oppressive, too
great to be endured, it may be resisted even by force. This may
be, but seldom is, the case.
Yet a people dependent upon legitimate political authority
may never revolt against it merely to secure complete political
authority or sovereignty for themselves. To maintain the contraly

52 XVIII, 106.
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that is, that individuals, groups, colonies, are inherently
sovereign and have the right to be sovereign, is to babble the
nonsense of Rousseau. It would, if adopted in principle, put
an end to all legitimacy:
Myself and two others might otherwise unite,
and declare ourselves a sovereign state, and
secede from the city, the state, and the Union,
and scornfully refuse to recognize your magistrates, your laws, your police, your conscription, and your tax-bills. This would be democracy
run mad, and too absurd to be asserted even by
the Evening Post or the New York Tribune.
53
At this time it becomes necessary to state clearly that
which has been implied all along in Brownson's discussion of
the state. He is endeavoring to establish principles which he
will endeavor to apply primarily to the concrete situation in
which the Anglo-American colonies found themselves at the
termination of the revolutionary war. By way of concluding the
discussion of these principles, they will be reviewed briefly.
Since they will be applied to a concrete situation in the
following chapters, the summary is given in terms of a concrete
problem, and how the position taken thus far is necessitated
by the problem confronting Brownson. In order to accomplish
this purpose it is necessary, at least momentarily, to break
away from Brownson's own exposition.
He has maintained that a people always begin their existence with a germinal organization Which is given to it. This

53 XVII, 570.
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organization grows with the people; it develops with them. It
becomes a part of the living, breathing people themselves. This
organization is represented in the living habits, traditions
and institutions

~f

a people. This living, growing organization

is a unifying factor which is more important than written
enactments.
If such a people are in possession of a territory, and they
are politically dependent, they are not sovereign. They hold
authority dependently upon the sovereign who has authorized
their existence. Such authority is legitimate; it is right.
Consequently it cannot be right to revolt against it merely in
order to obtain complete authority.
If it were accepted as a matter of principle that such a
people could revolt for the purpose of securing complete authority for themselves, one would accept, consciously so or not,
the principle that people are in themselves sovereign. Being
sovereign they have a right to unite voluntarily, to ordain
government, to revolt in order to secure compleie authority.
Thus Brownson maintains that if there could be a right to complete authority prior to the fact, one would be in the absurd
position of maintaining that it is right for a colony to resist
the rightful enactments of the mother country.
On the other hand, if such a colony does revolt de facto
it thereby severs the channel through which it derived legitimate authority. Since it has been out off from the source of
its authority, (1) it must be left without authority, or (2)
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its authority must be derived from some other source. (3) The
source can be none other than that indicated by Brownson in the
exposition of his own doctrine.
(1) Authority exists only in the state. The colony is a
transplanted dependent group, deriving authority legitimately
through the mother country. If by a wrongful act they sever that
channel, it is impossible for them to convene as isolated individuals and re-institute, by a convention, a legitimate government. They cannot, in other words, make their

g~ernment

a

rightful government by surrendering rights, agreeing to be
governed, or consenting voluntarily; in a word, their government
cannot be legitimated in terms of Rousseau's social contract.
Thus, if the channel through which legitimate authority is
derived is severed, and if the state must come into existence
rightfully, there is no possible way for Brownson to introduce
legitimacy into any government of Europe, and more importantly,
into the government of the United States.
(2) Having severed the channel from which they derived
authority, Brownson endeavors to discover a new channel through
which authority may be derived. It cannot come from God through
separate individuals, because individuals, again are equal. God
has given to man no dominion over man. Further, authority
obviously could not be derived through the written enactments
existing in virtue of the authority of Britain. With the termination of·the authority through which the written documents
were authorized, they were no longer law. Thus individuals as
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as such and any previously existing written documents are elimin
ated of necessity for Brownson as a means whereby, or as channel
through which, any new enactments might be legitimated.
(3) Brownson solves the problem, of course, on the basis of
his conception of authority as derived from God through the law
of nature. It is given to the nation when it exists as such. It
inheres in the people as an organism, fixed to a territory. The
people are constituted a people by the presence of living institutions and traditions which are prior to, a.nd able to survive
the destruction of, written documents. Thus with the termination
of the war, authority, under God, inhered - not certainly in
Americans as individuals - somewhere in the living organizations
which persisted despite the termination of the authority of
their written documents.
This summary of Brownson's view, made in terms of a concret
problem, indicates two things. First it indicates the reason
for Brownson's doctrine that a nation de facto is a nation de
jure. Second, it indicates that the problem confronting Brownson
in the following chapters is not at all concerned with a justifioation of the Revolutionary :lar. Furthermore, it cannot be a
problem concerning the forms of government to be adopted, for
he has maintained that the question of forms of government is
an idle one.
He has maintained that the most important characteristics
of a state are precisely those which cannot be written down.
Further, it is important to maintain institutions whioh have a
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hold on the people, whiah grow and develop with them. It is
important to maintain intaat the fundamental organization - the
inherent, internal organization of the nation, and to keep the
government in aonformity with it so that it may be invigorated by the life blood of the nation itself. For this reason
Brownson endeavors to present the basio nature of the organism
he aalls the Ameriaan Republia.

CHAPTER VIII
THE UNION OF STATES
It has been noted in a previous ohapter that after the
eleotion of 1840, Brownson's theory and the reality confronting
him refused to harmonize. The infallible people had betrayed
their birthright for a barrel of aider. Being thus rudely
awakened, Brownson was driven to an examination of the principles upon whioh he had based his views.
A somewhat similar situation confronted Brownson during
the period preoeeding the oivil war. His oomments upon praotioal affairs were based upon the principle that the Union is a
oonfederaoy of independent states or nations. He notes later
that "This view is simple, and is easily taken in, and we eonfees we held and defended it down almost to the breaking out of
1

the rebellion." As seooession threatened he found himself on
the side of the Union. Here again was a situation in whioh his
theory and the oonorete reality confronting him refused to
harmonize.
His procedure was similar to that followed in 1840.

~irst

of all he tested his theory for consistency. He had reasoned

1 XVII, 500. His exposition and defense of state rights is contained principally in XVI. He followed, as is evident, the
dootrine of Calhoun on this point. His oonneotion with Calho
is indicated very well in Schlesinger, 114-124.
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that if the states were in the beginning sovereign and independent, then the relationship between state and union is that
of the sovereign to his agent. He had supplied the fact that
they were sovereign when they began their existence as states.
The conclusion is inescapable. Finding no flaw in his reasoning,
or that of Calhoun to which it is similar, his only alternative
was to examine the fact which he had taken in and assumed to be
true.
Now the terms in which Brownson's investigation must be
conducted have been indicated in the

concludi~g

remarks of the

preceeding chapter. He has maintained that the formation of a
nation or a people with a distinctive internal organization or
constitution of its own is a process of growth and development
rather than a production. On the basis of his theory, a people
are constituted by the development of distinctive habits, customs, living traditions and institutions - not by the production of a written document. Consequently he is obliged to investigate the formative period of the nation, for this period
reveals its radical and distinctive elements.
In addition to this view Brownson has maintained that the
government of the people must be rooted in these elements. It
must retain them. If it does so it is envigorated by the life
blood of the nation itself. If it tends to eliminate anything
radical, it can be maintained only by physical force. Consequently the conclusion of the investigation reveals Brownson's
conception of the organic constitution to which the existing
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government must conform in order to maintain the Ameriaan
Republic.
The immediate results of Brownson's investigation, to the
surprise of no one, reveals the fact that he had been wrong in
assuming without a thorough investigation that the states were
originally sovereign. In terms of vindicating either North or
South, his arguments leading to that conclusion are unimportant.
They are, however, indispensable for a comprehension of Brownson's interpretation of an existing reality. It is for this rea
on that it is necessary to begin with his presentation of the
argument for an original nation.
Sinae it is Brownson's avowed purpose to discuss the organ
ic constitution, which cannot be embodied completely in written
documents, his case for union cannot rest entirely upon an
interpretation of a document such as the Articles of Confederation. He concedes that those who formulated these documents
looked upon the union as a oompaot between sovereign states.
But he also remarks that these men, for the most part, looked
upon the state itself as a oompaot entered into by sovereign
individuals, as is evident in the statement that government
2

derives its legitimacy from the oonsent of the governed.
Brownson argues that the mere faot that some individuals

2 XVII, 486.
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of the period viewed society in terms applicable only to a

temperance society does not mean that the society called the
state is really that kind of organizattmn. It is not a simple,
voluntary association despite the fact that these men thought
so. Likewise, the fact that some men thought they were forming
a simple contract between sovereign states does not imply that
their thoughts on the matter were in conformity with reality.
The real intention of those in authority has something to do
with the matter, but it is not the court of last resort beyond
which there is no appeal. Consequently the crux of the issue is
the reality itself rather than previous interpretations of it.

3

Thus there are in a sense two courts in which the case for
an original union of states may be tried. One of these is obviously the written documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution as
amended by the convention of 1787. However, to the extent that
these documents embody the philosophy of those who framed them,
such as the view that government derives its just powers from
the consent of the governed, they include opinions or interpretations of an existing situation. Since Brownson has questioned
the philosophical basis of such opinion, he is led to question
the opinions and interpretations of the founding fathers. Thus

3 XVII, 575, 484.

1
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their opinions represent a court in which the case may be tried.
but it does not represent the supreme court

~rom

whose decision

there is no appeal. The other court, the supreme court, is the
existing situation itself independently of previous interpretations.
Brownson states the case in commenting upon the philosophical judgment of the founding fathers.
Men may have a good understanding of facts and
yet fail utterly, and become grossly absurd, when
they attempt to construct theories for their
explanation. The question for us is, not what
theories our fathers held with regard to the seat
of the sovereign power, but where it was actually
lodged as a matter of fact, for the fact overrides
all theories on the subject.
4
Brownson's view is of course based upon the doctrine presented in the preceeding chapter, that a nation de facto is a
nation de jure. A nation derives authority from God by the fact
that it exists and maintains itself. If an organized people
institute civil government and exercise within and without t4e
functions consequent upon a nation, they are by that very fact
invested with authority. The rightfulness, or lack of it, by
which a nation comes into existence is not the criterion for
determining whether or not it has authority.
This means first of all that Brownson is not required to
justify the revolution by which the colonies acquired a status
as a nation. The United States has legitimate authority regard-

4 XVII, 576. Of. also XVIII, 126.
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5
less of whether or not the revolution was justified. It means
secondly that since sovereignty is a fact and not a right prior
to the fact, there is

no~

priori ground on which it is possible

to determine whether sovereingty existed in the states or in the
6

union.
This means that Brownson must discount arguments designed
to show an antecedent rightfulness of each state to sovereignty.
There is no right prior to the fact of sovereignty. It means,
too, that he must throw out of court arguments designed to show
that each state thought it was sovereign and had the right
to be
,
sovereign. The men who thought this way also thought that society itself was composed of individuals who are sovereign in
their own right. Accepting the theory that the state itself
derives legitimate authority because sovereign individuals surrender rights to it, it was natural for them to speak of a union
of states in terms of rights surrendered by sovereign states.
Brownson's basis for asserting an original union of states
is thus clearly defined:
The historical fact determines who is the sovereign,
who are the sovereign people, where, in a sovereign

5 Of., for example, the following: "Whether they were justified
or not in throwing off the authority of the British crown was
a momentous question for them, but is none for us •••• " XVII,
483. Referring to the same revolution he says, "We do not
understand how any revolution can be effected by legal authority. '1 XVII, 491.
6 "There is no reason~ priori, that we know of, why the original British sovereignty could not have inured to the states
severally. There was no positive law in force, or legal princi
ple prohibiting it." XVII, 568.

nation, the sovereignty is lodged, and through what
channels it is exercised; because the existenoe and
constitution of the national sovereignty is an historical fact, anterior to all written constitutions
and to all positive legislative enactments. What
might ha~e been, what is desirable, should have been,
are political and ethical questions, - very interesting, very important, no doubt, but of no moment in
determining what is.
7
The facts which Brownson presents briefly are the following
The original unit wf organization was the colony. Further,
••• the colonies were mutually separate and independent
political corporations, or, if you prefer, political
communities before the Union existed, and, unless in
the British people, did in no sense constitute one
political community. We do not pretend, and do not
recollect, that we ever have pretended, that, distinguished from their unity under the British crown
and parliament, they were alwafs one political
people •••• They were original y separate and mutually independent political communities.
8
Another fact: The people acting through colonial organizations
waged a war for independence. With the termination of the war,
the sovereignty of Britain with reference to the colonies was
terminated. The Crown was no longer the sovereign as a fact and
consequently was not rightfully sovereign. But sovereignty did
not lapse. It passed to those who won independence as a fact
and as a matter of fact exercised it:
Sovereignty never lapses, is never in abeyance,
and the moment it ceases in one people it is
renewed in another. The British sovereignty
ceased in the colonies with independence, and
the American took its place. Did the sovereignty,
which before independence was in Great Britain,
pass from Great Britain to the states severally,

7 XVII, 168.
8 XVII, 673.
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or to the state• united? It might have passed to
them severally, but did it? There is no question
of law or antecedent right in the ease, but a
simple question of fact, and the faot is determined
by determining who it was that assumed it, exercised it, and has continued to exercise it.
8
Brownson maintains that the obvious fact of the matter is
that people acting thro8gh colonial organizations waged the
suooessful war for independence. It is further obvious that the
colonial organizations did not merge to the extent that they
lost their identity as distinct organizations; but it is equally
obvious that they were not separated to the extent that they did
not aot jointly.
At this point it

~ust

be noted that Brownson nowhere at-

tempts to explain why the colonies acted jointly. There is no
intimation in his doctrine that the colonies united because of
a mutual love for one another, or with the avowed intention of
forming one nation. Nor is there an attempt made to disoover why
the people were distributed into colonies whioh acted jointly:
"How they became so united and so divided is o:f no consequence
in determining what was or is the real constitution of the
American people."

9

fhatever reasons may be alleged to explain

it, the faot remains that people distributed into colonial
organizations aoting jointly through these organizations waged
a successful war.
Having maintained that sovereignty was wrested from Britain

8 XVIII, 111.
9 XVII, 485.
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by the joint action of people existing in distinct political
corporations, Brownson must endeavor to defend the thesis that
it was exercised in the same way that it was secured. In his
estimation a sovereign nation is one which maintains, within
and without, the functions consequent upon every civilized
nation.
Brownson is obliged to show first of all that with the
termination of the war political authority remained in, and continued to be exercised by, distinct political corporations.
Secondly, he his obliged to show that these political corporationa continued to act jointly. No one of these distinct communities exercised and continued to exercise de facto the
functions consequent upon a civilized nation. Consequently they
were never independent nations de facto, and therefore not de
jure.
Brownson argues that after independence the states continued to exercise the functions formerly performed by them as colonies. There was therefore a continuity of function from colony
to successfully rebelled colony or state. The people who rebelled through distinct organizations continued to act through
distinct communities after the rewellion. Consequently it is
certain that "••• the political people of the United States have
never existed as a consolidated mass, without organization or
distribution into separate and mutually dependent states,
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corporations, or political societies."

10

It is equally oertain that the individual state has never
proved its ability to maintain civil government as a sovereign
nation by fulfilling within and without the functions conse11
quent upon suoh a nation. The functions which it has failed to
exercise as a fact are those which conoern its relationShip to
foreign powers, such as the negotiation of treaties and the
12
right to declare war. Thus, "••• bating a few irregularities
not to be counted, ••• " individual states have never existed
and maintained themselves as individual nations fulfilling all
13
of the functions consequent upon sovereignty.
Brownson argues therefore that there is a continuity of
function from Crown to individual-states-acting-jointly. In
terms of a federal government, which at this point represents
whatever allianoe existed among the states, this means that the
federal government performed the functions formerly reserved to
the crown. Thus the funotion by reason of which the colony itself lacked complete political authority, Which is the distinct
ive characteristic of a sovereign nation, is also lacking in
the successfully rebelled colony or the state considered

10
11
12
13

XVII, 565.
XVIII, 109.
XVI, 566; XVIII, 109.
XVI, 485. The few irregularities probably refer to those
instances in which some states attempted to negotiate
treaties.

separately.

14
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Consistently with his theory of the organic constitution,
which maintains that the formation of a state is a process of
growth and development, Brownson does not and cannot maintain
that a nation emerged from the struggle for independence with
15
institutions fully formed and developed. Consequently he does
not and oannot maintain that there was a clearly defined line
of demarcation between federal and state governments as early
as 1776. For this reason irregularities existin8 during that
period, or a confusion as to the precise function of each
organization, are to be discounted, for these lines of demarcation are part of the development and formation of the nation.
Thus he describes the period immediately following 1776 as a
transitional period during whioh the nation was struggling for
possession of the faculties whereby it oould maintain its
existence.
In its struggle to maintain itself, the people, acting
through colonial organizations, adopted the Articles of Oonfed
eration. The congress under it failed. It was acknowledged as
a failure. The very fact of failure proves that the Articles o

14 XVII, 566-672. Of, eg., the following: "The political
rights of the states hold from or continue the political
rights of the colonies while the Union inherits and continues the political rights or sovereignty held by the British
Crown, prior to Independence." XVII, 666.
16 XVII, 493; XVIII, 113.
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Confederation were not in harmony with the needs and wants of
the people. If they had met and had continued to meet the circumstances which confronted the people, thore
'10

.need t::>

::~.jc;1ct

wo~ld

have been

them. Their failure is consequently conclu-

sive proof of the fact that the central government authorized
16
under them was too weak.
In terms of Brownson's organic constitution, the doctrine
presented thus far means that the Union began with the distribution of people into distinct colonies under the Crown. While
dependent upon the Crown the people began to act jointly
through colonial organizations. The instinct or habit of acting
jointly in this way was strengthened by the struggle for independence. Circumstances necessitated concerted action for suecess.
The instinct for concerted action which the people had
developed, while present at the termination of the conflict,
was not clearly recognized by the people themselves. Thus they
formed a central government without taking into consideration
the instinct for joint action which had already been formed.
It was doomed to failure because it was not constructed in
accordance with the needs and customs of the people who had to
live under it. The fact that it was not in accord with the

16 "The Artioles of Confederation, it is well known, proved a
failure, did not meet the wants of the country, and precisely because they left the oen tral government too weak."
XVII, 487; XVIII, 113.
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with the needs and wants of the people is proved by the fact
that it failed.
Powers were more clearly defined under the institutions
adopted subsequently. Individual states retained jurisdiction
over particular interests, the general government over general
affairs. Being incomplete, neither government performed the
functions of a sovereign by itself. Consequently both governments are necessary for complete authority which is the distinctive characteristic of a nation. The fact that such an arrangement is in harmony with the basic structure and needs of the
people is proved by its success.
Thus Brownson contends that it was a people acting jointly
through colonial organizations who waged and won the war for
independence. It was a people acting jointly through state organizations who proved themselves capable of performing within and
without the functions consequent upon a civilized nation. Both
particular

commun~ties

and communities acting jointly are integ-

ral parts of the American Republic. Thus states are sovereign
l!l

in union or joint action but not in separation.

17 The following brief passage is cited to illustrate Brownson's
argument on this point. "••• if the English colonies, now the
United States, had separately declared and won their independence, they would unquestionably have become separately
independent states, each invested by the law of nature with
all the rights and powers of a sovereign nation. But they did
not do this. They declared and won their independence jointly,
and have since existed and exercised sovereignty only as
states united, or the United States, that is, states sovereign
in their union, but not in their separation. This is of itself decisive of the whole question. XVIII, 110.

~------------------------------------------------------~9
Brownson is somewhat vague in regard to the point at which
sovereignty lapsed in Britain and became a fact in the United
States:
Independence was declared in 1776, but it was
not a fact till 1782, when the preliminary treaty
acknowledging it was signed at Paris. Till then
the United States were not an independent nation;
they were only a people struggling to become an
independent nation. Prior to that preliminary
treaty, neither the Union nor the states severally
were sovereign. The articles were agreed on in
Congress in 1777, but they were not ratified by
all the states till May, 1781, and in 1782 the
movement was commenced in the legislature of New
York for their amendment. Till the organization
under the constitution ordained by the people of
the United States in 1787, and which went into
operation in 1789, the United States had in
reality only a provisional government, and it was
not till then that the national government was
definitely organized, and the line of demarcation
between the general government and the particular
state governments was fixed.
18
Before proceeding with Brownson's exposition of the
union of states it is necessary to note that he attempts to
gain additional support for his case by an interpretation of
historical documents. Of his rather ingenious comments in
this regard the following is typical. He says that the framers
of the original articles of confederation called it "confederation, but only because they had not attained to full consciousness of themselves; and that they really meant union,
not confederation, is evident from their adopting, as the
official style of the nation or new power, united, not confed

18 XVIII, 113.

r-----------------------------------------------------1~70
erate states." 19

A part of this statement is tenable inasmuch as the people
who were required to meet rather pressing problems immediately
after the war did not recognize clearly the extent of the joint
action required to win the war and to maintain themselves. Thus
the statement that the people had not attained to full consciousness of their institutions is tenable. Yet when Brownson
adds that

11

they really meant union" and not confederation, he

is clearly making a statement for which he can have no factual
evidence. One would begin to suspect that Brownson had no insight into the minds of these men and consequently had no way
of determining what they really meant or did not mean.
Brownson's position with regard to an interpretation of
these documents is indicated in the following:
There can be little doubt that the strongest
nationalists in 1787, if they had been asked
where was our political sovereignty prior to
the adoption of the federal constitution,
would have answered, in the states, or the
people of the states, severally; and would
have maintained, if pressed, that the national
sovereignty they asserted was created by the
surrender of a certain portion of the rights
of the states to the general government. The
possibility of such surrender nobody questioned,
and nobody saw anything absurd in the assertion
at once of the sovereignty of the Union and of
the states severally •••• Even in the preamble
to the declaration of independence, by the congress
of 1776, we find the assertion that "government
derives its just powers from the consent of
the governed.n Holding this doctrine, the
statesmen of 1787 could concede without difficulty

19 XVIII, 116.
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that the states, or the people of the states
severally, were sovereign prior to the adoption
of the federal constitution, and yet deny them
to be sovereign afterwards •••• To oonoede the
original sovereignty of the states severally,
and then to deny the right of seooession, is
simply to outrage common sense.

20

With this view of the philosophy prevailing at the time,
Brownson says it is necessary and important to take suoh a
factor into consideration in interpreting these historical documents. It is olear that the convention of 1787 recognized the
faot that states had been acting jointly or in cooperation with
one another, for one of its purposes was "to

p~ovide

for

a~

perfect union." Brownson argues therefore that if there had
been no union or joint action whatsoever, " • • • it would not and
21
would not have spoken of providing for a E!2.!! perfect union."
In view of the faot that Brownson maintains that a oonvention does not "institute or constitute society he maintains that
the words "to provide for a more perfect union" should be interpreted to mean that the convention of 1787 recognized the faot
that there were states, that these states had.been acting jointly or in union with one another, and that it was necessary to
provide a government whioh would express more perfectly the join
action whioh had always been present.
Brownson's oase for an original union, however, is based

2m XVII, 561-563.
21 XVIII, 120.

r-------------------------------------------------~17

primarily on the assertion that it was states acting jointly
who declared independence and fought for it, It was states acting jointly who exercised and maintained that oomplete authority
which is the distinctive characteristic of a sovereign.
In terms of Brownson's organic constitution this means that
the fundamental ge1·minal organization present in America was a
unity in diversity - states ani a union of states. This is the
original organic constitution of the American Republic,
With the recognition of independence and the subsequent
illegality of existing documents, this fundamental organization
of the people remained, Consequently sovereignty passed to the
states in union. Being invested with authority the organized
people were authorized to enact legal documents. Being the act
of a political sovereign, these documents are binding. They are
22
the legitimate enactments of a sovereign.
Thus far the basis on which Brownson expands his meaning
of the constitution, both organic and written, has been established, Brownsonls conception of its merits is a lofty one.
Before proceeding with his exposition, it is necessary to discover the respective roles assigned to providence, and the
statesmen whose philosophy he has berated in the fonnation of
both the written and organic constitution.
First of all the elements from which the organic union of

22 XVIII, 113,
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states developed - that is, the presence of colonies acting

jointly - is not the product of human wisdom, foresight or deliberation. The organism called the union of states is providential, "••• as much the work of Providence as the existence
in the human body of the living solidarity of its members."

23

Brownson does not hesitate to say that this Union is the
best possible system for the American people. Although it is the
best it is not mandatory therefore that it should be supported:
When we place the obligation to support our
institutions on the notion we may have that
they are the best, we give them only an intellectual basis, and can enlist only the
intellect in their behalf; but when we demand
obedience to them on the ground that they are
the law, we base them on morality, and place
them under the protection of religion. We
demand then obedience as a duty, not merely as
a sound judgment, and make loyalty not merely
a sentiment, but a virtue.

24

Although it may not appear such, Brownson's praise of the
statesmen of 1787 is genuine. Their genius is to be found in the
fact that they were, for the most part, guided by reality instead of their own speculations. They had the good sense to
adopt existing institutions. To the extent that they were guided
by reality they wrote well:
The merit of the statesmen of 1787 is that
they did not destroy or deface the work of
Providence, but accepted it, and organized
the government in harmony with the real
order, the real elements given them. They

23 XVIII, 127.

24 XV, 558.

~------------------------------------------------------,1?
suffered themselves in all their positive
substantial work to be governed by reality,
not by theories and speculations. In this
they proved themselves statesmen, and their
work survives.

25

For a more thorough comprehension of Brownaon 1 s stand on
these points it is now advisable to invest;gate his exposition
in the American Republic. In it he maintains that the American
Republic is the best practical solution of the problems confronting the political philosopher, not only with reference to
~

the reconciliation of liberty and authority, but also to the
problem of the relationship between church and state.

25 XVIII, 139-140.

CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
Brownson's exposition of the nature of the Ameriaan Republic is for him the most important part of his political philosophy. There is no complete authority except in the union of
states. Consequently the American Republic is an organism
whose immediate members are states. Thus individuals are member
of the organism only inasmuch as they are members of states.
Since the people constituted a nation by the union of
states are by that fact sovereign, they are authorized to insti
tute government or to modify the existing government. It is
their privilege as sovereign. In America the distinctive organ
for the exercise of authority is the convention.

1

It is quite obvious however, that for Brownson a convention called at random, appealing to the people as a consolii&*e
mass irrespective of state organization, does not represent
supreme political authority. He has just shown that the political people exist only as distributed into distinct but inseparable units. They have authority to ordain and institute
government only as assembled through states in union with other
states.

1 XVIII, 116.

-
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For Brownson, therefore, the traditional phrase "We the
people of the United States" is very expressive. It places
authority exactly where it is located: in the people of states
united. The phrase "in convention jointly assembled" is also
expressive because it indicates the distinctive organ through
which the sovereign speaks and commissions the agencies whereby
he exercises complete authority.
The convention is really the fundamental government of the
country because it is the immediate organ of the sovereign. Thus
the government of the country, as its sovereignty, is one and
indivisible. The sovereign exercises his functions through two
mediums, a general government and particular state governments.
This division of powers is according to Brownson distinctively American. It is found nowhere else in the world and
is similar to no previously existing form of government. It is
this distinctiTe feature. which is the glory of the American
2

system.

Thus it must be investigated more carefully.

First of all, the division of power is not between a
national and a state government. This is to imply that one is
the sovereign government while the other is subject, which is
inadmissable because sovereignty passed to the states united.
If one alone were sovereign, it would be the sole, complete
government of the country. Therefore the governments are coordinate. The respective spheres of each are defined. They are

2 XVIII, 189.

~--------------------------....17

both dependent upon the sovereign who instituted them, but not
upon each other. Consequently each is supreme within ita own
sphere. The basis of division is more properly between a general
government controlling all matters of common interest and a
particular government having jurisdiction over the particular
3

relations of individuals. One must be careful to understand
exactly what is meant by general and particular welfare:
The private welfare of each is, no doubt, for
the welfare of all, but not therefore is it the
"general welfare,"for what is private, particular
in its nature, is not and cannot be general. To
understand by general welfare that which is for
the individual welfare of all or the greater
number would be to claim for the general government all the :powers of government, and to deny
that very division of powers which is the crowning
merit of the American system. The general welfare,
by the very force of the words themselves, means
the common as distinguishable from the private
or individual welfare.
4
Understood in this way it is clear that the American system
does not have its basis in a system of checks and balances which
obstruct the exercise of power in order to guard against its
abuses. There is a division of power itself rather than mutually
antagonistic powers. There is no attempt mo make forces collide,
but there is an attempt to make them operate in different spheres
in order to prevent collision. This provides for the exercise of
power while at the same time it very obviously provides an
effective check against the abuse of power or ita excessive

3 XVIII, 131.
4 XVIII, 136.
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centralization. The general government cannot oppress the private rights of individuals because they are withdrawn from its
jurisdiction. In regard to these the states themselves govern
5
supremely.
Furthermore, the particular state government cannot oppress
the individual because the same division of power is carried on
into the heart of the state itself. In some states, more than
others, the division is carried on by means of counties, town
corporations, cities and similar institutions, each of whioh is
entrusted with the jurisdiction of affairs that are purely local.
There is therefore little danger of excessive centralization of
power within the state itself.
Understood in this way, the American system is unique. It
has no exact prototype in any previously existing system. Referring to the English system of checks and balances he says:
The principle of the British constitution is
not the division of the powers of government,
but the antagonism of estates, or rather of
interests, trusting to the obstructive influence of that antagonism to preserve the government from pure c~ntralism. Hence the study of
the British statesman is to merge diverse and
antagonistic parties and interests so as to
gain the ability to act, whioh he can do only
by intrigue, cajolery, bribery in one form or
another, and corruption of every sort.

6

Commenting upon what he believes to be its opposite, French
imperialism, he says:

5 XVIII, 139.
6 XVIII, 130.
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The emperor confessedly holds his power
by the grace of God and the will of the
nation, which is a clear acknowledgement
that the sovereignty vests in the French
people as the French state; but the imperial constitution, which is the constitution
of the government, not of the state, studies,
while acknowledging the sovereignty of the
people, to render it nugatory, by transferring it, under various subtle iisguises,
to the government, and practically to the
emperor as chief of government.

7

Brownson*s purpose in introducing both the English and the
French systems is to show that they represent extremes. The
English system as he represents it guards against the abuse of
power by obstructing its exercise on the basis of mutually
antagonistic interests. He remarks that if these checks and
balances were perfect, there would be no exercise of power whatsoever. Practically, however, it is not perfect. At one time
certain interests combine to get the upper hand, while after a
time possession is secured by other interests. Imperialism, on
the other hand, tends to an excessive concentration of power.
The American system is represented as combining the best
features of both and is consequently superior to either. It preserves unity without concentrating power. It provides for the
exercise of power without setting up antagonistic interests to
obstruct it.

8

A further examination of this distinctively American system discloses the fact that "It is not a constitutional

7 XVIII, 128.
8,XVIII, 128-130.

monarch~
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not a constitutional aristocracy, but, perhaps, may be defined,
with sufficient accuracy, a constitutional democracy, although
the terms are to us a little incongruous. We would, if the thing
were possible, exclude the word democracy altogether, as unnecessary and apt to mislead.n

9

However Brownson remarks in the same place that it is
apparently "••• too late to get rid of the .term." Consequently
he takes the position that if people will insist upon adopting
the term, he may as well tell them what their system means in
terms of democracy. It is not, however, without a snort of scorn
for the term itself that he makes this concession.
Brownson says that the only democracy compatible with American institutions is what he calls territorial democrracy. It is
this conception of territorial democracy based upon the theory
of an original union that gives him some claim to originality as
a politiaal philosopher. It is aonsequently necessary to investigate it carefully, because it is for him the most important
10
part of his analysis of the American Republic.

9 XVII, 484.
10 Brownson himself does not claim originality in regard to this
doctrine. He says that he derived it from hints and suggestions in the work of John c. Hurd, The Law of Freedom and
Bondage in the United States, XVIII, 3. His son, Henry F.
Brownson, claims that it is original with Orestes. Maynard,
345, seems to share that opinion. Whatever else may be said,
it is certain that Hurd does not present the viiw as Brownson
does. Brownson's constitutional theory, baaed as it was upon
Leroux, Plato, De Maiatre, et al, represents a synthesis
that is definitely his own.----
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Brownson states simply that American or territorial democracy means that the right to participate in the exercise of
authority is derived from the territory:
The great body of freemen have the elective
franchise, but no one has it save in his
state, his county, his town, his ward, his
precinct. Out of the election district in
whioh he is domiciled, a citizen of the United
States has no more right to vote than has the
citizen or subject of a foreign state.

11

This statement merely means that the right to vote is not
a personal right. Since it is not personal, it is not nomadic.
Since a person cannot wander about, voting whenever and whereever he pleases, the political power which is represented by the
vote cannot come from him as a person. It must be confined to or
based upon a place or a territory.
The doctrine that the right to vote is derived from territory is merely the particular application of a doctrine that has
been established in Brownson's view on the origin of authority.
In his analysis of the civil as opposed to the barbaric order,
he has indicated that the state must be a res Eublica. Otherwise
its authority is, and can be, only personal - a private right
or privilege. Being personal it is therefore arbitrary, despotic
in principle, and therefore illegitimate. It implys that man
has dominion over man, which is inadmissable because all men are
naturally equal.
Since the right to vote is the right to exercise political

11 XVIII, 152.

182

authority, it is erroneous, strictly speaking, to refer to it as
a right, for political authority is, and oan be, only a publio
trust. Being a trust, the extension of suffrage cannot be advocated on the ground that it is a natural right of men, or that
12
it is the right of every person because he is a person.
It inheres in the

~

publica as an organism to be exercised for the

welfare of the whole. Consequently the society called the state
may extend or restrict suffrage in order to secure its own welfare. In the case of the American Republic, the organic people
enacted written constitutions determining who may vote and the
conditions upon which he may vote. Since these constitutions
were enacted by an organic independent people who had the right
to enact them, they are law.
The constitution, however, provides for its own amendment.
Such amendments are of course legal if they are amended in the
manner prescribed by the constitution. The political people
determined by the constitution may extend or restrict suffrage
if in their judgment it is for .the best interests of society to
do so.
In Brownson 1 s estimation it would be illogical on the part
of the Ameri"an people to refuse, for example, to extend suffrage to negroes or to impose restrictions in terms of wealth. 13

12 XVIII, 193.
13 XVIII, 191-194.
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the

Ameri~an

Republic has in its radiaal constitution no ele-

ments of royalty, hereditary nobility, racial discrimination, or
class distinction in terms of wealth. In addition, property has
enough advantage in itself without making it a basis for voting.
He did not, however, advocate the indiscriminate extension
of suffrage. Negroes, for example, should first prove themselves
capable of maintaining themselves as free men before being entrusted with the ballot. He opposed, and one might add rather
vehemently, the extension of suffrage to women on the ground
that it would be to no one's advantage to permit them to enter
the political arena:
The vary fact that woman is the weaker vessel •••
renders her lass morally independent, lass frank,
open and straightforward, and in a contest with
man, compels her to resort to art, artifice,
intrigue, in which alone she can equal or surpass
him. Her accession to the political body could,
therefore, only introduce an additional element
of political and moral corruption.

14

Besides that, man does not separate his own interests from
those of women; consequently she cannot claim the privilege of
voting on the ground that it is necessary to protect her own

.

interests: "He always includes in his private interest that of
some woman; and if he cheats, robs, steals, swindles, gives or
takes bribes, it is almost always for the sake of his Eve, or
15
at least for the sake of his family."
This brief survey of Brownson's view of suffrage indicates
14 XVIII, 402.
15 XVIII, 403.
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that he was not opposed to the simple idea that the people
should have a voice in the government. He maintains, however,
that this voioe in government must find expression only in and
through the constitution. This constitution, it has been noted,
is based upon distinot but inseparable units. The presenoe of
these units rendered practical a system in which the power of
government is decentralized without checks and balances to obstruct the exercise of power. In order to retain intact this
desirable arrangement, Brownson contends that democracy must be
continued mn its teritorial basis. Each state must continue to
be attaohed to its own distinct territory, and to exercise auth16
ority over the affairs pertaining to it.
Opposed to the conception of authority as attaohed to and
inseparable from territory is the conception that it is attached
17
to persons.
Suoh authority is essentially despotic. It gives
power to govern without the right to govern. Its despotism is
manifested either in individualism, or in humanitarianism or :'
18
sooialism. Brownson believed that both of these trends were
manifesting themselves in the politioal currents of the day.
While, theoretically, the trend toward personal or individualistic democracy, ending ultimately in anarohy, is as dangerous as humanitarian democracy, Brownson believed that the danger

16 XVIII, 178.
17 XVIII, 178.
18 XVIII, 178.
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of an individualistic trend had been checked effectively by the
civil war. There is no further danger that the union will be
broken by the undue assumption of authority by the individual
states: "The danger to American democracy from that quarter is
forever removed, and democracy a la Rousseau has received a
terrible defeat throughout the world, though as yet it is far
19
from being aware of it."
Brownson believed that the danger from the other quarter
20
was muoh more imminent. With the termination of the war he
wrote that the Union victory would be interpreted as a victory
for reformers fighting for social equality. Thus the movement
for social reform would be stimulated temporarily at least
21

throughout the world.

The pendulum would swing away from indi-

vidualism and toward the other extreme.
Regarding its immediate effects in the United States he
writes that the Union victory will resUlt in a tendency toward
humanitarianism or consolidation, both within individual states
and among the states themselves. He notes however that "The

19 XVIII. 184.
20 Writing in 1857 he tells us that in the event of a war between north and south, all other issues would be forgotten:
n • • • the party opposed to slavery extension will then, in
spite of all that can be said, be an abolition party, and
the cry will be 'freedom to the slave'•••• The south ~an
not afford to provoke such a conflict, for in it the moral
sense of the civilized world would be with the north, which
would be cheered as the champion of freedom." XVII, 65.
21 XVIII, 186.
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constitution, in the distribution of the powers of government,
provides the states severally with ample means to protect their
individuality against the centralizing tendency of the general
•
22
government, however strong it may be."
He writes further, that along with the tendency to central
ize power in the general government is the tendency to centralize it in the hands of the executive. States, he believed,
would always retain their identity. But during the civil war it
was necessary to confer almost dictatorial powers upon the
presiQent - powers he was unwilling to relinguish with the term
ina tion of the v•ar: "The danger that the general government wil
usurp the rights of the states is far less than the danger that
the executive will usurp all the powers of congress and the
23
judie iary. Continuing, he says that ncongress clothed the .
president with dictatorial powers for war· purposes only, but
the executive forgets this."
It has been indicated in the discussion of the democratic
theory that this centralizing tendency is inevitable, according
to Brownson, it the proposition is defended, in simple unequivocal terms, that the people must rule, that they have the
natural right to vote, that their opionion must be consulted on
every issue. Such appeals are and can be made only to the
people as a mass of individuals in which case they are no more

22 XVIII, 186.
23 XVIII, 189.
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sovereign than the people of a foreign state. Furthermore, the
opinion to whioh appeals are made is, in Brownson's estimation,
seldom anything but a oompound of ignoranoe, prejudice, passion
caprice, and interest, constantly varying, condemning a Socrate
one day to drink hemlock, and the next erecting a temple to his
24
memory.
This direct appeal to the people in their oapaoity as
individuals is vicious. Representatives ask not, what is just,
what is right, but what will my constituents say? Opinion is
thus the ultimate criterion of right. This is political atheism
In Brownson's estimation a society based upon the conception that people have the right to rule is based upon the falsehood that dominion over man is attached to man. The pendulum
of such a sooiety must swing from individualism to socialism,
egoism to humanitarianism, anarchy to oaesarism. Amerioan society oannot be attaohed to suoh a pendulum.
It is in opposition to this oonception of authority that
Brownson proposes his theory of territorial demooraoy. The
people who are the politioal people are determined by the oonstitution, whioh is a law above the people beoause it is enaote
by a sovereign. The constitution determines further the extent
to which, and the conditions under which, the political people
may function. Under that oonstitution authority is oonfined to
a definite place.

24 XV, 204.

~eople

acting through the constitution of the

,-------------------------------------------------------------------,18€
place are sovereign in it; they perform the functions of a sovereign by controlling domestic affairs. Any one not domiciled in
it has no more authority in it than the resident of a foreign
state. It is the people of distinct places acting jointly under
the constitution who are the sovereign people. Thus territorial
democracy is the only democracy compatible with both the organic
and written constitutions of the American Republic.
Brownson admits that a conaeption of a people who are one
and many is a difficult one. He admits that the conception of a
territory which is one but nevertheless distinct is a difficult
conception. It is a conception of a society that resembles, more
closely than any other society, the Trinity. In these passages
Brownson takes a very lofty view of the American Republic:
God is the author and type of all created
things: and all creatures, each in its order,
imitates or copies the divine being, who is
intrinsically Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ••••
In the Holy Trinity is the principle and prototype of all society, and what is called the
solidarity of the race is only the outward
expression, or copy in the external order, of
what theologians term the cirouminsession of
the three divine persons in the Godhead.
Now, human society, when it copies the
divine essence and nature either in the distinction of persons.alone, or in the unity
alone, is sophistical, and wants the principle
of all life and reality.
The English system which is based on
antagonistic elements, on opposites, ••• copies
the divine model in its distinctions alone,
which, considered alone, are opposites and
contraries. It denies, if Englishmen ooUld see
it, the unity of God. The French, or imperial
system ••• denies the distinctions in the model,
and copies only its unity, which is the supreme
sophism called pantheism. The English system tends
to pure individualism; the French to pure

18'
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socialism or despotism, each endeavoring to
suppress an element of the one living and indissoluble TRUTH.

25

Brownson points out, of course, that the unity in diversity
of the American system resembles more closely the model or prototype of society than either of the other systems. It is the
original, inherent unity in diversity that rendered practical thE
division of power that is the distinctive feature of Americran
republicanism:
The special merit of the Ameriaan system is not
in its democracy alone, as too many at home·and
abroad imagine; but along with its democracy in
the division of powers of government between a
general government and particular state governments, which are not antagohistio governments,
for they act on different matters, and neither is
or can be subordinated to the other.

26

At this point one begins to wonder why Brownson has neglect
ed throughout his discussion of the merits of American republicanism to introduce the religious factor. He has maintained that
individual liberty and public authority cannot meet harmoniously
without the presence of infallible authority to define their
respeotive spheres. As a matter of fact, Brownson devotes a very
small portion of his work to a discussion af the relationship
27
between ohuroh and state in America.
The reason for this is the fact that Brownson endeavors to
show that the

Amer~an

Republic is based upon principles which

25 XVIII, 203-204.
26 XVIII, 205.
27 Less than 22 of 222 pages are devoted in the American Republic
to a discussion of the plaae of the church in the Ameriaan
system.
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are oatholio, universal. It recognizes the supremacy of the
spiritual order whioh is all that Brownson would ask of any
state. He has maintained that the ohuroh and state are distinot;
they derive authority through different channels. As external
corporations they are distinct, each having its own function.
Being distinot, they should not be intermingled, the one with
2$
the other.
Brownson does not attempt to establish the fact that the
founding fathers were favorable or unfavorable to Catholioity.
It has been indicated already that the private opinions of the
founding fathers are of no consequence whatsoever in determining
what is and what is not. What they thought of the matter is a
question that may be interesting, important to many people, but
not so to Brownson.
He says that de faoto many religious seats and denominations of one sort or another were present at the birth of the
nation. As a matter of faot, however, none of these seats
have been able to get their

~eouliarities

~~

constitutions or its laws."

"• • •

incorporated into its

Whatever reasons may be alleged to

explain the fact, nothing that is narrow, sectarian, bigoted,
has been incorporated into the constitution. The nation neither
adopted nor recognized the merits of one religion as opposed to
another. If any attempt were made now to establish a seat as the
religion of the nation, it would only "••• array all the other
s~ xviii, 216
29 XVIII, 212.
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29
sects as well as the church herself against the government."
Another fact is that the state professes to be founded on,
and to recognize, rights which are above it, anterior to it;
these are called the "rights of man," among which are the traditional "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."These

right~

however, are grounded on the spiritual order. They are derived
from God, as are all other rights. In recognizing, for all practical purposes, that these rights are above it, held independently of it, the state n••• acknowledges in reality, if not in
form, as its basis, as its very foundation, not only the inde30
pendence, but the supremacy of the spiritual order."
Brownson is endeavoring to show that the nation does not
feel itself free to destroy this religion or that, to

im~ose

this or that sectarian view as obligatory. There is rather a
practical recognition of the fact that it is obliged to respect
and to protect equally the religious convictions of its
~hus

citizens~

it protects Catholics in the exercise of their religion.

It protects their

pro~erty

from violence just as it does that of

any sect. It recognizes and protects the right of the church to
form and to direct the conscience of her subjects, to speak
freely and to exert whatever influence she is able to exert.

31

The relations between the church and state in America are
29 XVIII, 217.
30 XVIII, 231.
31 XVIII, 216.
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nearly normal in the estimation of Brownson. The fact that they
are normal is evinced by the lack of treaties and concordats,
which are needed only where there is an attempt
the stste to interfere with the church.

o~

the part of

He coneledes that suoh

oonoordats are neoessary in other states, and if they were broken it oould be interpreted to mean that the state oould do whataver it pleased with the church, her property and the religious
oonvictions of her citizens. The very faot that there are ooncordats shows that all is not well and that oonoessions must be
exacted to remedy an evil. Suelh treaties are unnecessary in the
United States because the conditions necessary for the ohurch
to exert her influence are already adopted in the constitution
of the nation.
This errangement, while practical nowhere else, is in itself better than any other oonceivable arrangement for the churcl,
If she is the official religion of a state, political and ecclesiastical affairs tend to be inextricably interwoven. Ecclesiastical appointments sometimes neceasitate state clearance beforE
becoming effective. Subsequently to appointment, clerics must
devote considerable time to purely political affairs, thus rendering less effective their spiritual

ende~vors.

Purely civil

act~

are sometimes attributed to the church as part of her policy.
Existing and flourishing in a monarchy, she is viewed as favorinE
monarohial as opposed to republioan forms. Being involved in
politioal affairs she is to an extent dependent upon political
powers in order to operate. To the extent that she is thus

19~
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dependent, the state may and often does use her to promote its
'32
own ends.
It is in opposition to this confusion that the American
system depicted by Brownson stands out in clear contrast. The
principles necessary for the church to exert her influence are
adopted not by treaties or concordats, or by a mixture of civil
and ecclesiastical powers, but in the constitution itself. There
is no mutual antagonism or distrust requiring concordats to establish spheres of church and state. Thus Brownson says:
Where there is nothing in the state hostile
to the church, where she is free to act according
to her own constitution and laws, and exercise
her own discipline on her own spiritual subjects,
civil enactments in her favor .or Against the
sects may embarrass or impede her operatio~s,
but cannot aid her, for she can advance no
further than sae wins the hearts and convinces
the understanding. A spiritual work can, in the
nature of things, be effected only by spiritual
means.

33

The relations between the church and state are not normal
in any other nation in the world

becau~e

the American Republic

is the only modern, civilized state tha.t is grounded in reality
in the recognition of the fact that there are rights which it as
a state cannmt touch. It is, in a word, the only state which is
so constituted that the state may trust the church and the dhurru
is free to work without the interference of the state.

32 XIII, 127-146.
33 XVIII, 217.
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Suah being the case, no sensible Catholict
aan imagine that the church needs any physical force against the sects •••• What are
called religious establishments are needed
only where either the state is barbarous or
the religion is sectarian. Where the state,
in its intrinsic constitution, is in accordance with catholio prinaiples, as is in the
United States, the church has all she needs
or can receive.

34

At this point BrONnson 1 s conception of ohuroh and state ia
AmerXra are more clearly defined. There is no separation in tke
sense that the state is above the church and feels free to do
with her whatever pleases its fanoy. They are separate as external governing bodies, which is good because an attempt to
establish here by law would
••• only weaken her as against the seats,
place her in a false light, partially justify
their hostility to her, render effective their
declrunations against her, mix her up unnecessarily
with political changes, interests, and passions,
and distract the attention of her ministers from
their proper work as churchmen, and impose on
35
them the duties of politicians and statesmen.
Also at this point it is necessary to introduce his conception of the union of church and state. He says that although
the church and state are separate as external governing bodies,
they are "••• united in the interior principles from which each
derives its vitality and force. Their union is in the intrinsic
unity of principle, and in the fact that, though moving in dif-

!6

ferent spheres, each obeys one and the same divine law."

XVIII, 216.
35 XVIII, 216.
36 XVIII, 217.
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This means that the American Republia is grounded in the
real order in a oonarete recognition of rights which are above
it, superior to it, whioh represents a law whioh it oannot violate. These rights are based upon God's law. Sinoe it is the
purpose of the state to protect them. God's law is already embodied in the state itself. It is adopted in its constitution.
Thus the ohuroh and the state are united by the faot that both
recognize and obey one and the same law of God.
On this b&sis Brownson maintains that the atmosphere of
American republicanism is oonduoive to the spread af Oatholioity. In imitating as it does in its own feeble way the Trinity
itself, it conforms to the prototype of all sooiety. It is thus
based on the real order; it is not sectarian, copying its model
only in its unity or diversity. It is oatholio, universal. For
the simple reason that they are seats, protestant denominations
are out of joint with that whioh is universal. Aooording to
Browns on, they have "a. • .~half':"avowed. oonviation" tba. t they
must unite, t:ba t they cannot sustain themselves in suoh an
atmosphere. !rhus ''Whey hold conventions of delegates; they • • •
form 'unions.' 'allianoes,• and •associations;' but, unhappily
for their suooess, the oatholia ohuroh does not originate in
convention •••• confederated seats are something very different
37
from a ohuroh inherently one and oatholio."

37 XVIII, 215.
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Since Amerioan republicanism is thus catholic, universal,
the s&cts maintaining themselves in it are not on a basis of
equality with the Ghurch. She is naturally superior to them, and
a contest between them, especially in Ameriaa, is not a contest
between equals:
In the United States false religions are
legally as free as the true religion; but
all false religions being one-sided, sophistical, uncatholio, are opposed by the principles of the state, which tend, by their silent
but effective workings, to eliminate them

38

Before concluding the discussion it is necessary to restate
Brownson*s position. He has endeavored to show that American
republicanism represents a good solution to the problem of individual liberty in relation to public authority. Because it does
so it also solves the problem of the nor.mal relationship between
the church and state. In still other terms., he means that it is
because the state has recognized and preserved the rights of God
it has, and can have, no quarrel with the church.
In order to clarify his thought, it is necessary to approac
it from a slightly different viewpoint. It is necessary to repeat briefly his conception of individual rights as God's rights
and the natural law as God's command to res1)eot the natural
order. The natural order includes both the rights of the individual and the rights of society. Sooiety is necessary and
natural for man and man is naturally social; both hold rights

38 XVIII, 212.
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from God. The first aspect of this thought is that the individual has rights which he holds independently of

so~iety.

In the

event it recognizes individual rights above it, superior to it,
which it cannot violate, the state is obeying God's command to
preserve the natural order which includes such rights. It is in
reality, although not in form, obeying God's moral law. As long
as it continues to obey it the church can have no quarrel with
the state.
If, on the other hand, the state assumes jurisdiction over
the conscience of the individual, it thereby disobeys Godts
moral law. The church as the divinely appointed custodian of
that law must, in such an event, quarrel with the state. Ecclesiastical authorities must intervene, by turning politiGians,
by extracting concordats, or in some other way, in order to secure the rights which individuals hold from God.
Suoh intervention is for Brownson abnormal rather than normal. Normally the ohurch and the state are distinct. 0ne oannot
absorb the other. The church does not replaoe the state, render
it unnecessary, superfluous. Nor is the contrary true. Each has
a distinct funation. The ohurch and state must be distinct but
not separated. Separation means that the church has no place in
the state. It means the complete independence of the state absolutism.
Thus Brownson advocates neither a mixture nor a separation
of

church~and

state. The ideal is an intrinsio union of ohuroh

and state based upon a mutual recognition and respect of God's
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command to preserve the rights He has given to individuals,
along with their distinction as external governing bodies. Such
distinction is practicable no where else in the world because no
where else is there a state which obliges itself, in its own inherent constitution, to obey God's natural law. For that reason
the church is obliged elsewhere to become involved in political
affairs, because without such intervention her right to exert
her influence within the state would not be recognized. But this
is necessary only when the state is so barbarously constituted
that she must supervise its administration "••• in order to infuse some intelligence into civil matters, and to preserve her
39
own rightful freedom and independence."
Thus Brownson holds that the church and state in America
are intrinsically united. Whether the founding fathers were
aware of it or not, the constitution enacted is conducive to
the spread of Catholicism. lt does not restrict, conflict with,
or hamper in any way, the spiritual mission of the ohurch.
This brief summary, based upon Brownson•s oonoeption of
law as the command of God to preserve the natural order, has
bean oonfined to the obligation of the state to preserve the
natural order with respect to individuals. Since the natural

39 XVIII, 218. Brownson believes that the only reason there were
rights and duties in feudalism was because the churoh infused
intelligence into oivil matters. Such rights were due not to
the feudal constitution of sooiety, but to the ohuroh. XVIII,
218.

1~9

order includes society, the same command of God obliges the
individual to sustain society.
Applied specifically to America, this means that allegiance
is a moral obligation. Loyalty is a duty; duty discharged is a
virtue. The preservation of this society may be, and in Brownson's estimation is, for the best interests of all concerned.
Ye~

Brownson is never more violent in his denunciation of demo-

cratic tendencies than in his denunciation of the "stupid
journalists and pothouse politicians" who urge allegiance on the
ground that the American Republic is the best. They may prate,
on the fourth of July, of the philosophical genius of the founding fathers, of the burning decks of the Bon Homme Richard and
the dark and dreary days of Valley Forge, of democracy as the
finest form of government. This is not Brownson's vintage of
patriotism. What is best, what is desireable, is no reason for
allegiance. The obligation to sustain the republic is based
upon God's command to preserve the natural order. l!'ailure to
fulfill the obligation to sustain it is a failure to obey God's
10
law, whic~ commands the preservation of society.
Brownson asks of Catholics, not only tnat they remember
their obligations as citizens, but also that they study the
American constitution in the light of their own theology. Their
theology enables them to comprehend ·the difficult "unity in

40 XVIII, 16-17; 69.
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diversity- 11 whiah is the glory of' American republicanism.
On the basis of the oonoeption that

Amer~an

41

republicanism

embodies the elements necessary for the solution of the problem
of individual liberty in relation to public authority, it is
thereby in possession of the elements necessary to solve practically the problem of the relationship between the ohuroh and the
state. It is well qualified to solve that problem. The following
passage represents the essence of what Brownson has endeavored
to say:
The religious mission of the United States
is not then to establish the ohuroh by external
law, or to protect her by legal disabilities,
pains, and penalities against the seats, however
unoatholio they may be; but to maintain Oatholio
freedom, neither absorbing the state in the ohuroh
nor the ohuroh in the state, but leaving eaoh to
move freely, aooording to its own nature, in the
sphere assigned it in the eternal order of things.
The effects of this mission of our country
fully realized, would be to harmonize church and
state, religion and politics, not by absorbing
either in the other, or by obliterating the natural
distinction between them, but by conforming both
to the real or divine order, whioh is supreme and
immutable. It places the two powers in their
normal relation, whiah has hitherto never been
done, because hitherto there has never been a state
normally constituted ••••
Vlhether the Amerioan people will prove faithful to their mission, and realize their destiny,
or not, is known only to Him from whom nothing
is hidden. Providence is free and leaves always

41 "Oatholios are better fitted by their religion to comprehend the real oharaoter of the American constitution than
any other olass of Americans, the moment they study it in
the light of their own theology.n XVIII, 192.

a space for human free will. The American
people can fail, and will fail, if they
neglect the appointed means and conditions
of success.
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42 XVIII, 217-219. Brownson concludes this passage optimistically, saying there is nothing in the past history of the
country to indicate that it will fail. Some ten years later,
however, he indicates his disappointment in the interest of
Catholics in political affairs, saying that those who are
politicians apparently forget about such factors as honesty,
almost as much so as their Protestant brethern. He is disappointed also in their lack of interest in the constitution,
which they are well qualified to understand, saying that
they know as little about it as Protestants. Even then he is
a little optimistic that Oatholicrs will eventually raise the
moral standards of parties instead of lowering themselves to
party levels. These views appear in October, 1874, October,
1875. XVIII, 562-598. His last artiole concludes: "Let them
[Catholics] study to understand and perform the duties, as
well as to understand and claim the rights of American
citizens, and all may yet go well." XVIII, 598.

CHAPTER X
COUCLUSION
The exposition of Brownson's political philosophy begins
with a discussion of the rights of the individual. On the basis
of his doctrine of communion, Brownson shows that man may sustain his existence and attain to his end by communing with God
through religion, property and society. The individual does
not derive from society the right to practice his religion and
to sustain his existence by using the natural forces God has
created for that purpose.
While admitting the possibility of proving philosophically
the proposition that the individual has rights which the state
may not violate, Brownson shows also that without the Catholic
religion the individual has no practical guarantee that his
rights will be preserved. ·,n thout the Ohurch the power to determine whether or not a right has been violated must be lodged
in either the individual or the state. Neither alternative is
acceptable. The practical adoption of the principle that the
individual possesses complete judicial power involves anarchy;
if such power is attributed to the state there is no guarantee
against absolutism.
Continuing his exposition, Brownson endeavors to show that
right is consequent upon ownership and coextensive with it.
The maker of a thing is its owner. God has made all things with
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out using any previously existing material. Therefore His ownership is complete. Because it is complete, all things are owed
to Him alone. From this viewpoint Brownson maintains that God
is the sole and exclusive legislator, for He alone determines
the obligations of creatures and states the conditions upon
which He will receive payment of that which is due to Him.
God's laws are written in the universe He has created.
Since He has created the natural order, it is evident that God
wills its preservation. In terms of God as sole and exclusive
owner, this means that creatures pay their devt to God at least
partially by respecting the things He has given to them.
The state is included in the natural order whose preservation is commanded by God. Brownson begins his proof of this
proposition with a refutation of contrary theories. The most
important of these is the theory which endeavors to account for
the origin of society and its authority on a purely human basis.
It presents itself under two aspects: one of these, called the
social contract theory, attempts to account for the origin of
society in the people considered distributively; the other, the
democratic theory, attempts to account for the origin of authority in the people considered collectively.
Brownson rejects the contract theory because it falsely
assumes that man is a social animal only subsequently to his
free decision to become one. Therefore it postulates an unreal
state of nature. Society must be totally artificial, a production de B£!£• Furthermore the theory supposes that govern-
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ment is purely contractual; consequently any three individuals
may convene and contract to authorize a government. Moreover,
the contract could bind only the contracting parties. Under the
contract the individual must surrender either all or none of
his rights. A via media is impossible. This means either despotism or anarchy. Because of these and other absurdities involved in it, the theory must be rejected.
The democratic theory asserts that the people collectively
have the right to rule. Their sovereignty is inherent and underived. Stated simply, it is repugnant, for it leaves no freedom for the individual. Consequently a formal refutation of the
theory is unnecessary. Brownson therefore endeavors to show that
while the theory is not promulgated openly, absolutism is involved in the equalitarian frenzy of the age. Movements toward
political and therefore social equality assume that man's good
is in the temporal order. They can culminate logically only in
absolutism.
Having rejected the most important of the erroneous
theories of the origin of society and its authority, Brownson
begins the statement of his own views with a criticism of the
patriarchal theory of the state. He maintains that the state is
radically different from the family and is not developed from
it by a process of mere growth or evolution in time. Authority
in the family is vested in the father who is its natural head
whereas the authority of the state must be a public trust rather
than a personal right. The state must be a commonwealth or a
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!!! Eublica. It must be based upon a territory commonly held.
Since the state is essentially a commonwealth, its authority inheres in the people collectively. It is derived from
God through the law of nature, which is God's command to preserve natural order. In view of the fact that God's command,
which is never in contradiction with itself, is the source of
both the rights of the individual and the authority of the
state, a conflict between individual liberty and public authority is impossible. The practical solution of the problem requires a recognition of the authority of the Church.
Brownson views the state as an organism. Man is at once an
entity and a member of society. From this latter viewpoint he
may be considered as a part of society. Society, being necessary
for manta welfare, is a great good.
Brownson's conception of the state thus far is that of an
organic people attached to a definite territory. It includes
also the idea that common habits and traditions represent the
basic unifying factors of such a people. Brownson speaks of
these factors in terms of the unwritten or providential constitution of the state.
On"the basis of his unwritten constitution Brownson distinguishes sharply between the state itself and the ministers
authorized to exercise its authority. A people attached to a
territory and independent of every other people is by that fact
a nation de jure. It derives authority from God through the law
of nature. Its authority inheres in the organism; it possesses
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authority as long as its organic constitution remains intact.
Thus a nation may survive the destruction of a particular govern
ment.
While Brownson maintains that a nation de facto is a nation
de jure, he does not hold that every government able to maintain
itself is legitimate. A government is legitimate only if it is
authorized by the nation, which may dismiss its rulers or change
its form of government v1henever such action is for the public
welfare.
Brownson is not interested in ascertaining the merits of
one form of government as opposed to another. He maintains that
no one form is inherently superior to another. His primary concern is to retain any form that is in harmony with the habits
and traditions of a people.
Brownson applies these pr·inciples particularly to the
United States. He is obliged to show that the states were not
severally sovereign nations at the termination of the revolutionary war, for if they were, they would retain the right to
resume their original status as sovereign nations. He argues for
an original union on the ground that the colonies acted jointly
while still under the dominion of Britain; they made a joint
declaration of independence; it was through their joint action
that they wrested sovereignty from Britain. With the termination
of the war the successfully rebelled oolonies oontinued to act
jointly in order to suooeed in performing all of the funotions
consequent upon an independent nation. Thus the people who have
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wrested sove.reiB'.nty and who have maintained their politioal
independenoe of other nations are a people distributed into distinct states acting jointly.
The fundamental organ through which the nation expresses
its will is the convention. The people assembled in this way
have authorized a general government whose

p~er

is restricted

to matters pertaining to the general welfare. The powers of the
particular state government are restricted to particular interests.
This division of power, based upon distinct territorial
units within the nation itself, is distinctively American; it
is found nowhere else in the world. Its merit lies in the fact
that it provides for the exercise of power while guarding effect
ively against its excessive centralization. This arrangement
must be preserved, not only because of its intrinsic merits but
because it is in.harmony with the unwritten constitution of the
nation. Both states and states acting jointly are and have been
essential parts of the nation.
The constitutional republicanism of the United States
represents the best practical solution of the problem of individual liberty in relation to public authority. The nation has
pledged itself to preserve the rights which God has given to
individuals. Thus there has been a practical recognition of_the
supremacy of God's law. The state is consciously aware of the
fact that there is a domain upon whioh it is forbidden to
trespass.

In pledging itself to observe the rights of individuals the
state has embodied God's law in its constitution. This law represents an internal bond or union between the ohuroh and state
whioh is better for the ohuroh than any other oonoeivable
arrangement. The atmosphere of Amerioan republioanism is partioularly oonduoive to the spread of Oatholioity. Catholios are
obliged as oitizens to preserve the Ameriaan Republic. The
obligation is based upon God's oommand to preserve the natural
order. Their aotive and intelligent interest in political affair
is neoessary to sustain the republio. With their cooperation the
Amerioan Republio will solve not only the problem of individual
liberty in relation to publio authority, but also the problem
of perfeoting the harmonious relationship alreading existing
between the Ohuroh and state.
This brief statement of Brownson's position indicates
1

first of all that he is not a oonsistent Thomist. One of the
first indications of that faot is to be found in Brownson's
disoussion of law wherein he takes the position that it is
primarily an aot of the will, whereas st. Thomas indioates
olearly that law is an aot of reason.

2

Brownson, moreover, does

1 While we shall attempt to oompare and to oontrast briefly the
position of Brownson with that of st. Thomas, who is seleoted
as a prominent representative of the great Christian tradition, no attempt is made to explain or to present a detailed
exposition of Thomistic politioal philosophy.
2 s.Th., 1-2, q.90, a.l, a; and ad 8~nd a.4, a.
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not indicate clearly the metaphysical basis for his views as
does St. Thomas.

3

Brownson refuses to discuss the merits of one form of
government as opposed to another. He maintains that no one form
is inherently superior to another and that the question cannot
be discussed apart from a concrete situation. st. Thomas, on
the other hand, appears to adopt the view that a monarchy is the
4

best form of government.

Brownson, furthermore, states explicit

ly that a particular nation, the American Republic,

ha~

devised

the best practical solution of the problem of individual liberty in relation to public authority, whereas the analysis of st.
Thomas is never confined to a particular civil order.
Brownson's emphasis upon a clearly defined territory as a
basis for political authority is also a departure from the tradition. While st. Thomas discusses the importance of a suitable
locality he does not do so with a view to showing that it is
necessary for authority.

5

The same may be said of Brownson's

. -: ~.Also,
um
3 s.Th., 1, q.l6, a.4,ala.
as Gilson points out, the
intellect is for st.~homas superior to the will(E.Gilson,
The Philosoph~ of St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Louis, 1937, 295297} whereas Brownson has maintained that the will is superior to the intellect.
4 He does so unequivocally in De
Bk. 1, oh. 2. The
question is also discussed in-s. ., 1-2, q.95, a.4, a.,
wherein the merit of each form is discussed and the conclusion
seems to be that the ideal is a combination of the best
features of each. st.Thomas also says that a free and intelligent people may flourish Under a democracy. ~., q.97, a.l,

RTf••

a.

5 De Reg., Bl.2, chs, 1,2,3,4.

.,,l
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attempt to determine the fundamental factors which unify a
people. On this point he emphasizes particularly the oommon
habits and customs whiah develop with a people. These are for
the most part unwritten but nevertheless important as unifying
factors.
Brownson's doctrine of the ideal relationship between
ahurch and state is in some respeats a departure from traditional doatrine. Both Brownson and st. Thomas agree that the ahurah
6

is superior to the state. Brownson's doatrine of the union of
ahurch and state existing in the Ameriaan republic is a departure from the traditional conception of that relationship.
While Brownson's doctrine is alearly different from that
of st. Thomas in the instances cited, it is rather difficult to
determine whether or not other views of Brownson are traditional. Brownson states explicitly that political authority is
vested in the people considered as a community. The most that
aan be said safely is that this appears to be the doctrine of
St. Thomas.

7

Brownson's doctrine that a nation de facto is a nation de
jure is not so much a departure from the tradition as a prima
facie view would indicate. If he held the view that any government able to maintain itself is legitimate, his doctrine would
be absurd. One phase of it, that the nation derives authority

6 De Reg., Bk.l, ah. 14.
7 S.Th., 1-2, q.l05, a.1, a.; Ibid,, q.90, a.3, ad. a.~.

0
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from God through the natural law seems to be consistent with
tradition as represented by st. Thomas, who also accepts the
8

view that the authority of society is natural. The other phase
of the same doctrine includes the view that whenever a political community finds itself subject to no other political power,
regardless of the circumstances leading to such a situation,
the community is authorized under the natural law to institute
and maintain a government of its own. This part of the doctrine
is certainly not traditional. Distinct nations in the modern
sense of the term did not exist at the time af st. Thomas. Consequently it seems reasonable to conclude that st. Thomas does
not discuss explicitly questions concerning the conditions
under which a political community has the right to complete
political self-determination. Brownson furthermore makes a
sharp distinction between a nation with a spirit of its own and
the gov-ernment authorized by the nation, whereas I cannot find
this distinction in st. Thomas. It seems impossible to find any
similarity between Brownson and st. Thomas on this point.
Other doctrines presented by Brownson are traditional. He
takes the position that the individual has rights which the
state may not violate. st. Thomas also states clearly that in
matters pertaining to his bodily welfare, such as nourishment

8 De Reg., Bk. 1, ch. 1; S.Th., 2-2, q.l04, a.l, c.
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and generation, as well as in matters pertaining to the internal
movements of his will, the individual is subjeot only to God.

9

Brownson, in some respeots, also aooepts the dootrine of
St. Thomas on law. Both agree that the individual is bound in
oonsoienoe to obey legitimate enaotmenta, while those that are
unjust or oontravene in any way the law of God are null and void
10
from the beginning.
For Brownson as well as st. Thomas the purpose of authority
is to direot, not to ooeroe. The authority of the state must be
used to promote the publio welfare rather than the private inter
11
ests of the ruler. There is no indioation in either that authority is a neoessary evil.
There is also a substantial agreement on the dootrine that
man is naturally sooial. This, of oourse, is olearly the dootrinE
12
of st. Thomas. ·Further, both agree that while man is an entity
13
he may be oonsidered also as a part of sooiety. Brownson also
oonours in the view of st. Thomas that the state is speoifioally
14
different from the family.

9 s.Th., 2-2, q.l04, a.5, a.
10 s.Th., 1-2, q.96, a.4, o. The exposition· of st. Thomas in
regard to the oriteria for determingng whether or not a given
enaotment is to be obeyed, is muoh more satisfaotory than
that of Brownson.
11 De ~eg., Bk. 1, oh.l.
12 De Reg., Bk I, oh. 1.
13 s.Th., 1-2, q.90, a.3, ad. 3~; of. also 2-2, q.97, a.lO,
ad. 2~.
14 s.Th., 2-2, q.97, a.ll, o.

213

As indicated already, Brownson adopts the view of st. Thomas that man, being insufficient for himself, requires society to
supply the goods he cannot acquire without cooperation. st.
Thomas states further that men form groups for the purpose of
living well together. He continues that "••• a good life is a
virtuous life. Therefore a virtuous life is the end for which
men form groups."

15

This end is for both Brownson and st. Thomas

ordained to the supernatural end of the individual; society is
16
merely one of the means which enables man to attain to his end.
And finally, for both, the state is not directly concerned with
17
the supernatural end of man.
In

attempting to evaluate Brownson's work, his position is

examined first of all from the viewpoint of consistency. As is
evident, Brownson has shifted positions frequently. Prior to
the election of 1840 he was not so keenly aware of the harmful
tendencies of popular rule and consequently did not berate
democracy to the extent that he did thereafter. There was a

~eg.,
De~.,

15 De

Bk 1, ch. 14.
Bk. 1, ch. l;cf. also the following: "Therefore it
IS not the ultimate end of an assembled multitude to live
virtuously, but through virtuous living to attain to the
possession of God." Ibid., ch. 14. For Brownson sooiety creates a medium in which religion may exe•t her supernatural
energy and it also "••• contributes as a powerful means to
the fulfillment by man of the divine purpose in his existence." XVIII, 15.
17 De Reg., Bk. 1, ch. 14.
16
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radiaal ahange in his views around 1861 when he developed his
theory of an original union of states.
Brownson•s early view of the state was bas&d1largely upon
his interpretation of the Flatonia theory of ideas. While he
abandoned it later, after his aonversion in 1844 When he beaame
familiar with the writings of Catholia theologians, he retained
a tendenay to Platonize. Immediately after his aonversion
Brownson abandoned the doatrine of aommunion whiah had led him
to the Churah, but about ten years later he

~egan

again to

write in terms of this doatrine.
While he has maintained aonsistently the view that oatholiaity is neaessary to sustain any state, but partiaularly
those whose administration is largely popular, his view of the
union of ahurah and state is first stated in his Ameriaan
Republic. Although Brownson said that this work represents the
final and definitive statement of his views, this point is
developed in greater detail in his later essays, partiaularly
throughout volume thirteen of his Works. Although his first
essays on the origin and ground of government inalude an expliait statement of the dootrine that a olearly defined territory is an essential element of the state, it is in his Amari~

Republia that he first speaks of territorial demoaraay. It

is in the same work that he first maintains that the essential
oharaoteristio of barbarism is the oonoeption of power as a
personal privilege, whereas in the oivil order it is a public
trust.

2l5
The inconsistencies stated thus far indicate Brownson's
intellectual honesty and his merit, rather than his deficiency
as a thinker. He has no love for a theory because it is his own
intellectual child. He confesses his readiness to accept truth
wherever he finds it, regardless of consequences to personal
prestige or temporal well being. His own justification for
shifting positions is adequate: nnoubtless we have changed our
opinions on many subjects, for we do not happen to be of the
18
number whom experience cannot profit or events enlighten." "But
it is no crime to grow wiser with years and to profit by experience or the grace of God.n

19

Of particular importance in attempting to evaluate Brownson
is the fact that he has attempted to present systematically and
coherently his best thoughts on political philosophy in his
American Republic. In fact Brownson observes that this work
represents his best as well as his final and definitive views
on the subject. Taking him at his word, critics of Brownson's
20

political position seldom go beyond this work.

18 XVII, 583.
19 Essays and Reviews Chiefly on Theology, Politics and
Socialism, New York, 1852, IX.
20 Hate, for example, the followj_n·~-: "T~;:.kj_ng Henry B1·ownson' s

sununary of The p.meri can Republic as the basis of discussion
at this point •••• n Maynard, 343. In all probability Maynard
refers to Literary! Scientific and Political Views of Oreste~
A. Brownson, selected from his works by Henry F. Brownson,
!few York, 1893, 154-202. Also, "The present paper confines
itself to an analysis of The Amerjc ~.:m Republic since this
work alone is remembered and because Brownson himself prefaced the val ume with the stnteme nt that it vias the final and
definitive exposition of his views.n Cook and Leavelle, 77.
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Unfortunately Brownson is deficient as a critic of Brownson
His exposition in The American

R~~blic

is not his best. To sup-

port this evaluation it is necessary to recall that.Brownson was
primarily a reviewer and a controversialist. The fact that he
was a national figure, respected and sometimes revered, was due
to his ability as a reviewer. His method was to analyze an
issue and to strip it of embellishments; in the estimation of
Lowell, already cited, this

me~nt

to beat first this half, then

that, black and blue.
The rough, independent reviewer professes in The Americran
Republic to quarrel with no one. Consequently the Brownson who
is a nstional figure because of his activity in a restricted
sphere is

consp~auous

by his absenee in The American Republic.

There is nothing in Brownson's habits or termperament to qualify
him to write calmly and systematically as he professes to write
in The Americlan _Republic.
Furthermore, the reader is well aware of the fact that
Brownson's tnly systematic treatise is characterized by terminological inaccuracies. He does not indicate clearly and consistently the sharp distinctions between state, government,
written and unwritten constitutions, required by his system. It
is true that anyone familiar with Brownson's essays is capable
of judging his meaning within a giyen context, but the lack of
consistent terminology in his only systematic exposition is
inexcusable.
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His terminological

inac~uracy

is also evident in his exposi

tion of the "providential constitution." He became familiar with
it through De Maistre. In his first review he accepted the
theory whole heartedly. Later he became more critical. He used
the term

providen~a

to signify the act whereby God sustains the

existence of His creatures and directs them to their end. His
primary purpose seems to be, in his later views, to convey the
idea that the people as a nation depend upon God for their origin and continued existence to the same extent that individuals
depend upon Him. While his purpose is good it is somewhat confusing to present such a doctrine in terms of a "providential
constitution," particularly when he also uses the term to signify the customs and traditions which unify a people.
Because his systematic exposition is confusing in the important instances cited, the writer would treat

~he

American

Republic as nothing more than a summary of Brownson's views,
convenient for those already familiar with them, but very liable
to mislead those who approach it with the understanding that it
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represents Brownson at his best. 21 The adoption of this attitude
on the part of his enthusiasts would be a great step toward
securing a firm foundation for a revival of interest in Brownson.
From the viewpoint of internal consistency, it must be
conceded that Brownson's principles, at any particular period
of his life, are in no sense mutually contradictory. Illustrating that point, it must be recalled that Brownson endeavors to
present a solution of the problem of individual liberty in relation to public authority. In the first part of his solution,
Brownson maintains that God is the complete owner of all things
because He has created them. Consequently all things are owed
to Him alone. This means that the individual is not an absolute

21 Maynard, 340, for example, says that it is a pity the book
has been neglected "••• as usually happens to anything a
Catholic writes." Yet he maintains Brownson was "••• too
prone to arrange his facts to support an a priori argument."
344. He adds that Brownson spent a large part of his book
proving what no sensible man ever doubted. 345. This latter
statement is pure and simple rhetoric because comparatively
little of that work is devoted to a discussion of democracy.
Further, Maynard maintains that Brownson's various thesis
are disconnected logically; it is unfortunate that he
attempted to connect the latter part of the work with the
first. 349. Mow if 'he American Republic is judged guilty
on all of these important points common sense as well as
consistency would seem to demand a clear-cut recognition
of the fact that it is not the best of Brownson. The expression of a contrary opinion seems slightly absurd.
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owner. He owns the things God has given to him, and his rights to
them are real because of God's command. Thus the rights of the
individual are guaranteed by the divine command.
The same doctrine means that God as sole and complete owner
possesses the right to define what is owed. In terms of law this
means that God alone has the right to legislate or to impose obligations. He has imposed the obligation to preserve the natural
order, which includes society. Authority is natural to society
and therefore God's command to preserve the natural order is the
source of the state~.authority. Since human legislators have no
authority in their own name, they must exercise it as stewards
of Him from whom all authority is derived. Thus a society abusing power forfeits its right to legislate.
Since the Church is the divinely appointed custodian of
God's law, it has the right to determine whether or not the
rights of the individual or the state are violated. Thus the
rights of the individual a.nd the authority of the state are
guaranteed by the representative of God.
This position is, vdth some exceptions, tenable. So far as
it is possible to determine, there is nothing philosophically
2~

unsound in the doctrine that the maker has a right to his produo •
22 Of., e.g., the foll-owing: "As effects follow their cause, so
it is just and right that the results of labor should belong
to him who has labored." Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, 8.
Official translation in Joseph Husslein, The Christian Social
l1:i.anifesto, New York, 1933.

220

On this basis it is possible to bring out olearly and in a rathe
simple and striking way the view that the individual must render
to His oreator the tribute of his being. It is only beoause it
is God's will that a person is obliged to support the state and
to obey its legitimate enactments. Thus there is a clearly defined moral obligation of loyalty. Rulers, on the other hand,
are made aware of the fact that they have no personal authority.
They possess authority only as a trust and are consequently
obliged to use it to 9romote the publio welfare.
Inasmuch as Brownson's exposition is presented in familiar
and acceptable terms, understandable even to those who are not
trained philosophers, his approach is commendable. Inasmuch as
he has not entered the realm of metaphysics in presenting his
conception of law, his discussion is deficient. A Thomist would
hardly embrace the doctrine that will is the basis of law.
Brownson's position on the origin of authority from God
through the natural law is sound. His refutation of contrary
theories is particularly good. His criticism of the social contract theory is irrefutable. He proves his point in argurnehts
that are at once conclusive and easy to follow.
The other phase of his doctrine in regard to rights in
relation to law includes the view that the state must permit the
Church full freedom to exert her influence; in the case of a
conflict the state must yield to the superior authority. Nor is
this allJ Catholicity is necessary to sustain the state.
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In asserting that position boldly and in defending it ably,
particularly at a time when it was

customar~

to assert timidly

that allegiance to the pope did not conflict with loyalty to
America, Brownson has made a contribution that is difficult to
overestimate. His truculence, perhaps imprudent at the time,
certainly succeeded in conveying to many the idea that Catholics
are not required to apologize for their Catholicism.
Brownson's ability to detect and ·to expose error is not
confined to instances in which he examines a particular author.
The Brownson writing on democratic and socializing principles
has demonstrated his ability to perceive the dominant tendency
of his age. Believing that the tendency toward totalitarianism
requires refutation, he has channelized his energy, directing
it toward the root-evil: the implication that material wellbeing is an end in itself which cannot be attained without
oooperetion. This granted, the equalitarian frenzy of the age,
Brownson argues, finds its logical resting place only in the
abolition of individuals as such.
The fact that Brownson has waged war consistently against
the tendency to adopt popular opinion as a criterion of morality
on the ground that it is atheistic and therefore emphasizes the
material rather than the spiritual is to his credit. He believed
sincerely that such a tendency existed and that as a Catholic
reviewer he was obliged to expose the danger involved in its
acceptance. Aware of his responsibility, perhaps extremely so,

he oould not be induced to give up his oause for suoh trivialities as popularity and wealth. For this he must be admired.
Brownson's analysis and exposition of demooratio theories and
23
tendencies represents him at his best.
Brownson's rejection of theories attempting to aooount for
authority on a purely human basis leaves the reader in a position that requires him either to aooept the view that authority
oomes from God or to deny that the state has the right to
govern. Brownson suooeeds in -proving that it ls illogical to
accept the legitimacy of oivil government while denying its
divine origin.
Brownson's doqtrilJ.e on:authority, as we have seen, ineludes the view that it must be based upon territory. Brownson
is undoubtedly oorreot in insisting upon the faot that the
modern civilized state is inconceivable without a fixed territory and that attachment to territory is in itself a civilizing
factor. The same doctrine also reiterates the view, whioh is
well worth emphasizing, that authority exists and must be
exercised for the public welfare. Whether territory is essential to authority and is the factor that

disting~ishes

oivili-

23 Maynard's opinion is exactly the opposite. He observes that
Brownson in his incessant girding against demooraoy was
wasting his energy: "Onoe again he triumphantly disproves
what no sensible man ever doubted." 345. If Brownson warred
with an imaginary enemy throughout his life, one wonders
why Maynard thought him worthy of so muoh attention.
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zation from barbarism is a debatable question.
There is in Brownson a clear recognition of the fact that
a people develops distinctive habits and traditions as a nation
and that these are important unifying factors. Written constitutions and governments must be adapted to the nation. Governments cannot be introduced from without regardless of the customs of people to be governed. Americans, for example, would
not be prepared to accept a monaroh; but it is equally obvious
that a republican form of government would not work as well
everywhere else as it has here.
Brownson's dootrines from this point are developed with
partioular reference to American republicanism. The first of
these is the view that any organized people in possession of a
territory who find themselves subject to no other political
power are by that fact authorized to institute and maintain
oivil government. If the nation maintains itself and its government fulfills its funot_ions, it is by that fact legitimate. It
retains ita right to govern as long as it retains its unity as
a nation. A government imposed from without through oonquest is
illegitimate; the nation has a right to resist such a government and to attempt to resume its own original status. A part
of a nation oannot wage war merely to seoure oomplete politioal
self-determination; war is justified only in the event of outrageous tyranny.
This dootrine may be described best as an honest attempt
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to justify the power of the American Republic. Brownson is correct in denying that a nation must come into existence rightfully in order to be legitimate, for as he points out, it would
be impossible to justify the power of any civilized nation on
this basis. Although he was extremely patriotic, he did not endeavor to prove that England had forfeited her right to govern
because of an abuse of power so serious that it justified a
declaration of war; and here Brownson is to be commended both
for his honesty and consistency in applying his principles. on
the basis of Brownson's doctrine it is unquestionable that
England had the right to rule her colonies. It was wrong to
resist her enactments as long as there was no serious abuse of
power. Furthermore Brownson could not accept, as a principle
universally applicable, the right to revolt merely to secure
complete political power. It is clear, therefore, that Brownson's doatrine that any organized people subject to no political power other than their own have the right to institute and
maintain government is the only basis on which he could justify
the authority of the United States. Brownson's justification
for the authority of the United States is probably as sound as
any other.
There is nothing objectionable in his view that a nation
has a right to resist a government imposed through conquest as
long as it retains its unity as a nation. The same may be said
of his view that it is impossible to accept in principle the
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doatrine that a part of a nation has a right to rebel merely
to secure complete political power.
Brownson's exposition of the distinctive characteristic
of American republicanism in terms of a division of power based
upon distinct territorial units is clear and conVincing. There
is a commendable insistence upon the doctrine that Ameriaa is
a constitutional republic rather than a democracy reflecting
popular whims. At least it is unquestionable that states were
never intended to be mere administrative units of a supreme
national government, and that America was not intended to be a
"democracy" as Brownson understood the term.
It is impossible to quarrel with Brownson's view that a
legislator must do more than express the will of the majority
of his constituents. It can be morally wrong for those in
authority to bow to the will of the majority. Brownson, however
overstates his case when he says that popular opinion is
usually a compound of ignorance, passion, prejudice and caprice
ever varying, condemning a Socrates one day to drink hemlock
and erecting a temple to his memory the next.
The culmination of Brownson s thought is his doctrine of
1

the union of Church and state in America. There is certainly
no indication in Brownson that the state is separate from and
superior to the Church. There is an explicit statement that the
American solution to the problem of the relationship between
Church and state, while the best for Ameriaa, is impracticable
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anywhere else in the world,
It is almost impossible to disagree with the thesis that
there can be no conflict between the Church and state as long
as the nation adheres to its pledge to protect the rights of
individuals and not only permits but protects the right of the
Church to exert her influence. An arrangement which would allow
churchmen to devote all of their energy to spiritual matters
is distinctly advantageous to the Church. While Brownson confesses that the relationship between Church and state in America is not as yet ideal, he maintains, and rightly so, that
American republicanism furnishes a basis for a more perfect
solution of the problem.
The argumentation whereby he supports his conclusion is
sound. The Church as the custodian of the divine law is obliged
to oppose any political power which violates that law. Consequently an harmonious relo. tionshi:p is possible vthenever and
wherever t:te

~t:~.:te

observes tl-:'.c natural moral law. America has

succeeded in preserving fo1· the individual the largest liberty
he has ever known; it seldom trespasses upon the rights God
has given to him. Therefore there is seldom a conflict between
Church and state in America. Thus the elements whereby the
rights of the individual are preserved, in this case territorial democracy or constitutional republicanism based upon a
division of power in terms of distinct territorial units, must
be preserved in order to secure a harmonious relationship
between the Church and the state.
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Brownson's final thesis is not without interest. He maintains that the active and intelligent interest of Catholics in
political problems is essential to the preservation of the
republic. With CDtholic support, the American Republic may
succeed in perfecting the harmonious relationship already
existing between the Church and state in America and thereby
present the pest practical solution of the greatest problem of
the age. It is regrettable that Brownson has not succeeded in
arousing more interest in this thesis.
The conclusion of the exposition of Brownson's political
philosophy is simple. As a philosopher, attempting to present
an organized and systematic treatise on political philosophy,
Brownson is deficient. As a revi·ewer and controversialist, he
writes with power and precision. It is in his discussion of
particular problems that the reader of Brownson observes a
logical mind in action. The Brownson writing on the social contract theory, or the tendency toward totalitarianism, or
Catholicity as essential to the maintenance of the American
Republic, is an eminently worthwhile Brownson. These essays
and those in which Brownson presents his views on American
republicanism and the union of Church and state in America are
an enduring monument to his genius. Only therein can the
student grasp an appreciation of the force and value of Orestes
Brownson.
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